口头答复 · 2025-02-18 · 第 14 届国会

美出口管制对新加坡芯片业影响

Impact of US Export Controls on Singapore's Semi-conductor Industry and Ensuring Singapore-based Chip Companies Abide by New Rules to Safeguard Country's Business Reputation

AI 治理与监管AI 经济与产业AI 与公共部门 争议度 3 · 实质辩论

议员质询美出口管制对新加坡半导体产业及经济的影响,及政府如何防止企业利用新加坡规避美国限制。政府强调新加坡作为法治透明的国际商业枢纽,严厉打击违法行为,维护国家信誉。核心争议在于新加坡是否被列为美出口管制第二等级,及如何修复与美国的信任关系。

关键要点

  • 防止规避美出口管制
  • 维护国际商业信誉
  • 争取提升出口管制等级
政府立场

坚持法治严惩违规,维护国际信誉

质询立场

关注美出口管制对产业影响及政策应对

政策信号

强化出口管制合规监管

"Singapore is a stable, trusted, reliable and well-connected international business hub."

参与人员(7)

完整译文(中文)

Hansard 英文原文译文 · 翻译日期:2026-05-02

3 叶汉荣议员问副总理兼贸易与工业部长:(a) 贸易与工业部如何确保新加坡的营商便利不会被企业利用以规避美国贸易限制;(b) 部门能否提供关于美国芯片出口管制规则对我国半导体产业及更广泛经济影响的最新评估。

4 乔安·佩雷拉女士问副总理兼贸易与工业部长,是否有措施确保在新加坡运营的实体遵守出口管制和国际法律,以维护新加坡作为备受尊敬的国际商业枢纽的地位。

5 林占武副教授问副总理兼贸易与工业部长:(a) 部门是否知悉新加坡将被列入美国新的人工智能出口管制第二级别;(b) 政府是否有具体外交政策目标,争取(i) 国家验证最终用户身份及(ii) 在这些管制下获得第一级别重新分类;(c) 美国方面是否已传达任何作为此类身份变更前提条件的具体技术和监管改进。

6 林占武副教授问副总理兼贸易与工业部长,鉴于美国机构已将新加坡标记为向被列入黑名单的中国人工智能企业非法转运芯片的枢纽:(a) 政府是否能够(i) 公开自2023年以来其对该类芯片再出口监管立场背后的外交政策理由,(ii) 详述导致此情况的任何或所有跨部门决策;(b) 政府如何打算修复因相关报道对新加坡信誉及与美国关系造成的损害。

贸易与工业第二部长(陈志凌博士):议长先生,恳请允许我一并回答今天议程上由叶汉荣议员、乔安·佩雷拉女士及林占武副教授提出的第3至第6号口头质询。

议长:请继续。

陈志凌博士:这些问题均涉及美国出口管制及新加坡对此类措施的应对。我的答复还将涵盖李显龙议员提交的类似议会质询,该质询安排在后续会议中答复。

新加坡是一个稳定、值得信赖、可靠且联通良好的国际商业枢纽。我们的经济竞争力基于对法治的承诺、零容忍腐败、透明的法规及开放包容的营商环境。我们经过长期努力建立了这一声誉。因此,我们对违反法律的个人和企业采取坚决果断的行动,这是我们竞争力的基础。

关于受美国出口管制影响的英伟达芯片问题,我们正在仔细审查,并将持续关注。迄今为止,我们的核查显示,英伟达向新加坡销售的产品实物交付占其整体收入不到1%。这些芯片主要部署于新加坡的主要企业及政府。我们了解到,英伟达向新加坡商业实体开具账单的其余收入并未涉及实物运入新加坡。

若新加坡企业从事欺骗或不诚实行为以规避其所受出口管制,我们将依法调查并采取适当行动。保障获取尖端技术及维护营商环境的诚信符合国家利益。

在新加坡,战略物资及技术的转让和经纪受《战略物资(管制)法》管辖。该框架坚实,与联合国安理会等主要多边出口管制机制保持一致。

除多边机制外,国家有时对特定物品实施单边出口管制。美国对先进半导体芯片的出口管制即为一例。

根据这些规则,美国期望企业确保其商业交易符合要求,包括对先进半导体芯片买方进行必要的“了解你的客户”(KYC)审查。虽然我们目前无法律义务执行其他国家的单边出口管制,但期望所有在新加坡运营的企业在其国际业务活动中考虑相关法规,确保业务透明。

我们绝不容忍企业故意利用与新加坡的关联规避或违反其他国家的出口管制。在操作层面,新加坡关税局与包括美国在内的外国同行密切合作,回应其关切,适当且在法律允许范围内协助调查。

必须强调的是,这一开放、包容且透明的监管体系适用于我们所有贸易伙伴。

部分议员还询问美国对先进半导体芯片管制对新加坡经济的影响。就制造和出口芯片能力而言,影响有限。美国当前的技术管制针对的是一小部分先进半导体芯片,而新加坡半导体产业专注于生产成熟工艺芯片,这些芯片广泛应用于家电、汽车及工业设备。

然而,在获取先进人工智能计算资源方面,例如英伟达H100图形处理单元(GPU),前任美国政府于2025年1月引入了人工智能扩散规则,旨在按国家层面管理对H100或同等级GPU的访问。新加坡与约150个国家一样,被划分为第二级别。当前美国政府尚未最终确定该规则细节,也未传达任何作为国家级别变更前提条件的具体要求。

我们的目标是确保本地及在新加坡运营的国际企业均能充分获取人工智能计算资源。我们将确保总部设在美国的云计算巨头继续作为通用验证最终用户在新加坡运营,并支持希望申请成为国家验证最终用户以获取人工智能计算资源的本地企业。

最后,我向议员们保证,我们将继续与在新加坡的企业合作,促进其从所有主要来源国获取先进半导体芯片及技术。同时,我们也将持续与美国政府沟通,回应其关切。

议长:叶汉荣议员。

叶汉荣议员(杨厝港):谢谢议长。我感谢部长的答复。我声明我在一家总部设于新加坡的全球投资公司工作。我很高兴部委强调遵守国际贸易规则,并且新加坡认真履行我们的义务。

部长能否详细说明有哪些保障措施防止企业利用新加坡作为通道规避美国出口限制,尤其是在美中贸易紧张加剧的背景下?部委如何在这些保障措施与确保我们继续成为吸引企业的目的地之间取得平衡?

陈志凌博士:感谢叶议员的追加问题。新加坡拥有健全的出口管制体系,基于全面的战略物资管制立法。《2002年战略物资(管制)法》及其附属法规管理和规范战略物资及技术的转让和经纪。

新加坡的管制物资和技术清单与四个多边出口管制机制保持一致,分别是瓦森纳协定、澳大利亚集团、导弹技术控制制度和核供应国集团。如我先前所述,执法由新加坡关税局负责。

我想更具体说明我们如何管理出口。潜在违规行为包括无适当许可证出口、转运、过境战略物资,提供虚假或误导性文件或信息,错误申报,以及无许可证或未注册经纪战略物资——这些行为将受到刑事处罚。

我们如何平衡与外国同行合作?如我先前答复所述,虽然我们目前无法律义务执行其他国家可能不时变化的单边出口管制,但在新加坡运营的企业若其国际业务活动涉及相关法规,应予以考虑。

外交部和新加坡关税局与部分外国同行(如美国)已有现有安排,便于调查相关企业。我们不时收到指控信息,若知悉违规,将自行展开调查。

我们的做法系统且彻底,继续强调我们拥有开放、包容且透明的监管体系,适用于所有合作伙伴。希望这回答了叶议员的追加问题。

议长:乔安·佩雷拉女士。

乔安·佩雷拉女士(丹戎巴葛):谢谢议长。我有一个追加问题。请问部长是否计划发布行业指引,支持在新加坡运营的企业遵守出口管制和国际制裁?

陈志凌博士:感谢乔安女士的追加问题。如我先前所述,国家可能不时单方面实施出口管制。我们已明确且透明告知在新加坡运营的企业,须遵守相关国家的出口管制,不得利用新加坡作为规避或绕过出口管制的渠道。

正如议员所指出,无法涵盖所有潜在、可能或未来单边出口管制。但指导我们成为声誉良好商业枢纽的原则将持续保持一致,我们将坚守这些原则。单边出口管制一旦引起我们关注,我们将与相关国家沟通,积极与美国这一重要伙伴接触,探讨如何更好管理并教育本地企业确保合规。希望这能给议员以信心。

议长:林占武副教授。

林占武副教授(盛港):先生,我最初向外交部提交了两项议会质询,后被转交贸易与工业部。我理解此举的动机,但希望部长或外交部部长能回应需要更外交政策视角的问题。

尽管陈部长称英伟达产品实物销售仅约1%,但英伟达最新向美国证券交易委员会提交的文件显示,截至2024年10月的九个月内,公司总收入为910亿美元,其中不到一半为美国国内收入;其次是新加坡,约70亿美元;中国(含香港)约120亿美元。这意味着新加坡约占英伟达全球收入的20%。[参见《个人说明》,官方报告,2025年2月26日,第95卷,第153期,个人说明部分。]

像我们这样的转口枢纽出现此类收入膨胀并不罕见,即使我们的增值部分很小或几乎没有,这也不完全是欺诈,正如部长似乎暗示的,而是合法的会计惯例和原产地规则操作。

无论如何,这种收入不平衡引发了商业行动,如我们所见。因此,我想询问外交部是否知晓这些不平衡,若知晓,是否评估促进转运贸易从外交政策角度对国家利益是正面还是负面?此外,外交部是否有正式机制审查或对贸易与工业部的贸易决策提供意见,这些决策不可避免地涉及外交政策影响?

最后,针对贸易与工业部的问题,鉴于美国已将新加坡列为第二级别,政府将采取或计划采取哪些具体措施防止进一步降级,这可能危及我们的人工智能枢纽愿景?

议长:外交部长维文·巴拉克里希南。

外交部长(维文·巴拉克里希南博士):议长先生,新加坡是转运枢纽,是数千家国际公司的重要区域及全球总部。我们的贸易额是国内生产总值的三倍,我们企业所从事的活动范围广泛,不仅限于新加坡及新加坡人拥有的公司,还包括这些公司的全球所有者,具有区域及国际影响力。因此,我不确定林占武副教授所说的不平衡具体指什么。

这些独特特征是新加坡在全球经济中独特角色的正常表现。例如,正如议员所言,英伟达在其报告中称22%的芯片销售归属于在新加坡运营的实体,但我的同事已向议员解释,只有1%的芯片实物运抵新加坡并部署于数据中心,服务政府及其他主要企业,包括超大规模云服务商。因此,这并无异常或不平衡。

问题的核心是这些企业是否利用新加坡规避单边出口管制。我的同事已向本院详细说明,新加坡通过《战略物资管制法》依法执行多边出口管制机制,包括瓦森纳协定、澳大利亚集团及导弹技术控制制度。这些机制主要针对武器、大规模杀伤性武器、化学及生物威胁及其他潜在重要的双用途设备,具有法律效力,我们以联合国安理会为依据。

全球约有200个国家,可能各自颁布单边出口措施。我们已说明无法律义务执行所有200个国家的单边出口措施,但会执行多边达成一致的出口管制机制。

话虽如此,我们国家利益不允许被利用,也不会允许企业为规避适用的单边出口管制措施,利用与新加坡的关联——因为新加坡以清洁、规范、透明和声誉良好著称——进行欺骗或规避行为。

关键在于责任在于企业,我们不容忍规避、欺骗、虚假申报或错误会计,并将采取行动。

当贸易伙伴向我们表达关切时,我们会协助调查或深入审查数据,确保国家利益。针对先进半导体芯片,我们也需要半导体。确实,我们是全球半导体制造和出口链条的一部分。

但目前新加坡制造的并非用于人工智能的高端H100芯片。我们需要这些芯片用于自身用途,因此必须监控芯片制造商的出口管制。

议员提及我们的第二级别分类。首先,该规则称为人工智能扩散规则,最初由拜登政府末期发布。目前规则仍在征求意见,形势尚在演变。我们不属于第一级别,而是与约150个国家同属第二级别。我不便详述芯片数量及是否构成限制。我们将继续与主要先进芯片出口国沟通,确保供应充足。

我相信议员们也明白,涉及此类敏感议题时,维护国家利益不应损害我们在战略物资谈判中的立场。希望议员理解,当前形势源于:一、新加坡独特且成功地履行全球角色;二、我们是值得信赖、可靠且诚实的合作伙伴。

如果你放眼更广,不仅仅是芯片和出口管制,关键是:作为一个小小的岛国城市国家和贸易枢纽,新加坡确实需要支持自由贸易。我们确实需要在全球供应链中发挥关键作用。

第二点,因为我们规模小,我们必须遵守国际法和多边规则,以及实施多边规则的程序和机构。这是作为小国的必然。

第三点,我们始终必须寻求对世界保持相关性,对大国和中等强国有用,但我们不会被其他大国利用,也不会被追求金钱利益的公司利用。

最后一点,在一个正在分裂、破碎或极化分裂的世界里,我们更应坚持正直,我在北京和华盛顿说同样的话,并且保持公正。这就是为什么陈部长所说的一切都适用于我们所有的贸易伙伴。

我想我已经说得够多了。希望我已经让议员和本院其他议员放心。

议长:陈部长。

陈志龙博士:谢谢议长。我也想回应林副教授刚才提到的关于英伟达季度收入的问题。

我想为议员澄清一个非常明确的情况:在2024年第三季度,英伟达季度收入中归属于新加坡的比例是22%。这反映的是英伟达客户收到账单的地点;这并不意味着货物运到了这里。因此,这与英伟达及其客户实际交付货物的物理地点无关。

让我大致向本院议员说明。全球企业将采购商品和服务的账单集中在其枢纽是常见做法,但这与产品实际运送到哪里是分开的。根据我们目前的核查和掌握的数据,显示在该季度,英伟达整体收入中实际运入新加坡的不到1%。其余在这里开具账单的收入并不涉及货物实际运入新加坡。

议长:李马克先生,最后一个追加问题。

李马克先生(提名议员):感谢部长详尽的答复。部长提到新加坡在美国人工智能芯片出口管制中被归为二级国家。我的追加问题是:作为二级国家的经济影响是什么?这种分类是否影响新加坡吸引人工智能芯片投资、高端半导体研发,甚至阻碍我们成为人工智能发展枢纽的雄心?

陈志龙博士:感谢李先生的追加问题。正如我尊敬的同事维维安部长所说,我们属于150个国家的较广泛基础。我认为我们处于良好阵营。

正如我之前答复中提到的,美国人工智能扩散规则尚未由现任政府最终确定;维维安部长也提到该规则是在拜登政府任期最后几天发布的。实际上是在2025年1月13日,刚刚一个多月前。随后有120天的评论期,将于2025年5月13日结束。新政府尚未对该规则的政策或立场发表评论。因此,我们是这150个二级国家之一。

虽然美国将18个国家归为一级,但并未具体说明分级标准,也未说明国家如何从二级重新分类为一级的要求。

获得人工智能计算能力对我们的国家人工智能雄心至关重要。正如我们《国家人工智能战略2.0》中阐述的,我们采取多管齐下的策略,支持产业、学术界和政府开展高价值人工智能活动。除了确保获得先进人工智能硬件和计算资源外,我们还将重点发展人才和基础设施。我们将继续支持在新加坡运营的公司获得先进芯片,包括受人工智能扩散规则管控的芯片。

目前,我们产业界对先进芯片的大部分需求来自总部设在美国的云计算巨头,如Meta、亚马逊、谷歌等。我们将与他们合作,申请成为通用认证终端用户,以允许他们将一定数量的先进芯片转移到新加坡,用于创新和业务需求。

对于本地有大量人工智能计算需求的公司,可以申请成为国家认证终端用户。认证终端用户分为两级:通用认证终端用户和国家认证终端用户。它们可以申请国家认证终端用户身份,以获得先进人工智能芯片的访问权限,我们将支持本地公司申请。

通用和国家认证终端用户进口的芯片不计入对二级国家施加的国家配额。

我们正在与新加坡产业界沟通,收集对草案规则可能对其业务活动影响的反馈。这将帮助我们更好地考虑支持企业的适当措施。正如我之前所说,我们也在与美国进行接触,解决他们的关切,并更好地理解他们对人工智能扩散规则的态度。

英文原文

SPRS Hansard 原始记录 · 抓取日期:2026-05-02

3 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how does the Ministry ensure that the ease of doing business in Singapore is not exploited by companies seeking to bypass US trade restrictions; and (b) whether the Ministry can provide an update on its assessment of the effects of the US chips export control rules on our semi-conductor industry and the broader economy.

4 Ms Joan Pereira asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry whether there are measures in place to ensure that entities operating in Singapore are compliant with export controls and international laws in order to protect Singapore’s status as a well-respected international business hub.

5 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Ministry is aware that Singapore will be placed under the new US AI export controls' Tier Two status; (b) whether it is a specific foreign policy objective of this Government to secure (i) the National Validated End-User status and (ii) Tier One reclassification under these controls; and (c) what specific technical and regulatory enhancements, if any, have been communicated by US counterparts as prerequisites for such status changes.

6 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry in light of how US agencies have flagged Singapore as a hub for illicit chip transshipments to blacklisted Chinese AI firms (a) whether the Government is able to (i) disclose the foreign policy rationales behind its regulatory stance with regard to re-exports of such chips since 2023 and (ii) detail any or all inter-agency decisions that led to this situation; and (b) how does the Government intend to rectify any damage to Singapore’s credibility and ties with the US arising from such reports.

The Second Minister for Trade and Industry (Dr Tan See Leng) : Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer oral Question Nos 3 to 6 on today's Order Paper, filed by Members Mr Yip Hon Weng, Ms Joan Pereira and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, together, please?

Mr Speaker : Please go ahead.

Dr Tan See Leng : These pertain to questions over the United States (US) export controls and Singapore's approach to such measures. My response today will also cover a similar Parliamentary Question that has been filed by Mr Mark Lee 1 , that has been scheduled for a subsequent Sitting.

Singapore is a stable, trusted, reliable and well-connected international business hub. Our economic competitiveness is based on our commitment to the rule of law, zero tolerance for corruption, transparent regulations and an open inclusive business environment. We have painstakingly built up this reputation over time. That is why we take firm and decisive action against individuals and companies that violate our laws. It is the foundation of our competitiveness.

Questions have been raised about Nvidia chips that were subject to US export controls. We are scrutinising this issue carefully and will continue to do so. So far, our checks indicate that physical delivery of products sold by Nvidia to Singapore represent less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue. These are mainly deployed in Singapore for major enterprises and the Singapore Government. We understand that the remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities in Singapore did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

If a company in Singapore is engaged in deceptive or dishonest practices to evade export controls that it is subject to, we will investigate and we will take the appropriate action in accordance with Singapore laws. It is in our national interest to secure access to leading edge technology and to maintain the integrity of our business environment.

Within Singapore, the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology is governed by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act. This is a robust framework that is aligned with major multilateral export control regimes, including those imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Outside of these multilateral regimes, countries sometimes impose unilateral export controls on specific items. The US' export controls on advanced semi-conductor chips are one example.

Under these rules, the US expects companies to ensure their business transactions adhere to their requirements, including doing the required Know Your Customer (KYC) on the buyers of the advanced semi-conductor chips. While we currently do not have legal obligations to enforce the unilateral export controls of other countries, we expect all companies operating in Singapore to take into account such regulations if they apply to their international business activities. Their international business activities should be conducted transparently.

We certainly do not condone businesses deliberately using their association with Singapore to circumvent or violate the export controls of other countries. At the operational level, Singapore Customs works closely with its foreign counterparts, including those from the US to address their concerns and to facilitate their investigations where appropriate and to the extent our law permits.

It is important to emphasise that this open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime applies to all our trading partners.

Some Members also had questions about the economic impact on Singapore arising from US controls on advanced semi-conductor chips. There is limited impact, in terms of our ability to manufacture and export chips. The US' current technology controls are aimed at a narrow subset of advanced semi-conductor chips, whereas Singapore's semi-conductor industry focuses on producing mature node chips which are used globally in appliances, automotives and industrial equipment.

However, in terms of access to advanced artificial intelligence (AI) compute – for example Nvidia H100 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), the previous US administration had introduced an AI Diffusion Rule in January 2025 aimed at managing access to H100 or equivalent GPUs on a country-level basis. Singapore, like around 150 countries, has been classified as Tier Two. The details of the US AI Diffusion Rule have not yet been finalised by the current US administration, and the US has not communicated any specific requirements as prerequisites for changes to countries' tiering classifications.

Our objective is to ensure adequate access to AI compute by both local and international companies with operations in Singapore. We will ensure that US-headquartered cloud hyperscalers can continue to operate in Singapore as Universal Verified End Users and also support local companies that wish to apply to be National Verified End Users with access to AI compute.

In closing, I wish to assure Members that we will continue to work with companies based in Singapore to facilitate their access to advanced semi-conductor chips and technologies from all the major source countries. We will also continue to engage the US administration to address their concerns.

Mr Speaker : Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang) : Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his response. I declare that I work in a global investment firm based in Singapore. I am glad that the Ministry has emphasised compliance with international trade rules, and that Singapore takes our obligations seriously.

Could the Minister elaborate on the safeguards in place, to prevent companies from using Singapore as a conduit to bypass US export restrictions, especially in light of heightened US-China trade tensions? And how does the Ministry balance these safeguards with ensuring that we remain an attractable destination for businesses?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Mr Yip for his supplementary question. Singapore has a robust export control regime and this is underpinned by a comprehensive strategic goods control legislation. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 and its subsidiary legislation governs and regulates the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology.

Singapore's list of control goods and technologies is aligned with four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And as I have alluded to earlier, the enforcement action is undertaken by Singapore Customs.

I wanted to give a bit more granularity in terms of how we manage the exports. Potential contraventions can include export, transshipment, transit of strategic goods without the requisite permits or providing false or misleading documents or information, incorrect declarations and brokering of strategic goods without a permit or being registered – and with that, criminal penalties can then be enforced.

How do we balance working with foreign counterparts? As I have earlier on mentioned in my reply, while we may currently not have legal obligations to enforce unilateral export controls of other countries, which may vary from time to time, companies that are operating in Singapore are expected to take into account such regulations if these apply to their international business activities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Singapore Customs also have existing arrangements with some foreign counterparts, such as those in the US, to facilitate the investigation of companies of interest. From time to time, when we do get information of allegations and if we are aware of breaches, we will undertake to conduct these investigations ourselves.

The approach that we take is systematic and thorough, and we want to continue to emphasise that we have an open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime and it applies to all of our partners today. I hope that addresses Mr Yip's supplementary question.

Mr Speaker : Ms Joan Pereira.

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar) : Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have one supplementary question for the Minister. May I know if there are plans to issue any industry guidelines to support firms operating in Singapore to comply with export controls and international sanctions?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Ms Joan Pereira for her supplementary question. As I have shared earlier on, countries may have export controls from time to time, unilaterally. Where we have been very clear and transparent to companies operating within Singapore is that they are expected to abide by the countries' export controls, and not use Singapore as a country to bypass or circumvent these export controls.

To this end, as the hon Member has highlighted, it would not be possible to cover every potential, probable or future export controls that countries may unilaterally impose. But those principles that have guided us through to build us up to where we are a reputable business hub, these principles will continue to be consistent and we will hold true to these principles. From time to time, when these unilateral export controls come to our attention, we will work with the relevant countries to gain clarity, to engage them, as we are actively engaging with the US, our very important partner, to see how we can better manage and better educate the businesses that are based here to make sure that they are able to comply. I hope that gives the Member the reassurance.

Mr Speaker : Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang) : Sir, I had originally posed my two Parliamentary Questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they were redirected to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). I understand the motivation behind this redirection, but hopeful that the Minister or a Minister from MFA will be able to respond to questions that call for a more foreign policy approach.

Notwithstanding Minister Tan's assertions about the physical sales of Nvidia products being only around 1%, Nvidia's latest filing with the US Securities Exchange Commission states that for the nine months that ended October 2024, the company booked US$91 billion in total revenue, of which a little less than half is domestic; that is, domestic to the US. The next highest source is actually Singapore, with around $7 billion, and it is more than that for China, which includes Hong Kong, at $12 billion. This means that Singapore accounts for around 20% of Nvidia's global revenue. [ Please refer to "Personal Explanation", Official Report, 26 February 2025, Vol 95, Issue 153, Personal Explanation section. ]

It is not unusual for entrepôt hubs like us to book such inflated revenue figures, even if our value-added component is small or negligible, nor is this really about fraud, as the Minister seems to allude to, but actually legitimate accounting practices and rules of origin machinations.

Regardless, the headline imbalance invites commercial action, like what we have seen. So, if I may enquire if MFA was aware of these imbalances and if so, is it, in its assessment, that facilitating transshipment trade is positive or negative for the national interest from a foreign policy angle? And relatedly, is there a formal mechanism for MFA to review or provide input to MTI's trade decisions that have inevitable foreign policy implications?

And finally, one question directly for MTI, and given that Singapore is now being placed under Tier Two status by the US, what specific steps will the Government take or plan to take to prevent further downgrades of our status, which could jeopardise our AI hub aspirations?

Mr Speaker : Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan) : Mr Speaker, Singapore is a transshipment hub, a vital regional and global headquarters for thousands of international companies. Our trade volume is three times our gross domestic product (GDP), and the range of activities that our companies are engaged in, and not just companies owned by Singapore and Singaporeans, but by global owners of these companies, have a regional and international footprint. So, I am not sure what Assoc Prof Jamus Lim is referring to when he says imbalances.

These unique characteristics are par for the course for the unique role that Singapore plays in the global economy. So, for instance, when, as the Member correctly said, Nvidia states in its returns that 22% of sales of chips were booked to entities with operations in Singapore, but my colleague has already explained to the Member only 1% physically came to Singapore and was deployed in data centres here, serving the Government and other major enterprises, including, I should add, hyperscalers. So, there is nothing unusual or unbalanced about that.

The nub of the question really is whether Singapore is being used by these enterprises and companies to evade unilateral export controls. And my colleague has very carefully explained to this House that Singapore, by law, through the Strategic Goods Control Act, gives effect to multilateral export control regimes. He referred to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Basically, these are focused especially on weapons or weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological threats, and other potentially significant dual-use equipment. And these have force of law and we take our reference from the United Nations Security Council.

There are 200 countries in the world. It is possible for 200 countries to promulgate unilateral export measures. We have explained that we are not legally obliged to enforce that unilateral export measures of 200 countries. But we will enforce the multilateral agreed-upon export control regimes.

Having said that, it is not in our national interest to be made use of and for companies who, for whatever reasons, are trying perhaps to evade unilateral export control measures that apply to them, to use their association with Singapore – because people know Singapore is a clean, hygienic, transparent and reputable place – we will not allow them to use that association with us to engage in deceptive or evasive measures to avoid unilateral export measures that apply to them.

The point is the onus is on that company and we will not countenance evasion, deception, false declarations or even mis-accounting; and that we will act on.

And as and when a trading partner comes to us and says, "We have concerns", at that point, we would certainly facilitate investigations or at least, have a deeper look at the data and see whether there is any cause for concern, and we do that in order to protect our own national interest. Specifically for advanced semi-conductor chips. We too have a need for semi-conductors. It is true that we are also part of the global chains that manufacture and export semi-conductors.

But those that are currently manufactured in Singapore are not the H100s, the high-end chips which are used for AI. But we need them for our own purposes and we therefore have to monitor the export regimes of the manufacturers of these chips.

The Member referred to our Tier Two classification. Well, first of all, they call it the AI Diffusion Rule. It was first published near the tail-end of the Biden Administration. In fact, right now, the rules are up for comments and the situation is still evolving. We are not in Tier One, but we are in Tier Two, in good company with about 150 other countries. I do not want to get into detail about the exact number of chips and whether that currently poses a constraint for us. Needless to say, we will continue to engage the major exporting source of these advanced chips to ensure that we have adequate.

And I am sure Members of this House will also be aware, when dealing with sensitive topics like this, it is not in our national interest to compromise our negotiating positions when it deals with strategic items on this score. So, I hope the Member understands that the situation that has arisen is: one, because of our unique role and indeed our successful performance of this unique, global role; and two, the fact that we are a trusted, reliable and honest player.

If you zoom out, beyond chips and export controls, the point is this: Singapore, as a tiny island city-state and a trading hub, we do need to stand in favour of free trade. We do need to play a critical role in global supply chains.

Second point, because we are small, we have to subscribe to international law and multilateral rules, and processes and institutions to give effect to multilateral rules. It comes with being small.

Third point, we always have to seek to be relevant to the world, to be useful to big and middle powers, but we will not be made use of, either by other powers or even by companies pursuing pecuniary interest.

And my final point, in a world which is bifurcating, fracturing or polarising and divided, it is all the more important for us to play it straight, for me to say the same thing in Beijing and Washington, and to be fair. And that is why everything that Minister Tan has said applies to all our trading partners.

I think I have said enough. And I hope I have reassured the Member and other Members of this House.

Mr Speaker : Minister Tan.

Dr Tan See Leng : Thank you, Speaker. I want to also address Assoc Prof Lim's point about Nvidia's quarterly revenue, as he shared earlier on.

I just wanted to put it into very clear perspective for the Member: in the third quarter of 2024, the proportion of Nvidia's quarterly revenue attributed to Singapore is 22%. This reflects the location where Nvidia's customers received the bill; it does not mean that it was shipped here. So, it is independent from the physical location that Nvidia and its customers deliver the goods to.

Let me share broadly with Members of the House. It is common practice for global entities to centralise the billing for procured goods and services in their hubs, but this is separate from where the products are shipped to. So far, from our checks and the data that we have on hand, it is revealed that in that quarter, less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue was physically shipped into Singapore. The remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities here did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

Mr Speaker : Mr Mark Lee, last supplementary question.

Mr Mark Lee (Nominated Member) : I thank the Minister for the very comprehensive reply. The Minister has mentioned that Singapore has been classified as a Tier Two country under the US AI chip export controls. My supplementary question to the Minister is: what are the economic implications of being in Tier Two and does this classification impact Singapore's ability to attract AI chip investments, high-end semi-conductor research and development or even hinder our ambitions to be an AI development hub?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Mr Lee for his supplementary question. As my esteemed colleague, Minister Vivian, has shared, we are in the broader base of the 150 countries. I think we are in good company.

As I have also mentioned in my reply earlier, the US AI Diffusion Rule has not yet been finalised by the current administration; and Minister Vivian has also alluded to the fact that it was released by the Biden Administration in the final days of his administration. Actually, it is on 13 January 2025, just over a month ago. And there is a 120-day comment period, which will end on 13 May 2025. The new administration has not commented on their policy or position towards the rule. So, we are among one of the 150 countries under this Tier Two status.

Whilst the US categorised 18 countries under Tier One, it did not share specific requirements on the tiering classification nor what requirements are required for a country to be reclassified from Tier Two to Tier One.

Access to AI compute is important for our national AI ambitions. As articulated in our National AI Strategy 2.0, we are adopting a multi-prong strategy to enable industry, academia and Government to undertake high-value AI activities. Besides securing access to advanced AI hardware and compute, we will also focus on talent and infrastructure development. We will continue to support companies operating in Singapore to gain access to advanced chips, including those that are under the AI Diffusion Rule.

Presently, most of the demand for advanced chips amongst our industry players come from US headquartered cloud hyperscalers. These are: Meta, Amazon, Google and so on. We will work with them to apply to be universal verified end users, so as to allow them to transfer a certain quantity of advanced chips to Singapore for their innovation and for their business needs.

For the local companies with significant AI compute requirements, they can apply to be the national verified end user. There are two tiers: a universal verified end user and a national verified end user. They can apply for the national verified end user status to receive access to advanced AI chips and we will support our local companies in their application.

Chips that are imported by both universal and national verified end users will not count towards the national cap imposed on Tier Two countries.

We are in consultation with industry players in Singapore to gather feedback on the potential impact of the draft rules on their business activities. This will allow us to better consider appropriate measures to support our companies and we are also, as I have said earlier, engaging the US to address their concerns and to also better understand their approach to the AI Diffusion Rule.