口头答复 · 2023-05-08 · 第 14 届国会

未收到短信OTP的银行交易纠纷

Reports of Unauthorised Bank Transaction taking Place despite Absence of Alerts on Customer's Telephone Records

AI 经济与产业 争议度 3 · 实质辩论

质询涉及客户未收到短信OTP却发生未授权银行交易的争议,政府回应此类情况极为罕见,警方无相关报告,金融纠纷调解中心仅接获少数争议案例。政府强调客户应及时联系银行及警方,银行需公平处理纠纷并可提供善意赔偿,客户可诉诸调解或法律途径。质询方关注银行与电信记录冲突时的复核机制及防范未来诈骗的准备。

关键要点

  • 未授权交易极罕见
  • 银行需公平处理纠纷
  • 客户可诉诸调解和法律
政府立场

强调银行责任与客户保护

质询立场

关注复核机制与防诈骗准备

政策信号

加强金融诈骗防范与纠纷机制

"MAS expects banks to treat customers fairly in all cases of disputes over unauthorised transactions."

参与人员(4)

完整译文(中文)

Hansard 英文原文译文 · 翻译日期:2026-05-02

24 陈武明医生问总理:(a) 是否有向金融纠纷解决中心提出的索赔案件涉及据称发生的未经授权的银行交易,而银行评估认为使用了一次性密码(OTP)短信,但客户的电话运营商记录未显示该短信OTP的发送或接收;(b) 这些客户是否有其他途径寻求赔偿。

贸易与工业国务部长(陈振声先生)(代表总理) :先生,陈医生描述的情况相当罕见:发生未经授权的银行交易,银行评估认为使用了一次性密码(OTP)短信,但客户的电话运营商记录未显示该短信OTP的发送或接收。新加坡警察部队自2021年以来未收到任何此类报告。金融行业纠纷解决中心(FIDReC)自2022年7月以来知晓两起客户对短信OTP的使用或接收存在争议的案件。

当客户怀疑自己被骗或银行提醒其账户发生未经授权的交易时,应立即联系银行或启动银行提供的冻结账户的“杀死开关”。他们还应向警方报告此类欺诈活动。

金融管理局(MAS)期望银行在所有未经授权交易争议中公平对待客户。银行必须考虑,一是是否履行了其义务,二是客户是否尽了保护账户的责任。根据银行调查结果,银行可能会向客户提供善意赔偿。

任何客户如愿意,可向FIDReC提交争议以进行调解和裁决。如果对FIDReC的结果不满意,可考虑寻求法律建议,决定是否向法院提起诉讼。

副议长 :陈武明医生。

陈武明医生(裕廊) :感谢部长的答复。我有两个追加问题。

首先,针对银行根据自身记录评估短信OTP已用于验证交易的争议处理流程是怎样的?尤其当银行认为短信OTP本质上意味着交易合法,但客户能提供来自电信公司的证据或证词,可能表明不同的评估结果时,是否有除FIDReC之外的复核程序?还是银行对此问题拥有最终决定权?

其次,副议长,我也想问国务部长,政府除了应对当前的反诈骗战役外,还做了哪些准备迎接下一场诈骗战?

一年前,即2022年2月,我在议会提出关于新兴深度伪造音频和视频通话风险的问题。此后,美国出现了潜在的深度伪造音频电话案例。我想请问部长,拟议中的损失公平分担框架是否会考虑此类新兴风险?是否也会考虑我之前提出的区分客户因深度伪造等被迫犯错与非被迫犯错的建议?

陈振声 :先生,感谢议员提出的两个追加问题。

让我先回答第二个问题,关于诈骗手法快速演变及新技术的使用。我们知道,诈骗者采用的技术不断进化,且借助差异化技术日益复杂,这也要求我们通过多管齐下的方式加强整个生态系统的机制和抵御诈骗的韧性。新加坡金融管理局(MAS)将继续与生态系统合作伙伴紧密合作,包括银行业和其他政府机构。例如,MAS正与银行合作,允许客户验证来自银行的真实来电。银行也在探索扩大生物识别技术的使用,结合活体检测,作为除密码和OTP之外的认证手段。

公众也能发挥作用。请安装Scamshield应用;不要向任何人透露您的网上银行凭证或密码;对收到的未经请求的信息或电话保持警惕,并通过官方网页或银行卡上的热线电话直接致电银行核实来电。

关于第一个问题,我会请议员参考我对议会质询的主答复。

至于损失公平分担的问题,林伟杰医生已就此提交了本届会议的质询,我们将在回应该质询时处理此事。

副议长 :嘉敏先生,因我们很快将结束质询时间,请您简短提问或澄清。

严彦松先生(亚历山大) :一个简短的追加问题。MAS何时会要求银行采用比短信OTP更安全的方法,例如基于应用程序的OTP?

陈振声 :简短回答是,MAS正与银行合作,采用包括短信OTP在内的多种认证措施,并随着技术发展,在不同用户中进行试验。

下午12时29分

副议长 :秩序。质询时间结束。国务部长孙雪玲的澄清。

[根据议事规则第22(3)条,只要议员未要求将其名下的问题推迟至以后会议日或撤回,未在质询时间结束前提出的问题的书面答复将载于附录。]

英文原文

SPRS Hansard 原始记录 · 抓取日期:2026-05-02

24 Dr Tan Wu Meng asked the Prime Minister (a) whether there are claims filed with the Financial Dispute Resolution Centre which involve an unauthorised bank transaction reportedly taking place and the bank has assessed that the One-Time Password (OTP) SMS messaging was used, but the customer's telephone operator records do not show transmission or receipt of such SMS OTP; and (b) whether there are other avenues available for these customers to seek redress.

The Minister of State for Trade and Industry (Mr Alvin Tan) (for the Prime Minister) : Sir, the scenario Dr Tan described is quite rare: where an unauthorised bank transaction took place and where the bank assessed that the One-Time Password (OTP) SMS messaging was used, but that the customer's telephone operator records did not show transmission to or receipt by the customer of such an SMS OTP. The Singapore Police Force has not received any such report since 2021. The Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC) is aware of two cases since July 2022 where the use or receipt of SMS OTP by the customer is disputed.

When customers suspect that they have fallen for a scam or are alerted by the bank to unauthorised transactions involving their account, they should immediately contact the bank or activate the kill switch that the banks provide to freeze their accounts. They should also report such fraudulent activities to the Police.

MAS expects banks to treat customers fairly in all cases of disputes over unauthorised transactions. The banks must consider, one, whether they have fulfilled their obligations, and two, whether customers have done their part to protect their accounts. Depending on the outcome of the banks’ investigations, they may offer goodwill payment to customers.

Any customer may, if they wish, lodge the dispute with FIDReC for mediation and adjudication. If they are not satisfied with the FIDReC outcome, they can consider seeking legal advice on whether to pursue their case in Court.

Mr Deputy Speaker : Dr Tan Wu Meng.

Dr Tan Wu Meng (Jurong) : I thank the Minister for his answer. I have got two supplementary questions.

Firstly, what is the process for handling disputes where the bank has assessed, based on their own records, that SMS OTP was used to validate the transaction, especially if the bank says SMS OTP by definition means it was legitimate, yet the customer is able to provide evidence, testimony from the telco that may suggest a different assessment of what happened? Is there a process for having this review besides FIDReC or does the bank have the final say on this question?

Secondly, Mr Deputy Speaker, can I also ask the Minister of State what is being done to prepare not just for the last war on scams but the next one?

A year ago, in February 2022, I asked in Parliament about the risk of emerging deepfake audio and video calls. Since then, there have been potential cases in the United States of deepfake audio voice calls. Can I ask the Minister whether the proposed equitable framework for sharing of losses will look at such emerging risks and will it also consider my previous suggestion on the difference between a customer making a forced error – for example, with a deepfake – versus an unforced error?

Mr Alvin Tan : Sir, I thank the Member for his two supplementary questions.

Let me take the second one with regard to the rapidly evolving nature of scams and the use of new technologies. We know that the techniques employed by scammers are constantly evolving and also gaining in sophistication with the use of differentiated technologies and this also thus requires a multi-pronged response across our ecosystem to strengthen our collective mechanisms and resilience against scams. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will continue to work closely with our ecosystem partners, including the banking industry and other Government agencies. For example, MAS is working with banks to allow customers to verify genuine calls from banks. Banks are also exploring expanding the use of biometric technology with liveness test in addition to passwords and OTP as a means of authentication.

Members of the public can also play their part. Please install Scamshield; do not divulge your Internet banking credentials or passwords to anyone; be suspicious of unsolicited messages or calls that you receive and also verify calls received by calling the bank directly on the hotline listed on the official websites or cards.

For the first question, I will refer the Member to my main reply to the Parliamentary Question (PQ).

But for the questions with regard to the equitable sharing of losses, Dr Lim Wee Kiat has filed a PQ on that matter for this Sitting and we will address this issue in response to that PQ.

Mr Deputy Speaker : Mr Gerald Giam, a very short clarification or supplementary question because we are going to be running out of Question Time very soon.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied) : Just a very quick supplementary question. When is MAS going to require the banks to use more secure methods besides SMS OTP, for example, using the app-based OTPs?

Mr Alvin Tan : The short answer is that MAS is working with the banks on a variety of authentication measures, including SMS OTP, and they are experimenting with different users as the technology evolves.

12.29 pm

Mr Deputy Speaker : Order. End of Question Time. Clarification by the Minister of State Sun Xueling.

[Pursuant to Standing Order No 22(3), provided that Members had not asked for questions standing in their names to be postponed to a later Sitting day or withdrawn, written answers to questions not reached by the end of Question Time are reproduced in the Appendix. ]