预算辩论 · 2022-03-02 · 第 14 届国会
国防预算与安全挑战
Committee of Supply – Head J (Ministry of Defence)
议员质询国防预算，强调俄乌战争暴露小国自卫重要性及信息战威胁。辩论聚焦地缘政治紧张、技术竞争及网络信息战的安全影响。政府回应强调加强自卫能力与技术防御，核心争议在于如何平衡预算与应对新兴安全威胁。
关键要点
- • 小国自卫重要性
- • 信息战与假旗行动
- • 美中技术竞争加剧
加强国防与技术防御能力
预算应更审慎分配
强化国防科技与信息安全
"We cannot assume other countries will come to our assistance when we are at war."
参与人员（11）
完整译文（中文）
Hansard 英文原文译文 · 翻译日期：2026-05-02
主席：国防部J项负责人。Vikram Nair先生。
安全趋势与新加坡武装部队的优先事项
Vikram Nair先生（实巴旺选区）：主席，我提议“将预算中J项的总拨款减少100元”。
我们生活在一个危险的世界。过去一周，我们目睹了俄罗斯入侵乌克兰，这是自二战以来欧洲大陆最大的战争。这场冲突的迹象已经酝酿了很长时间。俄罗斯军队在乌克兰边境的集结持续了数月，北约多个国家，包括美国，都预料到冲突将会爆发。
然而，当战斗真正开始时，尽管国际社会广泛谴责，乌克兰不得不独自面对武装更为强大的邻国。这对所有国家，尤其是像我们这样的小国，是一个重要的提醒：我们不能假设其他国家在我们开战时会来援助我们，我们必须尽全力自我防卫。
俄乌冲突揭示了一些令人担忧的胁迫手段，包括“假旗”行动——本质上是虚假信息宣传——以制造开战的借口。
这并非唯一的热点。过去一年，我们见证了国际安全环境的其他重大变化。美中竞争持续加剧，我们看到这在两国贸易和技术领域的法规中日益显现。我们也看到针对台湾的言辞和行动更为强硬，这似乎越来越可能成为两大国之间爆发冲突的催化剂，无论是有意还是无意。
近年来，评论员还指出，国际秩序的走向将由亚太地区的发展决定。因此，全球重心明显向这里转移，区域外国家也越来越关注这里。这包括欧盟国家如英国、法国和德国。有一种观点认为，这是好事，因为国家在该地区投入越多，就越可能在该地区权力平衡中发挥作用。
然而，随着对亚太地区关注的增加，我们也见证了新的安全安排的出现，例如澳大利亚、英国和美国之间的三边安全协定。其负面影响是，有人担心此类发展可能在该地区产生分裂效应，甚至可能引发军备竞赛。
另一个趋势是地缘战略问题与技术的日益交织。
技术是美中战略竞争的主要争夺领域。技术也被国家和非国家行为者用来采取非常规方式胁迫对手，包括通过网络攻击和信息战。
虽然新加坡远离俄乌冲突，但我看到一些信息在聊天群中传播，似乎旨在影响新加坡公众舆论，我怀疑这些信息可能是外国势力的信息战行动的一部分。
尽管疫情推动我们积极利用数字平台，但这也使我们的社会更易受到数字威胁。
国防部长能否评论国防部关注的安全环境趋势？国防部长能否更新这些及其他地缘政治安全发展如何影响国防部和新加坡武装部队的计划和优先事项？国防部和武装部队将如何应对外部环境的挑战？又将如何与志同道合的伙伴合作应对这些威胁？
（程序文本）提案提出。（程序文本）
主席：Alex Yam先生不在。Vikram Nair先生，请继续您的下一个削减。
下午6时45分
全球抗击新冠肺炎
Vikram Nair先生：主席，作为一个小国，新加坡的安全依赖于更广泛地区的稳定。由于新加坡经济的开放和互联互通，其他地方的重大动荡会对我们这里的生活产生切实影响。
持续的抗击新冠肺炎就是一个明显例子。即使新加坡看似较好地控制了病毒，我们也看到其他国家在挣扎。我们对贸易和旅行的依赖也意味着病毒最终会回到新加坡。
新加坡武装部队在邻国危机时发挥了重要作用，包括在邻国遭遇自然灾害时协助救援。
多年来，国防部长曾向议会通报国防部和武装部队与国际伙伴合作维护地区和平与安全的努力。
因此，我有一个问题想问国防部和武装部队，即是否采取了任何措施协助邻国抗击新冠肺炎？如果有，具体如何实施？
新冠肺炎与能力发展计划
黄伟中先生（裕廊选区）：尽管面临百年疫情，新加坡武装部队表现出色。即使在“断路器”最严峻时期，关键行动也未曾中断。武装部队现已为几乎100%的士兵、水手和空军人员接种疫苗。
然而，去年国防部长黄永宏博士提到，由于疫情，武装部队一些重大项目和计划出现延误。这无疑影响了武装部队的中长期能力发展计划。
新冠肺炎扰乱了全球供应链。它是否也会影响武装部队采购下一代平台和技术的供应链？
同样，我也想了解疫情如何影响武装部队在海外开发和测试新训练理论的能力。我知道有些军事演习在土地稀缺的新加坡无法进行。我担心过去几年疫情导致的旅行限制可能使武装部队难以获得宝贵的海外训练机会。
国防部长能否说明新冠肺炎疫情如何影响武装部队的中长期能力发展计划？
疫情期间的训练
黄俊贤先生（蔡厝港选区）：主席，疫情造成巨大干扰。我们的武装部队训练可能是受影响最严重的领域之一，因为陆军训练中只有有限部分可以远程或线上进行。疫情初期，基础军事训练和国民服役召集一度暂停。部分海外训练和演习也因旅行限制受影响。
去年国防部提到，在实施严格检测和安全管理措施后，一些海外训练和大规模演习已恢复。我很高兴尽管有些干扰，武装部队训练没有停滞，各方找到办法继续进行部分演习。国家面临的外部威胁在疫情期间并未减少，因此我们的防务准备和训练也不应停滞。欧洲当前局势提醒我们，安全威胁不会因疫情而消失。
随着新加坡逐步恢复大部分活动，我们现在处于比疫情初期更有利的位置，因为大量人口已接种疫苗。此外，民众也更熟悉如何在病毒持续存在的情况下安全互动。
因此，国防部能否分享武装部队国内外训练的最新情况？哪些训练已恢复到疫情前水平？
疫情期间的国民服役训练
朱德明先生（淡滨尼选区）：主席，随着新加坡过渡到与新冠共存，武装部队也逐步恢复国民服役人员训练。我注意到这伴随着安全管理措施、检测和分组安排，以保障国民服役人员安全。国防部未来一年召回国民服役人员的计划如何？
许多国民服役人员未能参与大型海外演习。即使武装部队在2021年成功完成“袋鼠演习”，但规模有限，因担忧病毒传播。
各国正过渡到与新冠共存。随着全球边境逐步开放，海外演习必须逐步恢复到疫情前水平。国防部能否分享2022年恢复大型海外演习的计划？
主席：Vikram Nair先生。如果您愿意将两个削减合并发言，请告知。
武装部队的作战准备
Vikram Nair先生：主席，谢谢。即使我们抗击新冠肺炎，外部威胁依然存在。疫情及其影响带来了新的脆弱点，潜在对手可能利用这些漏洞针对新加坡。
去年总参谋长辩论时，国防部长黄永宏博士谈到疫情对武装部队训练活动的干扰。他强调，借助严格的安全管理措施和强有力的检测，驻营训练和演习稳步恢复。我之前提到的国际形势发展使武装部队必须保持作战准备，确保即使在疫情环境下也能随时行动。
现在疫情已过去一年，恳请部长更新疫情如何影响武装部队的作战准备，以及是否仍能在必要时迅速投入行动。
武装部队的新冠安全措施
训练是国家防务的重要且必要部分。正如我之前提到的，即使在困难时期，训练也必须继续。这是我之前削减的另一面。
鉴于武装部队训练和行动可能需要人员密切接触——无论是在营区、舰船、军用车辆还是演习中——显然存在新冠病毒传播风险。我也预计武装部队需要制定方案应对部分作战单位感染新冠的情况。
因此，恳请更新目前采取了哪些安全措施保护官兵，减少因新冠导致严重疾病传播的风险。其次，国防部采取了哪些措施管理新冠风险并确保持续作战？
主席：Dennis Tan先生。
武装部队训练与战备
Dennis Tan Lip Fong先生（后港选区）：谢谢主席。过去两年，新冠肺炎几乎影响了我们生活的所有方面，包括工作场所、企业、公共机构、学校、活动等。武装部队和军事训练也未能幸免。武装部队克服了疫情对训练计划、训练方法、海外演习旅行限制以及士气可能造成的挑战，包括限制凝聚力活动等，同时确保战备和训练质量不受影响。
俄罗斯入侵乌克兰提醒我们，新加坡必须拥有强大的防卫力量，作为有效的威慑，防止外来侵略和野心。无论面临何种挑战，如新冠肺炎，防卫力量的质量和可信度必须始终保持。
去年总参谋长辩论时，国防部长黄永宏向议会介绍，尽管面临疫情挑战，关键设施保护、海上安全、防空和反恐工作仍全天候进行。部长还提到疫情影响了一些训练项目、演习和部署。虽然部分大型演习借助安全管理措施恢复，但其他演习或训练达到疫情前水平可能需要更多时间。
希望部长再次向议会介绍武装部队在疫情第二年如何维持训练和高水平战备，以及克服了哪些挑战。
去年总参谋长辩论时，国防部长还通报了许多武装部队人员参与社区新冠相关行动，如口罩包装、稳定宿舍疫情、协助设立社区护理设施、支持接触者追踪和医疗物流。
我理解并支持武装部队人员在这些领域的贡献，但这也意味着他们暂停了训练和常规部署。随着我们迈向后疫情时代——包括更多国家开放边境——我想问部长，武装部队有何计划恢复训练和演习至疫情前水平？是否会加强训练，弥补因疫情而缺席训练或作战岗位的时间？
主席：He Ting Ru女士不在。Henry Kwek先生。
下一代武装部队转型
郭显泉先生（芽笼巴鲁选区）：主席，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰及随之而来的新世界秩序正在我们眼前展开。我们可以从新现实中汲取许多教训。
强大的武装部队对于威慑潜在侵略者、保护新加坡和平稳定至关重要。
我们不能指望别人为我们流血。
因此，我们必须努力建设下一代武装部队，领先于快速变化的防务和战争形态。比如，随着技术的快速发展，国家间冲突可能不再以传统的物理或动能方式表现。冲突可能通过灰色地带战术，在战争门槛以下展开，或通过网络和数字领域发动攻击——这是大多数人在新冠疫情爆发后生活和工作的主要领域。即使冲突领域和方式不断扩展，恐怖主义等现有威胁依然突出。
我也认识到武装部队必须确保其平台和能力对常规军事威胁构成可信威慑。
事实上，军事能力的任何薄弱环节都是潜在漏洞，可能被利用。武装部队必须随时准备应对日益多样的挑战，保卫新加坡。
作为一个总生育率下降的小国，我们可以预期未来国民服役兵力规模也将相应减少。与此同时，第四次工业革命带来的新技术，如人工智能（AI）、数字分析和物联网，为武装部队提供了利用技术作为兵力倍增器的机会，以克服人力限制。
我欢迎国防部和武装部队2019年首次宣布的下一代武装部队建设努力。武装部队利用技术更好应对安全威胁，既及时又必要。
国防部长能否向议会通报下一代武装部队转型工作的进展？
无人技术
朱德明先生：主席，我们的低生育率是新加坡防务战略的重大挑战。全职国民服役兵人数预计将减少。国防部和武装部队需要以更少的人力做更多的事。
同时，新技术使我们能够更好地优化人力资源，更高效地完成任务，且用人更少。我相信国防部和武装部队在这方面已有进展。例如，去年总参谋长辩论时，国防部长提到新加坡陆军总部感知与打击部（HQ SS）的成立，整合了多种技术能力，使陆军能够“看得更清楚，打得更快”，且用人更少。
部长还谈到新技术如何使武装部队重新设计更多岗位。武装部队因此能从更大的人才库中选拔人员，担任以往因旧医疗分类系统不合格而无法担任的岗位，包括部署保护关键设施，现在还配备了无人值守的瞭望塔。
武装部队一直与防务技术界紧密合作，利用技术进步更好支持防务战略需求。无人机等技术的使用能显著弥补人员短缺。国防部能否更新其发展和强化无人技术的计划，以确保尽管人口下降，我们的防务战略依然稳健？国防部如何将无人技术纳入作战概念？又如何将人工智能融入防务计划？
主席：Gan Thiam Poh先生不在。黄伟中先生。
晚上7时
新兴威胁
黄伟中先生：乌克兰持续的敌对局势令人难以忽视。乌克兰政府所面临的网络攻击浪潮，揭示了21世纪战争的本质。战斗不仅在海洋、空中和陆地上进行，也在网络空间展开。乌克兰并非孤军奋战，近期事件强调这些攻击可能由非国家行为体发起。全球多个地区的关键基础设施遭受重大勒索软件攻击，造成严重的现实世界干扰。
事实上，新加坡也经历过类似的网络攻击。未来几年，潜在的网络攻击频率、规模和复杂性可能持续增加。如果这些攻击成功针对我们的军事基础设施和系统，后果将不堪设想。鉴于此，国防部长能否谈谈数字领域威胁的发展趋势，以及国防部和武装部队如何更好地应对这些不断演变的威胁？
网络威胁
郑德源先生（先锋选区）：当前数字时代，网络安全威胁格局不断演变。这些威胁包括勒索软件、拒绝服务攻击和高级持续性威胁，正从价值链上游影响运营技术，威胁关键基础设施。
因此，网络安全威胁的影响无处不在，可能对政府运作、全球供应链、医疗系统以及我们的军事系统等产生不利影响。
在国防和国家安全方面，我们看到涉及恶意网络行动的灰色地带行动日益增多。去年预算委员会上，国防部长提到已成立网络安全特别工作组，作为武装部队监控并积极寻找网络领域潜在威胁和侵略者的计划一部分。我认为这是加强新加坡数字领域防御的正确方向。
鉴于此，我想请国防部长更新武装部队加强军事网络安全以应对新兴网络威胁的持续努力。
与美中国防关系
洪伟能先生（西海岸选区）：主席先生，中国崛起及中美地缘政治局势演变对全球，尤其是新加坡产生重大影响。50年前，尼克松总统访华时，美国是超级大国，中国被视为“亚洲病夫”。1972年中国经济规模仅为美国的8.9%。但到2020年，中国经济已达美国的70.3%，预计2030年将超越美国。两国竞争激烈，涵盖技术、创新和国防建设。为遏制中国影响，成立了四方安全对话（Quad）和澳英美安全伙伴关系（AUKUS）。许多东盟国家，包括新加坡，被要求选边站队。我们正被卷入这股地缘政治变革浪潮。
我想请国防部长谈谈四方安全对话和澳英美安全伙伴关系对我们与美中关系的影响，以及对1971年启动、涵盖澳大利亚、新西兰、英国、马来西亚和新加坡的五国防务安排（FPDA）的影响。新加坡是否会继续欢迎美国核潜艇驻扎我们的海军基地，并最终接纳澳大利亚的核潜艇，尽管新西兰明确表示反对？
鉴于新冠疫情，尤其是最新的奥密克戎变异株浪潮，这如何影响国防部与美中两国同行的互动，包括与两国分别举行的联合军演？持续的乌克兰战争是否影响了我们与美中两国的防务关系？
防务外交
苏柏安先生（碧山-大巴窑选区）：主席先生，作为一个小国，新加坡的防务不仅依赖我们自身的意志和能力，也依赖我们与其他国家维持的战略友谊。新加坡特别容易受到外部环境冲击，往往源于我们无法控制的发展。因此，与志同道合伙伴在共同利益领域的合作非常重要。
随着世界逐步走出新冠疫情阴影，我很高兴看到外交会议和互动开始恢复。我想虚拟形式可能不是建立相互信任的最佳方式。新加坡-印尼领导人闭门会谈签署的协议就是一个好例子。尽管如此，我相信国防部和武装部队已创新方式，在非常时期保持国际交流并推进伙伴关系。
国防部和武装部队如何与外国同行合作，应对共同安全挑战？
还需注意的是，国家安全威胁已演变，可能采取更非常规形式。除了热战或武装冲突，网络攻击、敌对信息战甚至未来疫情等不同威胁，可能同样甚至更大程度地危及我们的生命和生计。
鉴于此，我们的防务外交努力遵循哪些原则？我们是否会看到更多协议以开展联合军事演习和武装部队海外训练，或其他合作形式，如去年美国副总统卡马拉·哈里斯访新时与美国国防部签署的网络安全谅解备忘录？
与印尼的防务合作协议（DCA）
郭贤泉先生：主席先生，我想请教国防部，印尼防务合作协议对新加坡和武装部队意味着什么？
总理最近访问印尼，参加由印尼总统佐科主持的新加坡-印尼领导人闭门会谈。此次闭门会谈不仅是疫情以来首次，也是成功的，签署了三套协议，解决了扩展框架下长期存在的双边问题。
我对我们在飞行情报区、引渡和军事训练等问题上取得的良好进展感到欣慰，尤其是在自1995年开始的长期讨论和谈判之后。
三份协议之一是关于2007年防务合作协议及其实施安排的联合声明，涉及武装部队与印尼国防军在印尼军事训练区的合作。印尼防务合作协议对新加坡、国防部和武装部队意味着什么？
区域安全合作
朱卡纳因·阿卜杜勒·拉希姆先生（蔡厝港选区）：乌克兰近期危机提醒所有国家，无论大小，危难时刻合作至关重要。全球范围内，中美紧张局势使包括我们地区在内的国家两极分化，表现于南海等多个地缘政治舞台。
东盟内部，许多国家面临国内、经济和疫情挑战。一个分裂和分心的地区不符合我们的利益。鉴于区域形势日益复杂，新加坡应促进东盟国家间更紧密合作。东盟防长会议（ADMM）是区域安全平台，促进开放对话和务实合作，维护区域稳定。ADMM以开放包容著称。
国防部长能否更新国防部通过ADMM促进更大合作的努力？此外，ADMM-Plus包括中国、俄罗斯和美国等八个国家，是区域安全架构，旨在促进18国的和平与稳定。鉴于乌克兰事态发展，这对ADMM和ADMM-Plus的工作及安全合作有何影响？
环境可持续性
黄俊贤先生：主席先生，气候变化对全人类构成生存威胁。气候变化引发的相关危机对国际和平与稳定有深远影响。新加坡因海平面上升而尤为脆弱。我们已经历极端天气，突发暴雨引发洪水。气候变化也影响粮食供应——令人担忧，因为我们高度依赖进口食品，出口国将优先满足自身需求。
虽然新加坡在全球气候行动中的贡献有限，但我们有强烈的道德义务和责任。
国防部能否分享其在武装部队和国防部内部提升环境可持续性和减少碳排放的措施？我敦促国防部继续采取系统全面的可持续发展方法，从减少食物浪费到尝试为空军战斗机使用绿色航空燃料。我期待听到更多绿色倡议、改进流程和加强检查以防止浪费，特别是在食物和电力方面。
主席：国防部长黄永宏博士。
国防部长（黄永宏博士）：主席先生，感谢允许我回应议员们的质询。我会尽量回答他们提出的许多问题，其他问题将由高级国务部长回复。
主席先生，我说一句显而易见的话，过去两年，抗击新冠疫情一直是全球政府和民众的核心关注点，包括新加坡。回顾历史，很少有事件能有如此影响力和广泛性。近代史上，二战有此影响力，定义了那一代人的共同经历。相比之下，新冠疫情虽不及二战破坏性大，但多年后，我相信经历过的人仍会铭记。
尽管本世纪面临新冠疫情这一独特挑战，正如一些议员所指出的，其他对新加坡构成安全威胁的挑战并未暂停。国防部和武装部队在投入抗疫战斗的同时，始终专注于安全环境。
武装部队的核心使命首先是保护新加坡免受所有潜在外部侵略者的威胁。维克拉姆·奈尔先生和丹尼斯·陈先生都提到这一点。作为一个小国，我们的反应空间有限，必须及早识别威胁。为新加坡的生存和福祉，武装部队不仅要时刻准备、长远规划、组织有序，还需灵活应变，以防范或抵御迫在眉睫的危险。
因此，尽管我们努力抗击新冠疫情，国防部和武装部队仍认真规划，建设下一代武装部队，不仅能应对当前安全威胁，也能预见未来威胁。我认为这必须是我们的策略。总会有意外威胁，如新冠疫情，但武装部队对已知威胁准备越充分，就越有能力应对未知威胁。我稍后会谈及议员们关心的一些举措。
首先，我想说明今年国防部预算的背景。
今年，我部支出将较过去两年增加。黄伟中先生问及此事。增加原因是因疫情期间中断的项目、训练和演习恢复。我必须强调，尽管疫情，我们仍持续采购新装备，但供应商受影响导致延迟。例如，空军的H225M中型运输直升机和CH-47F重型运输直升机交付分别从2020年底推迟至2021年3月和5月。原计划去年交付的无敌级潜艇也延迟。今年及以后，延期项目将恢复，新的装备采购也将继续。
晚上7点15分
议员们关心训练问题——黄俊贤、朱德明、丹尼斯·陈和黄伟中先生。武装部队预计今年本地和海外训练数量将恢复至疫情前水平。去年，我们海外演习减少，参演人数也少。例如，美国的“锻造军刀”演习有800人参加，澳大利亚的“袋鼠”演习约580人，均低于疫情前水平。国内，国民服役训练逐步恢复正常，营内训练召集率预计今年将达疫情前水平。
随着项目和训练恢复至疫情前水平，预计本财年支出为163亿新元，较去年增长6.5%，预计为一次性增长，弥补2020和2021财年的减少支出。疫情导致支出大幅波动，但未来五年国防部预算预计将与通胀同步增长，每年名义增长3%至4%，我此前已向议会保证。
过去两年支出减少并未影响战备水平。维克拉姆·奈尔和丹尼斯·陈先生问及此事。事实上，武装部队在疫情期间保持了高水平战备并执行关键任务。部队严格遵守健康安全措施，如对所有新兵和教官进行健康筛查，尽可能小组训练，测量体温，检测，并对返营国民服役人员每七天检测一次。
国防部和武装部队人员中，99.7%已接种疫苗，91%已接种加强针，这帮助我们控制感染。关于建设下一代武装部队，我回应郭贤泉和朱德明先生的请求，提供一些细节。
2007年服役的“强袭”级护卫舰已服役15年，正进行中期升级。它们是我们海上打击、防空和反潜的关键平台，但中期升级不仅是简单的增改。每次升级，我们都会考虑技术进步、人力资源、设计，甚至人工智能的应用。
升级后，护卫舰的作战能力将提升，配备更先进的作战管理和通信系统、武器系统，以及改进的维护流程——基本上是以更少资源实现更大效能。下一代武装部队将拥有更多无人系统，涵盖三军。空军已采购Orbiter 4近程无人机，体积小、传感器先进、便携性强，可用于和平与战斗多种任务。
今年，海军将部署首批海上安全无人水面舰艇（USV）巡逻本地水域。海军还将从2027年起用全无人系统替代扫雷舰。
我们是全球少数几个运营无人海上系统的海军之一。这些系统由国防科技研究所（DSO）、国防科技局（DSTA）和海军本地设计集成。DSO和DSTA是关键推动者。
DSO今年迎来成立50周年。我们为DSO的男女员工感到自豪和感激，他们过去五十年默默努力，提供颠覆性防务技术和解决方案，推动武装部队成为现代化战斗机器。
一些议员可能记得去年预算委员会上，我提到感知与打击总部（HQ SS）成立，HQ SS去年底首次参加“锻造军刀”演习。陆军也将在本月晚些时候启用首个猎人装甲战斗群。
主席先生，允许我在屏幕上展示一张图片。
主席：请展示。[向议员们展示幻灯片。]
黄永宏博士：下一代武装部队正在成形。你们现在可以看到它的雏形，随着时间推移愈发清晰。到2040年，陆军配备下一代步兵营、新型装甲履带车和榴弹炮，将更具机动性，能更快更强地追踪和打击。海军配备多功能作战舰、无敌级潜艇和无人水面舰艇，将能更远距离侦察和打击，保护我们的水域和海上交通线。
下一代空军配备F-15、F-35和下一代无人机，将更具杀伤力、多功能和效能，更好地守护我们的天空。下一代武装部队将为我们和后代提供更大信心，应对潜在侵略者，完成武装部队的核心使命。
许多议员都问过我们如何应对日益复杂的地缘政治局势和竞争。我恐怕没有哪个国家有魔法公式，也没有阿拉丁神灯可以许愿。我们的理念很简单。我们与所有国家交朋友，不结敌人。但我们也是现实主义者，善于观察历史和周围的事件，尤其是小而脆弱国家的遭遇。
我们看到1990年，富含石油的科威特被伊拉克入侵。我们也目睹了2017年卡塔尔遭邻国实施空中、陆地和海上封锁，这还不算久远。此刻，我们看到乌克兰人民深陷困境，思考着未来，处于刀锋边缘。不可思议和难以想象的事情发生了。他们的城市遭受轰炸并有外国军队驻扎；他们的生活方式和梦想被粉碎；他们的独立和自由岌岌可危。乌克兰人口超过4000万，不是一个小国。但大小和实力是相对的。对他们、科威特人和卡塔尔人来说，这些时刻关乎生死，自由或屈服。
确实，我们奉行的格言是：新加坡武装部队（SAF）越强大，交朋友越容易，敌人越少。如果新加坡人不愿意或不能捍卫新加坡，就不会有人像我们那样坚决地保卫新加坡。但如果我们能够在2040年前建立起那样的SAF，作为政府领导和本议院议员，我们能否集体满意地认为，我们已经光荣且满意地履行了对下一代的职责？
这里有些人可能会说，肯定可以，因为那样的SAF令人印象深刻。我认为我们的开国元勋们可能没想到我们能走到这一步。它肯定会是该地区最现代化、装备最先进的军队之一。但我坦率地说，“几乎达到了，但还不完全”，因为尽管下一代SAF很优秀且雄心勃勃，但在能力上仍有一些差距，最近的事件和发展已给我们敲响警钟。
我很高兴本议院的议员们也提醒了我们——维克拉姆·奈尔先生、黄绍恩先生和郑国威先生。我主要谈的是数字领域的威胁。要完成2040年的SAF，我们需要第四军种来补充现有的三个军种。我将花些时间详细说明这一重大举措，因为原因很重要。
首先，让我们用宽泛的通用术语来描述数字威胁，了解包括新加坡在内的国家面临的挑战。数字领域已变得和陆、空、海领域一样真实，我们为此建立了陆军、空军和海军。我想这里没人会怀疑这一点。事实上，有人认为，对下一代来说，数字领域是主导领域。以至于出现了“元宇宙”这个新词，指代那个虚拟宇宙。
数字领域产生的威胁可以直接影响现实物理世界的事件。在安全层面上，虚拟与物理的分界是虚假的，二者实际上紧密交织。我想这里没人会反驳这一点。我们已有现实例证证明这一真理，议员们也引用过：去年五月，美国东海岸因殖民地管道遭勒索软件攻击而出现燃料短缺；去年十月，伊朗人因支付系统被黑，无法给加油站加油。还有明显的例子显示，国家或非国家实体如恐怖组织，利用数字和物理领域的联合攻击。
我七年前在2015年总参谋长演讲中首次谈及这种混合战争，但近年来此类行动愈发频繁。即使现在，我们亲眼目睹乌克兰的这类行动。《金融时报》于2月14日报道，标题为“乌克兰加强网络防御”，相当近期。让我引用一些相关内容，生动展示此类攻击的预期：“自2014年以来，该国一直遭受持续攻击，网络间谍破坏数据库和服务器，电力和通信中断，虚假信息传播，都是常见手段。乌克兰政府和独立专家预计敌对网络活动将增加，试图在任何物理攻击前或期间破坏国家稳定。”
另一段话：“多年来肯定还有许多我们不知道的攻击，恶意软件已潜伏在系统中，随时可能被激活。”这是美国西北大学计算机科学教授VS Subrahmaniam的说法。他补充道：“这有点像在你家里埋了炸弹，平时无害，直到有人引爆。”还有：“乌克兰公共部门网络安全专业人才短缺，监管薄弱，应对能力有限，各机构协调不足。”
我相信所有议员都会同意，我们可以从这不幸的局势中吸取教训。最好现在就学习和调整，因为如果等到自己遭受攻击后才改变，代价将非常高昂。面对数字领域的所有事件，我们的应对措施应是什么？幸运的是，我们的情报来源尚未发现针对新加坡的此类有组织的混合手段颠覆或征服企图。
但这当然不意味着威胁永远不会出现。因此，我认为我们最好现在就做好准备，争取更长的准备期。对于SAF，明确的回应是设立第四军种。过去十年，国防部/SAF逐步建立了所谓的C4I——指挥、控制、通信、计算机和情报。
我们建设了这个群体以增强网络和系统的韧性。2017年成立了国防网络组织（DCO），协调国防部门的网络安全，议员们曾提出问题，我也做过更新。有些议员甚至在总参谋长演讲时要求更新。
C4I群体及其前身军事情报组织和联合C4，已支持其他三个军种超过20年。然而，情报群体在数字和物理世界威胁上的需求和直接责任急剧上升。以恐怖主义为例，C4I群体的角色不仅是支持性的，更是直接责任。
议员们应记得，9·11事件被归因于情报失败。随后不久，议员们可能记得，内务情报局基于良好情报果断行动，挫败了耶玛伊亚恐怖组织在新加坡发动袭击的阴谋。
晚上7点30分
为C4I群体成立新军种，将极大促进其任务聚焦，明确直接责任和问责，以及能力发展。人力资源对情报部门尤为重要，拥有与陆军、海军和空军同等的军种地位，将大幅提升招募和职业发展前景。
C4I群体演变为新的第四军种，将整合并扩展我们在数字领域的能力。但要有效应对预计将增多、日益复杂和有组织的外部数字威胁，我们需要的不仅是情报力量，还需要专门的数字力量。现有的DCO正在建设这样的力量，但不足以满足SAF不断扩大的需求和任务。形象地说，如果数字力量现在是一个营级力量，我们实际上需要几个旅，甚至一个师级力量。
国防部和SAF已考虑这些变化一段时间，探索多种方案以更好应对数字领域威胁。我们的结论是，设立新的第四军种——数字与情报军（DIS）——最能体现SAF的第四支力量。
DIS不应也不能仅仅像陆军、空军和海军那样，只是数字领域的类似部队。数字领域的性质及其威胁需要不同的技能、思维方式——我们称之为战术、技术和程序。我想大多数人对此直觉上都能理解。
SAF设想，为DIS招募的士兵类型、训练和部队结构将不同。但四个军种的士兵必须保持某些特质——遵守SAF核心价值观、具备作战思维、坚韧不拔以确保任务成功，最重要的是对增强新加坡安全与和平的共同使命的承诺。
技术，尤其是信息技术和通信，将在DIS中发挥重要作用。但它还需要在核心IT和通信之外，拥有数据科学、心理学、语言学、人类学和地理学等多样化专业，以帮助理解有组织的国家和非国家团体如何动机和手段上对新加坡构成威胁。
增设第四军种DIS，将使SAF更好地训练和作为一个网络化、整合且扩展的力量作战，应对我们已知存在的威胁谱系，以及未来数字领域将增加的威胁。其他国家也得出类似结论，已在三军基础上增设数字力量。例如德国成立了网络与信息领域军，整合了其通信与信息系统司令部和地理信息中心。
设立第四军种DIS需完成许多程序和流程。尽管如此，我们预计将在今年最后一个季度成立。
国民服役者是SAF陆、空、海三军的骨干，未来也将是数字领域的骨干。无论我们的计划如何，最终决定SAF能否成功的是国民服役者的素质和承诺。
今年是国民服役55周年纪念，正如我们以往所做，我们将举办多项活动以表彰他们的贡献。未来几个月将公布更多细节。
我们也希望改进国民服役制度。这些新举措来自国民服役审查委员会，部分议员曾询问，该委员会由国防部副秘书（行政）和陆军参谋长共同主持。提出了三项关键变革。
第一，为优化宝贵的人力资源，我们将把功能评估纳入入伍前体检。我想林标泉先生和莫哈末·法米·阿里曼先生问过这个。功能评估是什么？相比一般体检，功能评估更精确地衡量服役人员是否能胜任特定职业。同时，我们重新设计了1000个岗位，使更多服役人员能在此前不具资格的领域贡献力量。
第二，补发薪酬。这是长期存在的问题。我很高兴宣布，政府各部门和机构间更好的数据管理将使补发薪酬申请流程更简化，且实现自动化。简化且自动化。将设定默认的基本国服薪酬，国民服役者可申领营内训练期间的薪酬。这对非正式就业和训练人员尤其有用。基本国服薪酬定为每月1600新元，按国服召集时间比例计算。超过10万国服者和2.5万雇主将受益于自动化的补发薪酬申请和基本国服薪酬。
第三，我们将提高国服家庭奖（NS HOME）现金部分——每名国服者额外获得2000新元现金。
高级国务部长王瑞杰将提供这些变革及其他若干事项的更多细节。
这支四军合一的下一代SAF，配备有承诺和能力的国民服役者，将更好地使新加坡应对传统和新兴威胁。我们的威慑力依赖于强大的下一代SAF。这是主要方面。另一个方面是良好关系，许多议员谈及，尤其是与志同道合伙伴的防务关系。
洪伟能先生和萨克提安迪·苏帕特先生问及我们的做法。作为小国，新加坡需要尽可能多的朋友。拥有强大的防务伙伴网络，使我们能够提升防务能力，海外训练，并在对我们安全至关重要的战略问题上合作。
过去一年，我们保持了高层防务接触。例如，美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀于七月首次访新，八月我们与美国国防部签署了网络空间合作谅解备忘录。与中国方面，我于六月与国防部长魏凤和将军进行了视频会晤。海军去年通过“无接触”方式两次与中国人民解放军举行联合海军演习。
与印度方面，我们于一月签署谅解备忘录，允许SAF在印度昌迪普尔综合试验场进行武器射击。二月，我们续签了新加坡-越南防务合作协议。我们还与几个波罗的海国家签署了新的防务合作协议，制度化专业交流。这很有趣。我们决定波罗的海国家值得关注，这发生在乌克兰事件之前。现在，我们更感兴趣。我认为这合作将结出更多成果。
在近邻方面，去年十一月我们与印尼陆军举行了Safkar Indopura演习，这是我们陆军与外国军队的首次实兵演习。今年一月，印尼国防部长普拉博沃·苏比安托与我签署联合声明，同意生效2007年国防合作协议及其实施安排，涉及SAF与印尼武装部队的军事训练区。
郭振凯先生问这意味着什么。国防合作协议将加强我们防务机构间的战略关系，促进武装力量间更紧密的互动与合作。
朱卡尔奈因·阿卜杜勒·拉希姆先生问我们对东盟防长扩大会（ADMM-Plus）和东盟防长会议（ADMM）的态度。它们确实是亚洲事实上的多边防务集团，我们在网络和信息领域威胁方面发挥了领导作用，建立了ADMM网络安全与信息卓越中心，为所有东盟成员国提供月度报告。同样，SAF的反恐信息设施（CTIF）自2020年起运作，驻有11名外国联络官，及时提供可操作的反恐情报。
我也很高兴，今年香格里拉对话将在六月恢复实体会议，结束两年中断。
主席先生，请允许我向议员们更新国防部/SAF的主要绿色举措，唐伟先生曾问及，我在上次总参谋长演讲中宣布，目标是到2030年将整体排放增长减少三分之二。
SAF可持续发展办公室由SAF联合参谋长办公室领导，召集了外部专家小组，为实现可持续目标的实施计划提供见解。
议员们要求更新，我来介绍一些。截至今年年底，约四分之一的SAF营区将安装太阳能电池板，发电峰值达2000万瓦，相当于约5000户四房组屋的用电量。到2025年，这一比例将从四分之一跃升至三分之二，发电峰值达5000万瓦。智能计量系统也将安装，用于自动追踪电力和水的消耗，首批地点包括裕廊营区、巴耶利峇空军基地和樟宜海军基地。
RSAF已开始试验为F-16战斗机使用绿色燃料。这些努力及其他措施将帮助我们实现2030年的排放目标。
我感谢本议院议员每年支持我们的预算。国防部和SAF的责任是谨慎有效地支出，建设强大的国家防务，正如我所详述。
但令我和议员们欣慰的是，SAF是国家资产，可在当前新冠疫情等情况下部署。当新加坡因德尔塔和奥密克戎变异株病例激增时，国防部和SAF人员被召集协助卫生部，提供作战规划能力、人员接触追踪、呼叫中心或支援急诊部门。SAF还成立了居家康复工作组，更好管理患者居家康复计划，国民服役者也作为居家疫苗接种队和流动疫苗接种队提供帮助。我们的国防科学家和工程师贡献了多种支持系统。
议员们问我们如何协助海外。确实，我们超越新加坡边界提供了帮助。去年，SAF樟宜区域人道援助与灾难救援协调中心协调向受新冠疫情重创的地区国家转运医疗设备和物资，包括应印尼请求运送的500多吨氧气，作为“氧气穿梭”计划的一部分。
主席先生，首先让我感谢本院议员们对通过强大的新加坡武装部队（SAF）实现坚实国家防御的坚定承诺和支持。今年，尤其是由于乌克兰事件，我认为新加坡人更不需要被说服，因为我们共同有责任为自己和后代保持新加坡的安全与稳定。因此，我们很高兴看到其他人代表国防部（MINDEF）和武装部队（SAF）以及他们自己的信念，说出了正确的话。
但我认为深刻的教训已经深入人心，事实上，一些新加坡人还给我发了电子邮件。让我引用其中两封。
一封来自Tee KH先生：“我过去把营区训练当作‘假期’营，直到我意识到当伊拉克入侵小小的科威特时，保卫新加坡的重要性。现在我已退休，属于独立世代，我提醒正在服兵役的儿子认真对待训练。越多尽职的公民积极服役，保卫弱者，争取自由，做正确的事，战争结束得越快，战争甚至开始的可能性就越小。”
第二封来自Cheng CF先生：“如果新加坡人不保卫我们的国家，就没人会帮我们。我67岁，退役国民服役者。但只要我身体健康，我不会犹豫再次穿上制服，帮助我的新加坡同胞保卫我们的国家。这是我的国家，我的家园和土地。”
只要我们有像Tee先生和Cheng先生那样怀有深刻决心和信念的新加坡人，我说，我们的未来就依然安全。[掌声]
英文原文
SPRS Hansard 原始记录 · 抓取日期：2026-05-02
The Chairman : Head J, Ministry of Defence. Mr Vikram Nair.
Security Trends and SAF's Priorities
Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang) : Chairman, I beg to move "That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100".
We live in a dangerous world. In the past week, we have witnessed Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the largest war on the European continent since World War II. The signs of this conflict had been brewing for a long time. The Russian troop build-up along the Ukrainian border had taken place over many months and various NATO countries, including the US, had anticipated conflict would break out.
Yet, when the time for fighting came, despite wide-spread condemnation from the international community, Ukraine had to fight alone against a much more heavily armed neighbour. This is an important reminder to all countries, particularly small ones like us, that we cannot assume other countries will come to our assistance when we are at war and we have to do all we can to defend ourselves.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has brought to light some concerning methods of coercion, including "false flag" operations – essentially, disinformation campaigns – to create a pretext for war.
This is not the only hotspot. In the past year, we have witnessed other significant developments in the international security environment. The US-China rivalry has continued to intensify and we see that this is increasingly playing out in both countries' regulations in the trade and technology domains. We have also seen stronger rhetoric and action over Taiwan and this seems to be an increasingly likely catalyst if a conflict, intended or otherwise, were to break out between the two powers.
In recent years, commentators have also suggested that the trajectory of the international order will be determined by developments in the Asia Pacific. As a result, there is a discernible shift in the global centre of gravity and extra-regional countries are increasingly turning their attention here. This includes the European Union countries like the UK, France and Germany. In one view, this is a good thing as the more invested countries are in this region, the more likely they will play a role in balancing the powers in this region.
However, with this growing attention focused on the Asia Pacific, we have also witnessed the emergence of new security arrangements, such as the trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US. The flip side of this is that there are concerns that such developments may have a divisive effect in the region or could, potentially, trigger an arms race.
Another trend that has emerged is the growing intersection between geostrategic issues and technology.
Technology is a major area of contestation in the strategic rivalry between the US and China. Technology is also being used by both state and non-state actors that seek non-conventional ways to coerce their adversaries, including through cyber attacks and information warfare.
Although Singapore is far away from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, I have seen messages being circulated in chat groups that seemed to be targeted at swaying public opinion in Singapore and I have my suspicions that such messages may be part of an info-operations exercise by foreign actors.
While the pandemic has pushed us in the positive direction in terms of leveraging and maximising the use of digital platforms, this has, arguably, left our societies more susceptible to digital threats.
Could the Minister for Defence comment on some of the trends in our security environment that MINDEF is watching? Could the Minister for Defence also provide an update on how these and other geopolitical security developments are shaping MINDEF's and the SAF's plans and priorities? How will MINDEF and the SAF respond to the challenges in our external environment and how will MINDEF and the SAF work with like-minded partners to address these threats?
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
The Chairman : Mr Alex Yam is not here. Mr Vikram Nair, your next cut, please.
6.45 pm
Global Fight against COVID-19
Mr Vikram Nair : Chairman, as a small nation, Singapore's security is contingent on the stability of the wider region. Because of the open and interconnected nature of Singapore's economy, major destabilising developments elsewhere can have a very tangible impact on our lives here.
The ongoing battle against COVID-19 is a clear example of this. Even at times when Singapore has appeared to be managing relatively well with the virus, we have seen other countries struggling. Our dependence on trade and travel has also meant this virus would, eventually, find its way back to Singapore.
The SAF has played an important role in assisting our neighbours during times of crisis, including assisting with relief efforts, when neighbours faced natural disasters.
Over the years, the Minister for Defence has updated the House on MINDEF's and the SAF's efforts to cooperate with international partners to safeguard the peace and security in the region.
So, I have a question for MINDEF and the SAF and, that is, whether it is taking any steps to assist our neighbours in its battle against COVID-19. And, if so, how has it done?
COVID-19 and Capability Development Plan
Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong (Jurong) : Despite facing the pandemic of a century, the SAF responded admirably. Essential operations were not suspended even during the height of the circuit breaker. The SAF has now vaccinated almost 100% of its soldiers, sailors and airmen.
However, last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen spoke about delays to major SAF programmes and initiatives due to the pandemic. This would, undoubtedly, have led to an impact on SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans.
COVID-19 has disrupted supply chains around the world. Would it also disrupt the supply chains for building the next generation platforms and technologies that the SAF is seeking to acquire?
In the same vein, I would also like to better understand how the pandemic has affected the SAF's ability to develop and test new training doctrines in overseas settings. I am well aware that there are some military manoeuvres that we simply cannot practise in land-scarce Singapore. And I am concerned that the COVID-19 travel restrictions over the past few years may have made it difficult for the SAF to pursue valuable training opportunities overseas.
Could the Minister explain how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans?
Training amidst COVID-19
Mr Don Wee (Chua Chu Kang) : Chairman, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused huge disruptions. Our SAF training has probably been one of the more heavily impacted since limited aspects of Army training can be done remotely or online. In the early phase of the pandemic, Basic Military Training and National Service (NS) call-ups had to be suspended for a while. Some overseas training and exercises were affected due to travel restrictions as well.
Last year, MINDEF spoke about the resumption of some overseas training and large-scale exercises, after implementing stringent testing and safe management measures. I am glad that despite some disruptions, the SAF's training did not grind to a halt and that all parties managed to find ways to proceed with some exercises. The external threats to our nation do not diminish during pandemics. Hence, neither should our defence preparations and training. What is happening in Europe now is a stark reminder that security threats are not pandemic-proof.
As Singapore is moving forward with our calibrated approach towards resumption of most activities, I feel that we are in a better position now than we were earlier in the pandemic, as a significant proportion of our population now is vaccinated. In addition, our people are much more familiar with how to interact with one another safely, despite the sustained presence of the virus in our community.
Hence, would MINDEF share an update on SAF's training at home and abroad? Which parts of our training have returned to pre-COVID-19 levels?
NS Training amidst COVID-19
Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines) : Chairman, as Singapore transits to living with COVID-19, the SAF has also, gradually, resumed training for NSmen. I note that this is not without the implementation of safe management measures, testing and cohorting arrangements, to ensure the safety of our NSmen. What are MINDEF's plans to recall NSmen in the coming year?
Many of our NSmen have not had the opportunity to participate in large-scale overseas exercises. Even while SAF successfully concluded Exercise Wallaby in 2021, the scale of the exercise was limited, due to concerns relating to the transmission of the virus.
Nations are now transiting to living with COVID-19. With global borders now gradually reopening, overseas exercises must continue to be scaled up to pre-pandemic levels. Can MINDEF share its plans to resume larger-scale overseas exercises in 2022?
The Chairman : Mr Vikram Nair. Mr Nair, if you would like to take your two cuts together, please do.
SAF's Operational Readiness
Mr Vikram Nair : Chairman, thank you. Even as we battle COVID-19, external threats persist. As we grapple with the pandemic and its effects, there have been new vulnerabilities for potential adversaries to exploit in order to target Singapore.
At the COS debate last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen talked about disruptions to SAF's training activities as a result of the pandemic. He highlighted that there had been steady progress on resuming In-Camp Training and exercises, enabled by strict safe management measures and robust testing. The developments in the world that I have highlighted earlier make it imperative that SAF remains operationally ready and able to function at all times, even in this pandemic environment.
So, now that we are one year on, I would be grateful if the Minister can provide an update on how the pandemic has affected SAF's operational readiness and whether it is still able to move into operation if necessary.
SAF's COVID-19 Safety Measures
Training in the SAF is an important and necessary part of our nation's defence. And as I have mentioned in my earlier cut, it is important for such training to continue even during this difficult period. So, this is, in fact, the flipside of my earlier cut.
Now that SAF's training activities and operations are likely to require people to continue to work in close proximity – and these can be in camps, on ships, in military vehicles or even on exercises – there is clearly a risk of COVID-19 transmission. I also expect that SAF will need to work on scenarios on what will happen if parts of operational units come down with COVID-19.
So, I would be grateful if I can get an update, first of all, on what are the safety measures that are being taken to protect Servicemen in relation to COVID-19 and reduce the risk of transmission of serious illness arising from COVID-19. Secondly, what are the measures that MINDEF has taken to manage the risk of COVID-19 and to continue operating?
The Chairman : Mr Dennis Tan.
SAF Training and Combat Readiness
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang) : Thank you, Mr Chairman. In the last two years, COVID-19 has affected virtually all aspects of our lives. It has affected our workplaces, businesses, public offices, schools, events and many other areas. SAF and military training have not been spared, too. SAF had to overcome the challenges which COVID-19 might have imposed on its training programmes, training methodology, restriction of travel for overseas exercise and, possibly, our morale, due to restriction of activities, including cohesion activities, and so on and so forth. And all these without compromising SAF's combat readiness and maintaining the quality of its training regimes and programmes and the morale of our Servicemen.
The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine is a reminder to us of the importance of Singapore having a strong defence force as an effective deterrent against foreign aggression and ambitions. Both the quality and credibility of our defence force must be maintained at all times, regardless of the challenges, such as COVID-19.
At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen shared with the House that despite the challenges of COVID-19, protection of key installations, maritime security, air defence and counter-terrorism efforts continue around the clock. The Minister also shared that COVID-19 affected some training programmes, exercises and deployments. And while certain major exercises resumed with the help of safe management measures, it might require more time to restart other exercises or for training to reach pre-COVID-19 levels.
I hope the Minister can brief the House again on what was SAF's experience in maintaining its training regime and high-level of combat readiness last year, our second year of fighting COVID-19, and share with us the challenges which SAF had overcomed.
At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen also updated the House on the involvement of many SAF personnel to assist in COVID-19-related operations for the community, such as packing masks, stabilising the outbreak in dormitories, helping to set up the community care and recovery facilities, supporting contact tracing and medical logistics operations.
While I understand and agree with the support given by our SAF personnel in these areas, it also meant time-out from their training and their usual deployment or roles. As we head towards a post-pandemic world – and this includes more countries opening up their borders – I would like to ask the Minister what are SAF's plans to work towards the resumption of training and exercises back to a pre-COVID-19 level. Will SAF be enhancing training for all our forces and Servicemen and, in a sense, making up for their time spent away from our training or operational role as a result of COVID-19?
The Chairman : Ms He Ting Ru is not here. Mr Henry Kwek.
Next Generation SAF Transformation
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Kebun Baru) : Mr Chairman, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and, with it, a new world order, is unfolding before our very eyes. There are many lessons that we can draw from the new reality.
A strong SAF is vital in deterring potential aggressors and in protecting Singapore's peace and stability.
We cannot expect others to shed blood for us.
Therefore, we must work hard to build the Next-Generation SAF and stay ahead of rapidly changing defence and warfare. For example, with the rapid evolution of technology, interstate conflict may no longer manifest in conventional physical or kinetic modes. Conflict could instead be conducted through grey zone tactics below the threshold of war, or through attacks in the cyber and digital domains, where most of us now live and work following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. And even as the domains and modalities for conflict continue to expand and grow, existing threats to our peace and security, such as terrorism, remain salient.
I also recognise the importance of SAF ensuring that its platforms and capabilities serve as a credible deterrent to conventional military threats.
Indeed, any perceived weak point in our military capabilities is a vulnerability that could be exploited and the SAF must remain ready and prepared to respond to the ever-growing range of challenges to defend Singapore.
As a small country with a shrinking total fertility rate, we can expect subsequent National Service cohorts to similarly decrease in size in future. At the very same time, new technologies arising from the fourth Industrial Revolution, such as artificial intelligence (AI), digital analytics and the Internet of Things, offer new opportunities for SAF to leverage as a force multiplier to overcome manpower limitations.
I welcome the efforts to build the Next-Generation SAF, as MINDEF and SAF first announced in 2019. It is timely and necessary that SAF harnesses technology to respond better to security threats.
Could the Minister for Defence update the House on the progress of the transformation efforts towards the Next-Generation SAF?
Unmanned Technology
Mr Desmond Choo : Mr Chairman, our low birth rate is a significant challenge to Singapore's defence strategy. The number of full-time National Servicemen is projected to decrease. MINDEF and SAF will need to do more with less.
At the same time, new technologies have allowed us to better optimise manpower resources and complete tasks better, more efficiently and with less manpower. I believe that MINDEF and SAF have already made strides in this area. For example, at last year's COS, the Minister for Defence spoke about the inauguration of the Singapore Army's Headquarters Sense & Strike (HQ SS), which integrated various technology-enabled capabilities, to allow the Army to "see better and shoot faster" with less manpower.
The Minister also spoke about how new technology had enabled SAF to redesign more jobs. SAF can then tap on a larger pool of Servicemen to serve in roles that they would have previously been ineligible for under SAF's old medical classification system. This included being deployed to protect key installations, now augmented by unmanned watch towers.
SAF has been working closely with the defence technology community to leverage advances in technology to better support the needs of our defence strategies. The use of technology, such as drones, can significantly make up for a shortfall in personnel. Can MINDEF update on its plans to develop and intensify the use of unmanned technologies to ensure our defence strategies remain robust despite our declining population? How has MINDEF developed its concepts of operations to incorporate such unmanned technologies? How has MINDEF incorporated AI also into its defence plans?
The Chairman : Mr Gan Thiam Poh is not here. Mr Shawn Hwang.
7.00 pm
Emerging Threats
Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong : The ongoing hostility in Ukraine is difficult to ignore. The onslaught of cyber attacks that the Ukrainian government is facing shines a light on the nature of warfare in the 21st century. Battles are fought not just in the sea, air and on land, but also in cyberspace. Ukraine is not alone when facing such threats. Recent events have underscored that these attacks can be initiated by non-state actors. Major ransomware attacks have targeted critical infrastructure in different parts of the world, causing serious, real-world disruptions.
In fact, Singapore has experienced such cyber attacks as well. In the years ahead, it seems likely that potential cyber attacks will continue to increase in frequency, scale and complexity. If these attacks were to successfully target our military infrastructure and systems, there would be dire consequences. In the light of this, could the Minister for Defence provide views on how threats in the digital domain are evolving and what MINDEF and SAF are doing to better address these evolving threats?
Cyber Threats
Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer) : The cybersecurity threat landscape is constantly evolving in the current digital age. These threats, which include ransomware, denial-of-service attacks and advanced persistent threats, are originating further up the value chain by impacting operational technology and threatening critical infrastructure.
As a result, the effects of cybersecurity threats have left no stone unturned, as it has the potential to adversely impact governmental operations, global supply chains, healthcare systems and our military systems, among others.
On the defence and national security front, we have seen the increased prevalence of grey zone operations involving malicious cyber campaigns. At last year’s Committee of Supply, the Minister for Defence said that the Cybersecurity Task Force had been stood up, as part of SAF’s plans to monitor and actively seek out potential threats and aggressors in the cyber domain. I think this is a step in the right direction to shore up Singapore’s defences in the digital domain.
In view of this, I would like to ask the Minister for Defence for an update on the SAF’s ongoing efforts to enhance our military’s cybersecurity to address these emerging cyber threats.
Defence Relations with US and China
Mr Ang Wei Neng (West Coast) : Chairman, the rise of China and the evolving geopolitical situation between China and the US had a global impact, especially on Singapore. When US President Richard Nixon visited China 50 years ago in 1972, the US was a superpower while China was seen as the sick man of Asia. In terms of nominal GDP, the size of China's economy in 1972 was just 8.9% of the US economy. But in 2020, China's economy became 70.3% of the US economy. It is projected that China's economy will overtake the US economy by 2030. The rivalry between the two countries has given rise to stiff competition in technology, innovation and defence build-up. As a result, Quad and AUKUS were formed to counter the influence of China. Many ASEAN countries, including Singapore, have been asked to take sides. We are being swept up in this current of geopolitical change.
I would like to ask the Minister for Defence what is the impact of the Quad and AUKUS on our relationship with the US and China and how does it impact the current Five-Power Defence Arrangement, or FPDA, which was started in 1971 as a third security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore? Will Singapore continue to welcome US nuclear submarines at our naval base and, eventually, host Australia's nuclear submarine when New Zealand had categorically said no?
In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the latest Omicron wave, how does it affect MINDEF's engagement with its US and Chinese counterparts, including the joint exercises with these two countries respectively? Has the ongoing Ukraine war affected our defence relations with the US and China?
Defence Diplomacy
Mr Saktiandi Supaat (Bishan-Toa Payoh) : Mr Chairman, as a small state, Singapore’s defence depends not only on our will and ability to defend ourselves, but also the strategic friendships that we maintain with other nations. Singapore is particularly vulnerable to shocks that take place in our external environment, often due to developments outside of our control. Hence, our cooperation with like-minded partners in areas of common interest is important.
As the world looks to step out of the COVID-19 shadow, I am glad to see that diplomatic meetings and engagements are starting to return. I imagine that virtual formats may not be the most conducive means to build mutual trust. The recent agreement signed at the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat is a good case in point. Notwithstanding that, I am sure that MINDEF and SAF have innovated new ways to keep up international engagements and advance partnerships in extraordinary times.
How are MINDEF and SAF cooperating with their foreign counterparts to address common security challenges?
It is also important to note that national security threats have evolved today and may now take less conventional forms. Instead of hot war or armed conflict, different threats, such as cyber attacks, hostile information campaigns and even future pandemics, might endanger our lives and livelihoods, equally or even to a greater extent.
In view of that, what are the principles guiding our defence diplomacy efforts? Will we see more agreements to conduct joint military exercises and our SAF training abroad, or for other types of cooperation like the cybersecurity MOU we signed with the US Department of Defence when US Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore last year?
Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Indonesia
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry : Mr Chairman, I would like to ask MINDEF about the implications of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia for Singapore and for SAF.
The Prime Minister recently visited Indonesia for the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat hosted by Indonesian President Jokowi. Not only was the Retreat significant because it was the first Retreat since the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also successful in that it saw the signing of three sets of agreements that addressed longstanding bilateral issues under the ambit of the Expanded Framework.
I am heartened by the good progress that we have made in advancing our bilateral interests in issues, such as the Flight Information Region, extradition and military training, especially following the long-drawn discussions and negotiations on these issues, which started back in 1995.
One of the three agreements signed was a Joint Statement on the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementation Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian National Defence Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia. What does the DCA with Indonesia mean for Singapore, MINDEF and SAF?
Regional Security Cooperation
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang) : The recent crisis in Ukraine has thrown up stark reminders to all nation-states, big or small, that cooperation in times of need is critical. Globally, US-China tensions have polarised countries, both in our region and further afield. These have manifested in various geopolitical theatres, including the South China Sea.
Internally, many ASEAN countries are facing challenges domestically, economically and with the current pandemic. A region that is divided and distracted is not in our interest. Singapore should seek to facilitate stronger cooperation among ASEAN countries, given the increasingly complex regional landscape. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the region's security platform to engage in open dialogue and practical cooperation to foster regional stability. ADMM prides itself as being open and inclusive in this regard.
Can the Minister for Defence provide an update on MINDEF's efforts to foster greater cooperation through ADMM? Further, ADMM-Plus consists of eight other countries, including China, Russia and the US. ADMM and ADMM-Plus are the region's security architecture and are meant to contribute to regional peace and stability among all 18 countries. Given the developments in Ukraine, what is the impact on the work and security cooperation of both ADMM and ADMM-Plus?
Environmental Sustainability
Mr Don Wee : Chairman, climate change poses an existential threat to all humanity. The related crises arising from climate change have deep implications for international peace and stability. Singapore is one of the more vulnerable nations due to the rising sea level. We are already experiencing erratic weather patterns which wreak havoc with sudden downpours causing flooding. Changes in weather patterns are also affecting food supplies – a frightening prospect, as we rely heavily on imported food; exporting nations will prioritise their own nations’ needs first.
While Singapore may be limited in how we can contribute to global climate action, we should spare no effort as we have a strong moral obligation and duty.
Would the Ministry share an update on its measures to improve environmental sustainability and reduce carbon emissions within SAF and MINDEF? I urge the Ministry to continue with its systematic and comprehensive approach to sustainability, from reducing food waste to trying out green aviation fuel for RSAF’s fighter jets. I look forward to hearing more about its green initiatives, improved processes and enhanced inspections to prevent wastage, particularly for food and electricity.
The Chairman : Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen.
The Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen) : Mr Chairman, thank you for allowing me to reply to the Members' cuts. I will try to answer as many of the questions that they have asked. The others will be replied to by the Senior Ministers of State.
Mr Chairman, I state the obvious when I say that battling COVID-19 has been the central preoccupation of governments and their citizens all over the world in the last two years, including Singapore. If we think about it, very few events have that power and reach. In recent history, I think World War II did, and that shared experience had defined that affected generation. If you compare, COVID-19 is not as devastating as World War II, but many years on, I suspect that it will likely linger in the memories of all those who have lived through it.
But despite the singular challenge of this century, COVID-19, there is no respite, no temporary cessation of other challenges that pose security threats to Singapore, as some Members have observed. My Ministry and SAF have remained very focused on the security environment even as we went into the trenches to join the whole-of-Government in our fight against COVID-19.
The SAF’s core purpose, first and foremost, must remain to protect Singapore from all potential external aggressors. Mr Vikram Nair alluded to this, Mr Dennis Tan, too. And because we are a small country, with less space figuratively and literally to react, we need to recognise these threats early. For Singapore’s survival and well-being, the SAF not only needs to be always prepared, to plan long term and be well-organised, but also nimble to change, if we are to prevent or ward off imminent danger.
Therefore, despite our efforts to fight COVID-19, MINDEF and SAF have continued to plan in earnest so that we build the next generation SAF that is not only capable of meeting today’s security threats, but anticipating tomorrow’s, too. And I think that must be our approach. There will always be the unexpected threats, just like COVID-19. But the better the SAF is structured to deal with the known threats, the more bandwidth it has to deal with the unknown unknowns. I will deal with some of these initiatives later on, which Members have asked for.
But, first, let me put MINDEF’s budget this year in context.
This year, my Ministry will increase our spending relative to the past two years. Mr Shawn Huang asked about this. That increase is due to the resumption of projects, training and exercises which were disrupted by COVID-19 over the past two years. I should underscore that we continued to purchase and acquire new platforms despite COVID-19. But suppliers were also affected, causing delays. For example, deliveries of RSAF’s H225M Medium Lift and CH-47F Heavy Lift helicopters were delayed from end-2020 to March and May 2021, respectively. The delivery of our Invincible-class submarines, initially planned for last year, has also been delayed. For this year and beyond, projects deferred or delayed will resume, as will the acquisition of new platforms.
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Members have asked about training – Mr Don Wee, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Shawn Huang. SAF expects to increase numbers of training, both locally and overseas, to reach pre-COVID-19 levels later this year. Last year, we, indeed, had fewer overseas exercises and with fewer troops. For example, Exercise Forging Sabre in the US, with 800 personnel, Exercise Wallaby in Australia with around 580 personnel, much fewer than pre-COVID-19 levels. At home, NS training has progressively returned to normalcy and in-camp training call-up rates are on track to reach pre-COVID-19 levels this year.
With the planned resumption of both projects and training to pre-COVID-19 levels in the coming financial year, we are projecting an expenditure of $16.3 billion. This translates to an increase of 6.5%, which is expected to be one-off and a catch-up for the reduced spending for FYs 2020 and 2021. COVID-19 resulted in sharp dips and spikes but, over the next five years, MINDEF's budget is expected to keep pace with inflation, or 3% to 4% nominal growth each year, which I have assured this House previously.
The reduction in spending over the last two years did not occur at the expense of readiness. Members have asked about this – Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Dennis Tan. Indeed, SAF was able to operate at a high level of readiness and conduct critical operations amidst the pandemic. Soldiers within units were disciplined and kept to strict health and safety protocols, such as health screening for all recruits and instructors, training in smaller groups where possible, temperature taking, testing, and testing returning NSmen from their In-Camp Trainings (ICTs) every seven days.
Of our MINDEF/SAF personnel, 99.7% are vaccinated and 91% have received their booster shot. And that has helped us keep our infections at bay. I said that we were determined to keep building up the next-generation SAF – Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Desmond Choo asked for updates. Let me provide some details.
The Formidable-class frigates, first commissioned in 2007, are now 15 years old and due for their midlife upgrade. They are our key fighting platforms for maritime strike, anti-air and anti-submarine warfare, but the midlife upgrade, as we do for all platforms, will be more than just addition and alterations, if I can use the construction term. Because each time we do a midlife upgrade, we look at the technology that has evolved, our manpower, the design and, including artificial intelligence, if we can.
So, after the upgrade, the frigates' combat capabilities will increase and be equipped with better combat management and communication systems, weapons systems, along with improved maintenance processes – basically, to use less to achieve more. The next-generation SAF, which Mr Desmond Choo asked about, too, will have more unmanned systems across the three services. The RSAF has acquired the Orbiter 4 Close-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CR-UAV). And with their smaller size, capable sensors and increased portability, these can be used for a wide range of operations, in peace and combat.
This year, our Navy will deploy the first tranche of Maritime Security Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) to patrol local waters. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) will also replace its Mine Countermeasure Vessels with a fully unmanned system from 2027 onwards.
We are among the first few navies in the world to operate unmanned maritime systems. These systems were designed and integrated locally by DSO National Laboratories and Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and RSN. DSO and DSTA are critical enablers.
DSO celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. We are immensely proud of and grateful for the men and women of DSO, who, for the past five decades, have worked hard behind-the-scenes to provide game-changing defence technologies and solutions. They have transformed the SAF into today's modern fighting machine.
Some Members would remember that at last year's Committee of Supply (COS), I spoke about the inauguration of the Headquarters Sense and Strike (HQ SS) and the HQ SS was able to participate for the first time in exercise Forging Sabre late last year. The Army will also operationalise the first Hunter Armoured Battle Group later this month.
With your permission, Mr Chairman, I would like to display an image on the screens.
The Chairman : Please do. [ A slide was shown to hon Members. ]
Dr Ng Eng Hen : The next-generation SAF is taking shape. You can already see its new form now, inchoate, but with greater definition as each year passes. By 2040, the Army, equipped in the next-generation infantry battalions and new armoured tracked carriers and howitzers, will be more manoeuvrable, able to track and strike faster and harder. The Navy, with Multi-Role Combat Vessels, Invincible-class submarines and USVs will be able to see and strike further at sea and in the depths, to better protect our waters and our sea lines of communication.
The next-generation air force, with F-15s, F-35s and the next generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, will be more lethal, versatile and effective to better protect our skies. This next-generation SAF will provide for this and the next generation, our children and theirs, greater confidence in dealing with potential aggressors to fulfil the SAF's core mission.
Many Members have asked how we navigate the increasingly complex geopolitical situation and rivalries. I am afraid no country has a magic formula, no Aladdin's lamp that you can make wishes from. Our philosophy is a simple one. We make friends with all countries and seek no enemies. But we are realists, too, and keen observers of history and events around us, and, especially what happens to small, vulnerable states.
We saw how Kuwait, an oil-rich state, was invaded by Iraq in 1990. We observed how Qatar suffered an air, land and sea blockade imposed by its neighbours in 2017, not so long ago. And at this very moment, we witness Ukrainians deeply troubled as they ponder over their future, balanced on a knife's edge. The unthinkable and unimaginable have occurred. Their cities are under bombardment and with foreign troops; their way of life, their dreams are shattered; their independence and freedom are under peril. Ukraine, with a population of over 40 million, is not a small country. But size and might are relative. For them, Kuwaitis and Qataris, these moments are about life and death, freedom or subjugation.
Indeed, we live by the dictum that the stronger the SAF, the easier it is to make friends and have fewer enemies. No one will defend Singapore as robustly if Singaporeans do not or cannot. But if we are able to build up the kind of SAF by 2040, can we be satisfied collectively, as leaders in the Government and Members of this House, that we have discharged our duties honourably and with satisfaction to our children's generation?
Some here might say, yes, because that kind of SAF is impressive. I think our founding fathers could not have envisaged that we could have come quite this far. It will, certainly, be among the most modern and better-equipped militaries in the region. But my honest answer is "almost there, but not quite", because, as good and as ambitious as the next-generation SAF is, there are some gaps in capabilities, which recent events and developments have warned us against.
And I am glad that Members of this House have warned us, too – Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Shawn Huang and Mr Patrick Tay. And I am talking primarily about threats in the digital domain. To complete that SAF 2040, we will need a fourth service to complement the existing three services. I will spend some time elaborating on this significant move as the reasons are important.
Let us characterise the digital threat, first, in broad general terms, to know what countries, including Singapore, are up against. The digital terrain has become as real as the land, air and sea domains for which we have raised the Army, Air Force and Navy. I think no one here doubts that. In fact, some would argue that, for the next generations, the digital domain is the dominant domain. So much so that a new word "metaverse" has been coined for that virtual universe.
Threats that emanate in the digital domain can readily impact events in a real physical world. That divide between virtual and physical, in security terms, is a false one as the two are, in fact, intricately interwoven. Again, I do not think anyone here would gainsay this. We already have real-life examples that exemplify this truth and Members have quoted it: fuel shortages across the US East Coast last May due to ransomware attacks on the Colonial Pipeline; Iranians could not top up their gas and petrol stations last October because the payment systems were hacked. There have also been clear examples of countries or non-state entities, like terrorist groups, that use a combination of attacks through both the digital and physical domains.
I first spoke about this type of hybrid warfare seven years ago in my 2015 COS speech, but, over the past few years, there have been many more examples of this type of campaigns. Even now, we are witnessing with our own eyes that kind of campaign in Ukraine. The Financial Times reported it, with the headline: "Ukraine shores up cyber defences" and this was on 14 February, so quite recent. Let me give Members some relevant quotes which provide vividly what to expect in this kind of attack: " The country has been under constant attack since 2014, cyber-espionage damage to databases and servers, disruption to powers and communications, and disinformation are all part of the playbook. The Ukraine government and independent experts expect hostile cyber activity to increase, in an effort to destabilise the country before or during any physical attack".
Another quote: "There are bound to have been many, many more attacks over the years that we do not know about and that have left malware embedded in systems ready to be activated" – this was a quote from Prof VS Subrahmaniam, who is a professor of Computer Science at Northwestern University in the US. He adds: "It is a bit like a bomb being planted in your house, is benign until someone sets it off". Another quote: "Ukraine meanwhile suffers from a deficit of public sector cyber security expertise, weak regulation, limited response capabilities and a lack of coordination between various agencies".
I think all of the Members would agree with me here that we can learn from this unfortunate situation. And far better to learn and adjust now, because if we wait and change only after an attack on ourselves, the cost is going to be very high. When we look at all these incidents in the digital domain, what then should our response be? Fortunately, our intelligence sources have not identified such orchestrated attempts to subvert or subjugate Singapore using hybrid means.
But, of course, that does not mean that the threat will never come. So, I think, we best prepare now with a longer runway. And for SAF, a clear-cut response is a fourth service. Internally, over the past decade, MINDEF/SAF have progressively built up what we call the C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.
We built up that community to enhance the resilience of our networks and systems. We set up the Defence Cyber Organisation (DCO) in 2017, to coordinate cyber security across the defence sector, and Members of Parliament have filed questions and I have given updates. And some of you have asked for updates, even at this COS.
The C4I community and its predecessors, the Military Intelligence Organisation and Joint C4, have been supporting elements to the three other services for over 20 years. However, the demands and direct responsibilities on the intelligence community for both threats in the digital and physical world have risen sharply. If we take terrorism, for example, the role of the C4I community is not only supportive but a direct responsibility.
Members would remember that when 9/11 occurred, it was characterised as a failure in intelligence. Shortly thereafter, Members might recall that decisive actions by ISD, based on good intelligence, foiled a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to launch terrorist attacks in Singapore.
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The formation of a new service for the C4I community will greatly facilitate their mission focus, sharpen direct responsibility and accountability, and capability development. The human resource is particularly important for the intelligence services and having a Service status, just like Army, Navy and Air Force, will enhance recruitment and career prospects considerably.
The evolution of the C4I community into a new fourth service will integrate and expand our capabilities in the digital domain. But we will need more than that to deal effectively with digital threats from external aggressors that we expect will grow in number, sophistication and organisation. To achieve this, we will need not only an intelligence force but a dedicated digital force. The current DCO is building up such a force but it is insufficient for the SAF’s expanding needs and mandate. Figuratively, if the digital force is now a battalion force, we actually need a few brigades, perhaps even a Division-size force.
MINDEF and SAF have been considering these changes for some time now, exploring various options to better prepare for threats in the digital domain. Our conclusion is that a new fourth service – the Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS – best encapsulates this fourth arm of the SAF.
DIS should not and cannot be just like the Army, Air Force and Navy, with similar troops operating in the digital domain instead of the physical domain. The nature of the digital domain and the threats therein require different skillsets, mindsets – what we call Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. I think that is intuitive to most.
SAF envisages that the type of soldiers you recruit for DIS, their training, force structure will be different. But some traits must be maintained for soldiers across the four services – the adherence to SAF core values, operational mindset, resilience that lead to mission success and, above all, a commitment to the shared mission to enhance Singapore’s security and peace.
Technology, especially related to IT and communications, will play a big role for DIS. But it will also require a force with specialisations not only in core IT areas and communications, but in diverse areas, including data science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology and geography, that will help them understand the motivation and means by which orchestrated state and non-state groups aim to harm Singapore.
The addition of this fourth service, the DIS, will allow SAF to better train and fight as a networked, integrated and expanded force to deal with the spectrum of threats that we know exist today, but also the digital domain that we know will increase in the future. Other countries have also come to the same conclusion and added a digital force to their tri-services. Germany, for example, has established the Cyber and Information Domain Service, consolidating its Communication and Information Systems Command and Geo-information Centre.
There are many procedures and processes to undertake to set up this fourth service, DIS. Notwithstanding this, we expect to set it up by the last quarter of this year.
NSmen form the backbone of the SAF, on land, air and sea and, in the future, also our digital domain. Whatever our plans, ultimately, it is the quality and commitment of our NSmen that will determine whether SAF can succeed.
This year marks the 55th anniversary of NS and, as we have previously done, we will have a number of events to recognise their contributions. We will put out more details in the coming months.
But we also want to make improvements to our NS system. These new initiatives are from the NS Review Committee, which some Members have asked about, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary (Administration) of MINDEF and the Chief of Army. Three key changes are proposed.
First, to optimise our precious manpower resource, we will now use functional assessments as part of the pre-enlistment medical screening. I think Mr Lim Biow Chuan and Mr Mohd Fahmi Aliman asked about this. What are functional assessments? Compared to general physical assessments, functional assessments are a more precise gauge of whether the Servicemen can perform specific vocations. At the same time, we have redesigned 1,000 jobs so that more Servicemen can contribute in areas they were not previously eligible for.
Second, Make-Up Pay. And this has been a longstanding issue. I am happy to announce that better data management across Government services, agencies will now allow claims of Make-Up Pay to be streamlined and, yes, the magic word, automated. Streamlined and automated. There will be a default base NS pay which NSmen can claim for In-Camp Training. This will be especially useful for those in informal employment and training. The base NS pay is set at $1,600 per month and prorated for the duration of NS call-ups. Over 100,000 NSmen and 25,000 employers will benefit from the automated Make-Up Pay claims and base NS Pay.
Third, we will increase the NS HOME awards, with higher cash components – an extra $2,000 in cash to each National Serviceman.
Senior Minister of State Heng Chee How will provide more details on these changes, as well as several others.
This four-service Next Gen SAF, with committed and capable NSmen, will better position Singapore to deal with both conventional and emerging threats. Our deterrence depends on a strong Next Gen SAF. That is the main prong. But another prong is good relations, which many Members have talked about, particularly defence relations, with like-minded partners.
Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked about our approach. As a small country, Singapore needs as many friends as we can have. Having a strong network of defence partners has allowed us to build up our defence capabilities, train overseas and cooperate on strategic issues critical to our security.
In the past year, we maintained high-level defence engagements. For example, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made his introductory visit to Singapore in July and we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Cooperation in Cyberspace with the US Department of Defense in August. With China, I met Minister for National Defense General Wei Fenghe virtually in June. The RSN held joint naval exercises with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army via a “contactless” modality twice last year.
With India, we signed an MOU in January for the SAF to conduct weapon firings in India’s Chandipur Integrated Test Range. We renewed the Singapore-Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement in February. We have also concluded new defence cooperation agreements with a few Baltic States, to institutionalise our professional exchanges. This is interesting. We decided that the Baltic States were of interest and this happened before Ukraine. Now, we are even more interested. So, I think that cooperation will bear more fruit.
Closer to home, we conducted Exercise Safkar Indopura with the Indonesian Army in November, the first physical exercise between our Army and a foreign counterpart. In January, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto and I signed a Joint Statement on our agreement to bring into force the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementing Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian Armed Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia.
Mr Henry Kwek asked what the implication of this is. The DCA will strengthen the strategic relationship between our defence establishments and promote closer interaction and cooperation between our armed forces.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked about our approach to ADMM-Plus and ADMM. It is, indeed, the de facto multilateral defence grouping in Asia, and we have taken the lead on tackling threats in the cyber and information domains by establishing the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence, which now provides monthly reports for all ASEAN Member States. Similarly, SAF’s Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF) has been in operation since 2020 and 11 foreign liaison officers are stationed there. The CTIF produces timely and actionable counter-terrorism intelligence.
I am also pleased that, this year, the Shangri-La Dialogue will resume in June physically, after a two-year hiatus.
Mr Chairman, let me also update Members on MINDEF/SAF’s major green initiatives, which Mr Don Wee has asked about, which I announced at the last COS, to reduce the growth of overall emissions by two-thirds by 2030.
The SAF Sustainability Office, led by SAF’s Chief of Staff-Joint Staff, has convened an external panel comprising experts to provide insights on implementation plans to meet our sustainability targets.
Members have asked for updates, let me give some. By the end of this year, about a quarter of SAF camps will have solar panels installed to deliver 20 megawatt peak of electricity. This is equivalent to the consumption of around 5,000 4-room households. By 2025, it will jump from a quarter to two-thirds of our camps generating 50 megawatt peak of electricity. Smart Metering Systems will also be installed to track electricity and water consumption automatically, starting with Jurong Camp, Paya Lebar Airbase and Changi Naval Base.
RSAF has commenced trials for the use of green fuel for its F-16 Fighting Falcons. These efforts and others will help us meet our emission targets by 2030.
I am thankful that Members of this House have supported our budget each year. On MINDEF and SAF’s part, our responsibility is to spend prudently and effectively to build a strong national defence, as I have detailed.
But it is gratifying to me, and to Members here, too, that SAF is a national asset to deploy in situations like the current COVID-19 pandemic. When Singapore experienced a resurgence of cases due to the Delta and Omicron variants, MINDEF and SAF personnel were called upon to assist MOH to provide operations planning capabilities, staff contact tracing, call centres or to man emergency departments. SAF also stood up the Home Recovery Task Group to better manage the home recovery programme for patients, and NSmen also helped as Home Vaccination Teams and Mobile Vaccination Teams. Our defence scientists and engineers contributed a variety of support systems.
Members have asked how we helped overseas. And, indeed, we did, beyond Singapore’s shores. Last year, SAF’s Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre coordinated the transfer of medical equipment and supplies to regional countries worst hit by COVID-19, including the shipment of over 500 tonnes of oxygen at Indonesia’s request as part of the "Oxygen Shuttle" programme.
Mr Chairman, let me thank Members of this House for their steadfast commitment and support for a robust national defence through a strong SAF. This year, particularly because of the events in Ukraine, I think Singaporeans need less convincing that it is our collective responsibility to keep Singapore safe and secure for ourselves and successive generations. So, we were pleasantly pleased that others were saying the right things on behalf of MINDEF and SAF, and of their own convictions, of course.
But I think salutary lessons have sunk in and, indeed, some Singaporeans have sent me emails. Let me just quote from two of them.
One is from Mr Tee KH: “I used to take my in-camp training as a ‘holiday’ camp till I realised how important it is to defend Singapore when Iraq invaded tiny Kuwait. Now a retiree and from the Merdeka Generation, I reminded my son who is serving NS to take his training seriously. The greater the force of dutiful citizens who are actively serving their country, defending the weak, fighting for freedom and doing what is right, the better chance that wars will end quickly and the less chance wars will even begin.”
The second is from Mr Cheng CF: “If Singaporeans don’t defend our country, nobody will help us. I am 67, a retired NSman. But as long as I am fit, I will not hesitate to don my uniform again to help my fellow Singaporeans to defend our country. This is my country, my home and soil.”
As long as we have Singaporeans who share the deep resolve and conviction that Mr Tee and Mr Cheng shared, then, I say, our future remains secure. [ Applause. ]