MDDI 演讲稿 · 2024-10-15
张莉媚部长在《ELIONA 法案》二读时的开幕演讲
张莉媚部长在《ELIONA 法案》二读时的开幕演讲
要点
- • 伦敦科技公司Sumsub的研究显示,2024年各选举国深度伪造事件同比激增——印度增至3倍、印度尼西亚超15倍、韩国超16倍。
- • 多国已立法限制选举深度伪造内容:韩国禁止在选举前90天发布AI竞选视频(最高7年监禁或约5万新元罚款);巴西禁止合成选举宣传;美国加利福尼亚州要求平台在选举日前120天起屏蔽候选人的深度伪造内容。
- • Meta、微软、OpenAI及TikTok等二十家科技公司于2024年2月在慕尼黑安全会议上签署《科技协议》,承诺打击选举中具欺骗性的AI应用。
- • 调查显示逾六成新加坡人担忧深度伪造对选举的冲击,新加坡为此提出《ELIONA法案》,修订《国会选举法》与《总统选举法》。
- • 法案禁止发布经数字生成或篡改、且逼真描绘候选人从未发表或实施的言行的在线选举广告,无论内容对候选人有利与否,转发、分享及提升曝光等传播行为同属违法。
- • 法案豁免AI生成的卡通及动画人物、美颜滤镜等无害外观修饰,以及明显不具真实感的娱乐性内容(如表情包)。
完整译文(中文)
MDDI 英文原文译文 · 翻译日期: 2026-06-21
部长Josephine Teo就《选举(网络广告诚信)(修正)法案》二读开场演讲,2024年10月15日
引言
1. 副议长女士,我提请动议,"请现对法案进行二读。"
深度伪造内容对选举的威胁
2. 女士,2024年是全球选举大年。今年,全球近半数人口已经或即将参与投票。
3. 遗憾的是,在已举行或计划举行选举的国家,深度伪造事件明显增多。总部位于伦敦的科技公司Sumsub的研究显示,相关数据触目惊心。与一年前相比,印度的深度伪造事件数量增至三倍;印度尼西亚增至逾15倍;韩国增至逾16倍。¹
4. 今年1月,美国总统乔·拜登的声音遭到伪造,被用于自动拨号电话,企图阻止民主党人参与新罕布什尔州初选。这些自动拨号电话触达了数千人。美国联邦通信委员会此后宣布AI生成的自动拨号电话为违法行为,指出其具有以虚假信息误导消费者的潜力。传输这些伪造自动拨号电话的电信公司被处以100万美元罚款,幕后主使个人则面临600万美元的罚款及刑事指控。
5. 去年斯洛伐克议会选举期间,网络上流传着一段政客讨论选举舞弊的深度伪造音频。不出所料,该音频迅速病毒式传播。其影响因发布时机而进一步放大——恰好在斯洛伐克选举"静默期"(类似于我们的冷静日)之前。该候选人最终落选,尽管此前一直在民调中领先。深度伪造音频是否导致了他的落败?没有人能够确定,但我们当然不希望选举遭受此类事件的影响。
海外司法管辖区与行业行动
6. 深度伪造内容为何如此泛滥?简单来说,制作起来已变得非常容易且成本低廉。议长先生,在您允许的情况下,我是否可以在LED屏幕上播放一段视频?
表格说明
部长深度伪造视频演示
你好,今天办公室里非常忙碌,我刚喝了一杯咖啡。
(停顿)您以为视频中说话的真的是我本人Jo Teo吗?实际上,这是一段由人工智能生成的深度伪造视频。
制作这段视频只需一人花费一小时,使用任何人现在都可以从互联网上轻松获取的软件即可。
试想,若有人制作出逼真的深度伪造内容,描绘本院议员说出或做出我们实际上并未说过或做过的事,并将其广泛传播。这类技术只会持续进步,深度伪造内容可能变得愈加逼真、更具说服力、也更易于制作。
7. 议长先生,议员们能够体会到AI技术正在快速进步。如果您刚才观看的深度伪造视频未能让您相信它是在模仿我本人,更先进的版本很快便会做到。
8. 世界各地,各国已认识到有必要减轻深度伪造内容对本国选举造成的危害。
a. 例如,韩国修订了《公职人员选举法》,禁止在选举前90天内播出使用AI生成内容的政治竞选视频。该修订法律于今年1月生效,违者可被判处最高七年有期徒刑,或处以最高5000万韩元(约合新加坡元5万元)的罚款。迄今为止,韩国国家选举委员会已在其选举期间下架了388条深度伪造内容。
b. 另一个例子是巴西,该国已禁止在选举期间发布任何有损或有利于任何候选人的合成选举宣传内容。相关制裁措施包括撤销候选人的参选资格,或若其已当选则撤销其授权。
c. 上个月,加利福尼亚州将《2024年捍卫民主免受深度伪造欺骗法》(Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024)签署成法,要求社交媒体平台在选举前120天至选举当日期间屏蔽针对候选人的实质性欺骗性深度伪造内容。
d. 澳大利亚政府也在考虑采纳其选举委员会的建议,对选举中AI的使用加以规范。该委员会近期警告称,其在保护选民免受深度伪造视频及模仿政客的电话骚扰方面能力有限,而此类深度伪造内容可能出现在澳大利亚即将举行的选举中。
9. 感到忧虑的不仅仅是各国政府。科技行业也已认识到选举深度伪造内容的危险性,以及确保选民能够自由行使选择权、免受基于AI操控的重要性。包括Meta、Microsoft、OpenAI和TikTok在内的二十家领先科技公司于2月在慕尼黑安全会议上签署了《科技协议》(Tech Accord),承诺打击今年选举中AI的欺骗性使用。
维护新加坡选举的诚信
10. 面对上述发展,新加坡人的担忧是有充分理由的。一项研究²显示,超过十分之六的新加坡人担忧深度伪造内容对下届选举可能造成的影响。
11. 在2021年一宗涉及虚假信息与网络谎言的案件裁决中,我国最高法院指出:"通过散布虚假信息与谎言来左右公职人员选举或公民投票的结果,与民主的核心原则根本不相容。"
12. 议长先生,我希望议员们能够认同,AI生成的虚假信息可能严重威胁我国的民主根基,需要我们作出同等严肃的回应。《选举(网络广告诚信)(修正)法案》(ELIONA)是我们经过审慎权衡后的应对举措,旨在强化《国会选举法》和《总统选举法》下的选举法律,确保候选人陈述的真实性以及我国选举的诚信得以持续维护。
法案范围
主要法律要求
13. 议长先生,我现在将向议员们介绍法案的主要内容。
14. ELIONA法案将修订我国选举法律,禁止发布符合以下条件的内容:
a. 属于或包含网络选举广告,即「OEA」;
b. 经数字生成或处理;且
c. 描绘某候选人作出其实际上未曾作出的言论或行为;
d. 但其逼真程度足以使部分公众在看到或听到该内容后,合理地相信该候选人确实作出了上述言论或行为。
15. 我将逐一详细阐述上述各项条件。
16. 第一,根据我国现行选举法律,网络选举广告是指任何在网络上发布的信息或材料,可合理视为旨在促进、争取或损害某候选人或政党在选举中的成功或前景。现行OEA条款指导互联网在选举期间的透明、负责任使用,包括竞选活动,并确保选举以公平方式进行。ELIONA法案通过针对OEA的实质内容,进一步强化了OEA制度。
17. 第二,ELIONA法案的适用范围涵盖经数字生成或处理的内容。这包括使用生成式AI等AI技术生成或处理的内容,也涵盖Photoshop、配音和剪接等非AI技术。上述技术目前被视为较为传统的编辑手段,但仍可用于处理描绘候选人的内容,与AI生成的深度伪造内容同样具有危害性和误导性。
18. 第三,ELIONA法案的适用范围针对选举情境下危害最大的内容类型,即通过对候选人言论或行为的虚假呈现,对公众产生误导或欺骗,且其逼真程度足以让部分公众合理相信的内容。
19. 是否具备逼真性这一条件将进行客观评估。没有放之四海而皆准的标准,但可以提出若干一般性要点:
a. 第一,此类内容应与候选人已知的外貌特征、表情及言行举止高度吻合。从技术层面而言,我们预期其具备一定程度的精密性,使得光线、肢体动作或音频失真等方面的不一致之处降至最低。
b. 第二,内容可能借助真实人物、事件和地点,使虚假呈现显得更为可信。例如,一段涉及时事的虚假竞选集会演讲,若以真实且为人熟知的集会现场为背景,看起来会更加真实。
c. 我们还须认识到,受众会通过由其个人经历、信念和认知偏见所塑造的不同视角,来感知和处理相同的内容。例如,我们许多人都觉得总理会在社交媒体上提供投资建议这一说法难以置信。但作为国会议员,我们都曾接触过遭受此类AI诈骗侵害的居民。在这方面,只要有部分公众会合理地相信候选人确实作出了内容所描绘的言论或行为,该法律即适用。
20. 此外,在评估内容是否与候选人的言论或行为相符时,我们将主要依赖候选人就其是否确曾作出该言论或行为所作的声明。我将在发言后段进一步阐述这一点。
21. 内容须同时满足全部四项法律要件,方可被列为禁止内容。即该内容
a. 属于或包含OEA;
b. 经数字生成或处理;且
c. 描绘某候选人作出其实际上未曾作出的言论或行为;
d. 但其逼真程度足以使部分公众在看到或听到该内容后,合理地相信该候选人确实作出了上述言论或行为。
22. 议长先生,经您允许,可否请书记员向各位分发一份说明材料,以阐明在新条款下哪些内容将被允许、哪些将被禁止?先生,议员们也可通过MP@SGPARL应用程序查阅该说明材料。
23. 将被禁止的内容示例包括:
a. 以逼真方式呈现候选人发表其从未说过的言论的音频伪造内容;
b. 以逼真方式呈现候选人参与实际未曾发生的活动、或会见其从未见过的人员的AI生成图像;
c. 断章取义并歪曲候选人行为的逼真处理图像或视频。
24. 无论内容对任何候选人有利或不利,均不影响上述规定的适用。在选举期间发布此类被禁止的内容,包括通过推广、分享和转发现有内容,将构成违法行为。
不太可能受到规管的内容之相关保证
25. 在提出这一应对候选人网络上逼真虚假呈现的新措施的同时,我们也注重不禁止在竞选活动中合理使用AI或技术。虽然每个案例将逐案评估,但有若干情形不在禁止之列。
a. 第一类是AI生成或动画人物及卡通内容。此类动画大多并非真实人物的照片级逼真复制品;受众通常能够判断所描绘的言论或行为并非真实。
b. 第二类是无害的外观修饰,例如使用美颜滤镜,或对图像和视频进行色彩和光线调整。此类修改通常不会实质性地影响真实性,也不会造成对候选人言论或行为的虚假呈现。
c. 第三类是娱乐性内容,例如网络表情包(memes)。我们认识到此类内容可能在选举期间的网络讨论中出现。只要网络表情包被评估为不具逼真性,且不会误导受众对候选人言论或行为的判断,即不受该法律的规管。
26. 部分议员可能存有顾虑——候选人在集选区(GRC)或单选区(SMC)背景下的普通竞选海报,若上传至网络,是否会受到禁止?此类海报通常是明显的合成图像,例如候选人被不成比例地叠加于某一地标或背景之前。公众不会合理地认为此类内容是对候选人行为的真实描绘。此类竞选海报不太可能落入禁止范围之内。禁令不适用于某些通讯及出版物
27. 议长先生,我想明确说明,禁令不适用于某些类型的内容。
28. 第一,该法案不延伸至私人或家庭通讯。出于用户隐私考量,这是指在个人之间或封闭群体内分享的内容,例如与家人或一小群朋友的群聊。
a. 话虽如此,我们知道虚假内容可能在开放的 WhatsApp 或 Telegram 频道中迅速传播。若有举报指出,禁止内容正在涉及众多互不相识用户、且公众可自由访问的大型群聊中传播,此类通讯将受法案约束,我们将评估是否应采取行动。
b. 确定通讯是否属于私人或家庭性质的相关因素,已在各相关选举法令中列明。
29. 第二,禁令不适用于经授权新闻机构发布的新闻报道。此举旨在为就禁止内容进行公正报道留有空间,以便公众能及时获悉有关候选人的虚假内容。
30. 第三,我们认识到,普通人可能在未意识到内容已被篡改的情况下,不慎转发消息和链接。若某人并不知情、且没有理由相信该候选人实际上并未说过或做过相关事情,并因此无意间触犯禁令,法例将为其提供免责辩护。
禁令的持续时间及适用对象
31. 议长先生,加强保障措施将在选举期间适用,即从颁发选举令状之日起至投票日投票结束为止。
32. 从颁发令状至提名日期间,我们将对希望以准候选人身份自我认定、并希望受《ELIONA 法案》保障措施保护的个人引入双重要求:
a. 第一,缴付选举押金;以及
b. 第二,同意由选举局(ELD)公开其姓名。同意表格将通过 ELD 网站提供,相关网站将每日更新。
33. 缴付选举押金是参选的先决条件,也是个人有意参选之认真程度的指标。
a. 这比单纯公开声明有意参选更进一步。
b. 公布缴付押金者的姓名,也将使公众清楚了解哪些个人受法律保障。
c. 候选人可完全自主决定何时在提名日前向公众告知其参选意向。候选人可选择缴付选举押金,但暂不同意公开其姓名,直至提名日方才同意。
34. 提名程序完成后至投票日投票结束期间,《ELIONA 法案》的保障措施将适用于涉及所有成功获提名候选人的内容。
35. 与此同时,个人本身也应主动站出来,澄清并辟除其认为对自己存在误导性描述的内容。
法案的执法
技术评估
36. 政府将使用一系列检测工具,评估相关内容是否经由数字手段生成或篡改。我们可调用的工具包括商业工具,以及内部开发的工具,或与研究人员合作开发的工具,例如网络安全先进技术中心(CATOS)的研究人员所开发的工具。
37. 这些工具持续更新,以跟上技术发展。持续大力投资研究是确保我们保持领先的方式之一。我们已向 CATOS 拨款 5000 万元,为期五年,用于开发检测网络危害的新技术能力,包括检测有害的数字篡改内容。
候选人声明
38. 在审查依据这一新禁令所举报的虚假内容时,政府将优先处理候选人向选举主任(RO)提交的报告。除就内容是否被篡改进行技术评估外,选举主任还将依赖候选人的声明,以判断内容是否对其言行存在虚假描绘。
39. 在这一新禁令下,我们高度重视候选人向选举主任作出的声明,因为候选人最能迅速澄清相关内容是否如实、准确地反映了其本人的言行。政府不太可能掌握候选人是否确实说过或做过某事的全部证据,尤其是在私下场合发生的情况。
40. 候选人将向选举主任作出声明,以证明其陈述的真实性。该声明表格将通过 ELD 网站上的候选人门户向候选人开放。
虚假声明的处罚
41. 为遏制滥用法律的行为——例如候选人要求删除实为如实描述其言行的不利内容——候选人在请求中故意作出虚假或误导性声明将被列为违法行为。
42. 违法行为的处罚已在各选举法令中列明。若被裁定犯有违法行为,当事人可面临不超过 2,000 元的罚款,并丧失被选为国会议员或总统的资格。此外,若已当选,该候选人作为国会议员或总统的当选结果也可能被宣告无效。
选举主任的权力
43. 目前,选举官(RO)有权向任何相关人士(包括社交媒体服务)发出纠正指令,要求删除或禁止在新加坡访问被禁止的网络竞选广告,或停止或减少其电子通信活动。
44. ELIONA 法案将上述权力延伸,使 RO 得以就这一新类别的内容发出纠正指令,且相关纠正措施须在规定期限内完成。
45. 如前所述,政府将优先处理候选人向 RO 提交的报告和声明。如经评估属于真实情况,RO 将发出纠正指令。仅在特殊情况下,才会考虑在没有候选人声明的情况下就虚假陈述发出指令。这类情况可能出现在客观事实已广为人知,或政府掌握可靠数据足以确认候选人实际言行之时。
46. 公众也可向当局举报候选人疑似被禁止的内容,以供审查。
47. 为更好地协助公众在选举期间作出知情选择,当局将就已对违规内容发出的纠正指令通知公众。
不遵从纠正指令
48. 不遵从 RO 所发出的纠正指令即构成违法。鉴于社交媒体服务所具有的广泛影响力及其应承担的责任,我们已将社交媒体服务提供商不遵从纠正指令的罚款上限提高至 100 万元。
49. 这是一项合理的调整——修订后的罚则与其他内容监管工具下的类似违法行为相当,包括《防止网络虚假信息和网络操纵法》("POFMA")、《广播法》("BA")及《网络犯罪危害法》("OCHA")。
50. 对于所有其他人士(包括个人),不遵从纠正指令的财务及监禁处罚维持不变,罚款上限为 1,000 元,或监禁不超过 12 个月,或两者兼施。
51. 我们已就 ELIONA 法案下的相关要求与主要社交媒体服务进行沟通,并明确表达我们的期望:上述指令须被迅速遵从,以维护我国选举的公正性。
将 ELIONA 纳入我们的一揽子措施
52. 议长先生,正如政策研究所(Institute of Policy Studies)的 Carol Soon 博士所指出,ELIONA 法案在"内容"、"时间"及"对象"三个维度上经过审慎校准,是我国在选举事务管理方面一贯坚守原则做法的延续。
53. 首先,该法案针对最具危害性的数字生成及篡改内容(包括深度伪造内容),此类内容可能影响选举结果;与此同时,该法案也认可新型内容创作技术的价值,以及候选人采用创新方式与选民互动的意愿。
54. 其次,该法案仅在选举期间适用,即从令状颁发之日起至投票日投票结束为止,旨在维护选举程序的公正性,并在选举期间为公平、正当的政治讨论保留空间。
55. 第三,上述保障措施适用于所有候选人,不论其所属政党,亦不论虚假内容的潜在影响。这是因为,有利于某位候选人的虚假内容必然对另一位候选人不利,反之亦然。我们的选民必须能够依据对未来政治领袖真实、如实的呈现作出知情选择。候选人在选举期间同样有责任以诚信方式行事。
56. ELIONA 法案是对我们历年来为应对各类有害网络内容所推出的一揽子措施的更新。在选举期间及选举期间以外,现有内容监管工具将继续适用于某些类型的人工智能生成虚假信息及深度伪造内容。
a. 例如,根据 POFMA,部长或在选举期间获委任的代理权力机构,可向收件人发出指令,要求其传达更正通知。部长或代理权力机构亦可以深度伪造内容含有虚假事实陈述且发出指令符合公共利益为由,指令删除或禁止访问相关深度伪造内容。
b. 根据 OCHA,可就具有刑事性质的网络活动发出指令加以处理,例如涉及深度伪造的诈骗活动。
c. 根据《防止骚扰法》,个人可就某些对其造成骚扰、惊吓或困扰的内容寻求补救。
POFMA 新行为准则
57. 除 ELIONA 法案在选举期间所订立的期望外,社交媒体服务在任何时候均应就数字生成或篡改内容承担更大责任。大多数主要社交媒体服务亦是 POFMA 下的指定互联网中间商,将须通过即将颁布的 POFMA 行为准则("准则")随时防止和应对数字生成或篡改内容遭到滥用。
58. 这包括 PII 须建立完善的系统和流程,以加强对数字生成或篡改内容的透明度,例如通过标注方式实现。与目前已生效的其他三项 POFMA 行为准则一样,新准则正在与指定互联网中间商协商制定,我们计划于 2025 年完成准则的制定并予以颁布。
结语
59. 议长先生,请允许我以华语继续发言。
60. 我相信许多人都有过这样的经历:身边的亲友对网上的深伪内容深信不疑。无论我们怎么解释,对方仍旧把假消息信以为真。有时,甚至连我们自己也上当,受骗,假内容的散播,让人防不胜防。
61. 在人工智能的迅速发展下,深伪内容只会变得更普及,更逼真,让别有居心的人能够更轻易,更快速地在我们的社会散播怀疑的种子。如果这种假内容在大选期间广泛传播,其后果将不堪设想。
62. 事实上,这并非无稽之谈。近期,不少国家的大选中,已经看到了假内容的危害。这项新法令旨在禁止在网上发布和传播歪曲候选人言行举止的假内容,让我们才可以更好地保障民主进程和选举的公平性。
63. 然而,法令并非灵丹妙药。增强公众辨别内容真伪的能力,才是最有效的预防针。因此,让我们同心协力,对网上内容提高警惕,必要时,向可靠来源求证。每个人从自身做起,成为抵御假内容的第一道防线。
64. 议长先生,请允许我作出总结。
65. 在深度伪造的时代,眼见不再为实。我们不仅要质疑来源和言论的真实性,更要质疑那些通常被视为事实依据的东西:我们所看到的图像和视频,以及我们所听到的音频片段,即便那是一把熟悉的声音。
66. ELIONA法案将为我们的选举增添额外一层保障,但每个人——候选人、公民、科技平台——都在保护我们的民主方面各有其责。
67. 我们必须保持选举的公平与诚信,以事实而非虚构为依据。总体而言,本院议员无论党派立场,均支持这些理念,我呼吁各位议员支持本法案,以便我们能够继续维护选举廉正。
68. 议长先生,我就此提请付议。
1 Sumsub。(2024年)深度伪造案例在举行2024年大选的国家激增,Sumsub研究显示。https://sumsub.com/newsroom/deepfake-cases-surge-in-countries-holding-2024-elections-sumsub-research-shows/
2 Verian。(2024年)四分之三的新加坡人对诈骗中使用深度伪造技术感到担忧。https://www.veriangroup.com/press-release/three-quarters-of-singaporeans-concerned-about-the-use-of-deepfakes-in-scams
英文原文
MDDI 官网原始记录 · 抓取日期: 2026-06-21
SECOND READING OPENING SPEECH BY MINISTER JOSEPHINE TEO ON THE ELECTIONS (INTEGRITY OF ONLINE ADVERTISING) (AMENDMENT) BILL, 15 OCT 2024
Introduction
1. Madam Deputy Speaker, I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a second time.”
Threat of deepfakes to elections
2. Madam, 2024 is a bumper year for elections around the world. Almost half of the world’s population have gone or will go to the polls this year.
3. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable increase of deepfake incidents in countries where elections have taken place or are planned. Research conducted by London-based tech company Sumsub suggests that the numbers are alarming. In India, compared to a year ago, there are three times as many deepfake incidents. In Indonesia, more than 15 times and in South Korea, more than 16 times. 1
4. Earlier in January this year, a fake version of U.S. President Joe Biden’s voice was featured in robocalls that sought to discourage Democrats from participating in the New Hampshire Primary. The robocalls reached thousands of people. The US Federal Communications Commission has since declared AI-generated robocalls illegal, noting that they have the potential to confuse consumers with misinformation. The telecommunications company which transmitted the fake robocalls has been fined US$1 million, and the individual behind it faces a fine of US$6 million and criminal charges.
5. During the Slovakian parliamentary elections last year, a deepfake audio of a politician discussing electoral rigging was posted online. Unsurprisingly, the audio went viral. Its impact was amplified by its timing – right before Slovakia’s electoral “silence period”, which is like our cooling-off day. The candidate lost the elections, despite having earlier led in the polls. Did the deepfake audio contribute to his loss? No one can say with certainty, but surely we prefer not to have elections subject to such incidents.
Overseas jurisdictions and industry action
6. Why have deepfake content proliferated? The short answer is that they have become very easy and cheap to produce. With your permission, Mr Speaker, may I play a video on the LED screens?
Table caption
Minister’s deepfake video presentation
Hello, it’s been a busy day in the office, and I’ve just had a cup of coffee.
(Pause) Did you think this was really me, Jo Teo, speaking in this video? Actually, this is a deepfake generated by artificial intelligence.
It only took one person one hour to create this, using easily accessible software that anyone can use right now from the Internet.
Imagine if someone produced realistic deepfakes, depicting Members of this House saying or doing something we did not actually say or do, and disseminated it. Such technology will only improve, and deepfakes may become even more realistic, convincing, and easy to make.
7. Sir, Members will appreciate that AI technology is improving quickly. If the deepfake video you just watched did not convince you of its impersonation of me, more advanced versions soon will.
8. Around the world, countries have recognised the need to mitigate the harms of deepfakes to their elections.
a. For example, South Korea revised its Public Official Election Act to ban political campaign videos that use AI-generated content 90 days prior to an election. Violations of the revised law, which took effect in January this year, can lead to jail time of up to seven years, or a fine of up to 50 million won, which is almost S$50,000. To date, 388 deepfakes have been taken down by the National Election Commission of South Korea during its elections.
b. Another example is Brazil, which has banned synthetic electoral propaganda that will harm or favour any candidate during an election. The sanctions include the revocation of the candidate’s registration or their mandate, if they had been elected.
c. Last month, the state of California passed into law the “Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024”, which requires social media platforms to block materially deceptive deepfakes of candidates from 120 days before the election to the day of the election.
d. The Australian government is also considering the advice of its Electoral Commission to regulate the use of AI in elections, given the Commission’s recent warning that it has limited scope to protect voters from deepfake videos and phone calls imitating politicians in Australia’s upcoming elections.
9. It is not just Governments which are concerned. The tech industry has also recognised the dangers of electoral deepfakes, and the importance of ensuring voters can exercise their choice, free from AI-based manipulation. Twenty leading tech companies, including Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, and TikTok, signed the Tech Accord at the Munich Security Conference in February, committing to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections this year.
Upholding the integrity of elections in Singapore
10. In the face of these developments, Singaporeans are rightly concerned. One study 2 shows that more than 6 in 10 Singaporeans are worried about the potential impact of deepfakes on the next election.
11. In a 2021 ruling on a case related to misinformation and online falsehoods, our apex court had said: “It is simply incompatible with the core principles of democracy to procure the outcome of an election to public office or a referendum by trading in disinformation and falsehoods.”
12. Mr Speaker, I hope Members will agree that AI-generated misinformation can seriously threaten our democratic foundations and demands an equally serious response. The Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Bill, or ELIONA, is our carefully calibrated response to augment our election laws under the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Presidential Elections Act, ensuring that the truthfulness of candidate representation and the integrity of our elections continues to be upheld.
Scope of the Bill
Key legal requirements
13. Sir, I will now bring Members through the key aspects of the Bill.
14. The ELIONA Bill will amend our election laws to prohibit the publication of content that:
a. is or includes online election advertising, or “OEA”;
b. Is digitally generated or manipulated; and
c. depicts a candidate saying or doing something that he or she did not in fact say or do;
d. But is realistic enough that some members of the public who see or hear the content would reasonably believe that the candidate did in fact say or do that thing.
15. I will go through each of these criteria in detail.
16. First, online election advertising under our existing election laws refers to any information or material published online that can reasonably be regarded as intended to promote or procure, or prejudice the electoral success or prospects of a candidate or political party. The existing OEA provisions guide the transparent and responsible use of the Internet during elections, including for campaigning, and ensure that the elections are contested fairly. The ELIONA Bill strengthens the OEA regime by targeting the substantive content of the OEA.
17. Second, the ELIONA Bill is scoped to address content that is digitally generated or manipulated. This includes content generated or manipulated using AI techniques such as generative AI. It also includes non-AI techniques such as Photoshop, dubbing, and splicing. These are now seen as more traditional editing methods. But they can still be used to manipulate content depicting candidates, making them as harmful and misleading as AI-generated deepfakes.
18. Third, the ELIONA Bill is scoped to address the most harmful types of content in the context of elections, which is content that misleads or deceives the public about a candidate, through a false representation of his speech or actions, that is realistic enough to be reasonably believed by some members of the public.
19. The condition of being realistic will be objectively assessed. There is no one-size-fits-all set of criteria but some general points can be made:
a. First, such content should closely match the candidates’ known features, expressions, and mannerisms. Technically, we would expect a degree of sophistication resulting in minimal inconsistencies in aspects like lighting, body movements, or audio distortions.
b. Second, content may make use of actual persons, events and places so that the false representation appears more believable. For example, a fake rally speech touching on current affairs looks more real when placed against the backdrop of an actual and familiar rally site.
c. We must also recognise that audiences perceive and process the same content through different lenses shaped by their individual experiences, beliefs, and cognitive biases. For example, many of us find it incredible that the Prime Minister would be giving investment advice on social media. But as Members of Parliament, we have all met residents who have fallen prey to such AI-enabled scams. In this regard, the law will apply so long as there are some members of the public who would reasonably believe that the candidate did say or do what was depicted.
20. Also, in assessing whether content matches a candidate’s speech or actions, we will be relying primarily on declarations by the candidate if he or she had said or done that thing. I will elaborate on this later in my speech.
21. All four legal limbs have to be met for the content to be prohibited. That is, the content
a. is or includes OEA;
b. Is digitally generated or manipulated; and
c. depicts a candidate saying or doing something that he or she did not in fact say or do;
d. But is realistic enough that some members of the public who see or hear the content would reasonably believe that the candidate did in fact say or do that thing.
22. Mr Speaker, with your permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a handout that will illustrate our thinking on what will be allowed or disallowed under the new provisions? Sir, Members can also access this handout through the MP@SGPARL App.
23. Examples of content that would be prohibited include:
a. Realistic audiofakes featuring a candidate saying things he did not say;
b. Realistic AI-generated images of a candidate participating at events that did not happen, meeting people that he or she did not meet;
c. Realistic manipulated images or videos taken out of context and misrepresenting a candidate’s actions.
24. It does not matter if the content is favourable or unfavourable to any candidate. The publication of such prohibited content during the election period, including by boosting, sharing, and reposting existing content, will be an offence.
Assurances on content that are unlikely to be caught
25. As we propose this new measure to tackle realistic misrepresentations of candidates online, we are mindful not to disallow reasonable use of AI or technology in electoral campaigning. While each case will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, there are several scenarios that the prohibition will not extend to.
a. The first is AI-generated or animated characters and cartoons. Most of these animations are not photorealistic replicas of real persons; audiences will generally be able to tell that the speech or actions depicted are not real.
b. The second is benign cosmetic alterations, such as the use of beauty filters, or colour and lighting adjustments of images and videos. Such alterations typically involve modifications that do not materially affect truthfulness, and do not result in a misrepresentation of a candidate’s speech or actions.
c. The third is entertainment content, such as memes. We recognise that such content can arise as part of online discourse during the election period. Memes will not be caught under the law as long as they are assessed to be unrealistic and do not mislead audiences about a candidate’s speech or actions.
26. Some Members may be concerned – will candidates’ regular campaign posters, showing individuals against the backdrop of a GRC or a SMC, be prohibited if they are put online? Such posters are usually obvious composite images, such as candidates disproportionately superimposed in front of a landmark or backdrop. Members of the public would not reasonably believe such content to be realistic depictions of a candidate’s action. Such campaign posters are unlikely to fall within the scope of prohibitions. Ban will not apply to certain communications and publications
27. Mr Speaker, I would like to make clear that the ban will not apply to certain types of content.
28. First, the Bill does not extend to private or domestic communications. This refers to content shared between individuals or within a closed group, like group chats with family or a small group of friends, in view of user privacy.
a. That said, we know that false content can circulate rapidly on open WhatsApp or Telegram channels. If it is reported that prohibited content is being communicated in big group chats that involve many users who are strangers to one another, and are freely accessible by the public, such communications will be caught under the Bill and we will assess if action should be taken.
b. The factors that determine whether communications are private or domestic are set out in the respective election Acts.
29. Second, the prohibition does not apply to news published by authorised news agencies. This is to give space to fair reporting on prohibited content, such that the public can be alerted to the false content about candidates in a timely manner.
30. Third, we recognise that a layperson may carelessly reshare messages and links without realising that the content has been manipulated. The legislation provides for a defence if a person did not know and had no reason to believe that the candidate did not in fact say or do the thing and inadvertently commits the offence.
Duration of the ban, and who the ban applies to
31. Sir, the enhanced safeguards will apply during the election period, from the issuance of the Writ of Election to the close of polling on Polling Day.
32. From the issuance of the Writ to Nomination Day, we will introduce a two-part requirement for individuals who would like to identify themselves as prospective candidates and have the safeguards of the ELIONA Bill apply to them:
a. First, pay the election deposit; and
b. Second, consent for their names to be made public by the Elections Department (“ELD”). The consent form will be made available via the ELD website. The intention is for the website to be updated daily.
33. Paying the election deposit is a pre-requisite for standing in an election and an indicator of an individual’s seriousness of intent to be a candidate.
a. It is a step up from simply making a public declaration of one’s potential candidacy.
b. Publishing the names of those who placed the deposit will also make clear to the public which individuals are covered by the law.
c. It is the candidate’s choice entirely when to inform the public about his or her intention to stand for election before Nomination Day. Candidates can choose to put down the election deposit but withhold consent to make their names public until Nomination Day.
34. After nomination proceedings are completed, and up to the close of polling on Polling Day, the safeguards of the ELIONA Bill will apply to content depicting all successfully nominated candidates.
35. At the same time, individuals themselves should also readily come forward to clarify and debunk content that they believe misrepresents them.
Enforcement of the Bill
Technical assessment
36. The Government will use a range of detection tools to assess if the content has been generated or manipulated using digital means. We have at our disposal commercial tools, and also those developed in-house, or in partnership with researchers, such as those at the Centre of Advanced Technologies in Online Safety, or CATOS.
37. These tools are constantly updated to keep up with technology. Continuing strong investment in research is one way to ensure that we stay ahead. We have channelled $50 million in funding over five years to CATOS, which will develop new technological capabilities to detect online harms, including harmful digitally manipulated content.
Declaration by candidates
38. In reviewing reports of false content flagged under this new prohibition, the Government will prioritise candidates’ reports to the Returning Officer (“RO”). Besides the technical assessment on whether content has been manipulated, the RO will also rely on candidates’ declarations on whether the content falsely depicts their speech and actions.
39. We have placed significant weight on candidates’ declarations to the RO under this new prohibition, as a candidate is in the best position to speedily clarify if the content is a truthful and accurate representation of himself or herself. The Government is unlikely to have all the evidence of whether a candidate actually said or did something, especially if it was in a private setting.
40. The declaration by candidates will be made to the RO, for candidates to attest to the veracity of his or her claim. This declaration form will be made available to candidates via the Candidate’s Portal on ELD’s website.
Penalties for false declaration
41. To deter the abuse of the law, such as candidates requesting to take down unfavourable content that is in fact a factual representation of their speech or action, it will be made an illegal practice for candidates to knowingly make a false or misleading declaration in a request.
42. The penalties for an illegal practice are set out in the election Acts. If convicted of an illegal practice, one may face a fine not exceeding $2,000, and become ineligible to be elected as a Member of Parliament or the President. Further, if already elected, the election of a candidate as a Member of Parliament or President may also be invalidated.
Powers of the Returning Officer
43. Currently, the RO has powers to issue corrective directions to any relevant person, including social media services, to remove or disable access in Singapore to prohibited online election advertising, or to stop or reduce its electronic communication activity.
44. The ELIONA Bill extends these powers for the RO to issue corrective directions against this new category of content, and corrective actions must be taken within the specified period of time.
45. As mentioned earlier, the Government will prioritise candidates’ reports and declarations to the RO. If assessed to be a genuine case, the RO will issue corrective directions. Only in exceptional cases will directions be considered against false representations without a candidate’s declaration. This may arise when the objective facts are widely known or if the Government has access to data that reliably confirms the candidate’s actual speech or action.
46. The public can also report potentially prohibited content of candidates to the authorities for review.
47. To better equip the public to make informed choices during the elections, the public will be notified about corrective directions that have been issued against offending content.
Non-compliance with corrective direction
48. Non-compliance with a corrective direction issued by the RO is an offence. Recognising the extensive reach and responsibility that social media services must uphold, we have raised the fine of up to $1 million for a provider of a social media service that fails to comply with a corrective direction.
49. This is a reasonable adjustment – the revised penalty is on par with similar offences under other content regulation tools like the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (“POFMA”), the Broadcasting Act (“BA”), and the Online Criminal Harms Act (“OCHA”).
50. For all others, including individuals, there is no change to the financial and custodial penalties for non-compliance with a corrective direction, and remains at a fine not exceeding $1,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both.
51. We have engaged major social media services on the requirements under the ELIONA Bill and shared our expectation that such directions are to be promptly complied with to uphold the integrity of our elections.
Adding ELIONA to our suite of measures
52. Mr Speaker, as noted by Dr Carol Soon of the Institute of Policy Studies, the ELIONA Bill is carefully calibrated in its scope of the “what”, “when”, and “whom”, and is a continuation of our principled approach towards the conduct of elections in Singapore.
53. First, the Bill addresses the most harmful digitally generated and manipulated content, including deepfakes, that can influence electoral outcomes, while recognising the value of novel content creation techniques and the desire of candidates to employ innovative methods to engage voters.
54. Second, it applies only during the election period, from the issuance of Writ to the end of polling on Polling Day, to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and preserve space for fair and legitimate political discourse during the elections.
55. Third, the safeguards apply to all candidates regardless of political party and potential impact of the fake content. This recognises that fake content favourable to one candidate must be unfavourable to another, and vice versa. Our voters must be able to make informed choices based on factual and truthful representation of our prospective political leaders. Candidates too have a responsibility to conduct themselves with integrity during the elections.
56. The ELIONA Bill updates our suite of measures introduced over the years to address various forms of harmful online content. During and outside the election periods, existing content regulation tools will continue to apply to certain types of AI-generated misinformation and deepfakes.
a. For example, under POFMA, a Minister, or an appointed Alternate Authority during the election periods, may issue a direction for a recipient to communicate a correction notice. The Minister or Alternate Authority may also direct the removal or disabling of access to deepfakes on the grounds that they contain false statements of fact and it is in the public interest to issue the direction.
b. Under OCHA, directions may be given to deal with online activities that are criminal in nature, such as deepfake-related scams.
c. Under the Protection from Harassment Act, individuals may seek recourse for certain content that have caused personal harassment, alarm or distress to the individual.
New POFMA Code of Practice
57. Beyond the expectations set out in the ELIONA Bill during the election period, social media services should also bear greater responsibility for digitally generated or manipulated content at all times. Most major social media services are also prescribed Internet intermediaries under POFMA, and will be required to prevent and counter the abuse of digitally generated or manipulated content at all times through an upcoming Code of Practice under POFMA (“Code”).
58. This includes an obligation for PIIs to put in place adequate systems and processes to enhance the transparency about digitally generated or manipulated content, such as through labelling. Like the three other POFMA Codes in effect today, the new Code is being formulated in consultation with the prescribed Internet intermediaries, and we intend to finalise the Code for issuance in 2025.
Conclusion
59. Mr Speaker, may I continue in Mandarin, please.
60. 我相信许多人都有过这样的经历: 身边的亲友对网上的深伪内容深信不疑。无论我们怎么解释,对方仍旧把假消息信以为真。有时,甚至连我们自己也上当,受骗, 假内容的散播,让人防不胜防。
61. 在人工智能的迅速发展下,深伪内容只会变得更普及,更逼真,让别有居心的人能够更轻易,更快速地在我们的社会散播怀疑的种子。如果这种假内容在大选期间广泛传播,其后果将不堪设想。
62. 事实上,这并非无稽之谈。近期,不少国家的大选中,已经看到了假内容的危害。这项新法令旨在禁止在网上发布和传播歪曲候选人言行,举止的假内容,让我们才可以更好地保障民主进程,和选举的公平性。
63. 然而,法令并非灵丹妙药。增强公众辨别内容真伪的能力,才是最有效的预防针。因此,让我们同心协力,对网上内容提高警惕,必要时,向可靠来源求证。每个人从自身做起,成为抵御假内容的第一道防线。
64. Mr Speaker, let me conclude.
65. In the age of deepfakes, seeing is no longer believing. We have to question not only the authenticity of sources and statements, but the very thing that usually counts as truth: what we see as images and videos, and what we hear through audio clips, even if it is a familiar voice.
66. The ELIONA Bill will add an additional layer of safeguards to our elections, but everyone – candidates, citizens, tech platforms – have a part to play in protecting our democracy.
67. We must keep our elections fair and honest, conducted on the basis of fact, not fiction. By and large, Members of this House regardless of party allegiance have supported these ideals, and I appeal to Members to stand behind this Bill so that we can continue to uphold the integrity of our elections.
68. With that Sir, I beg to move.
1 Sumsub. (2024) Deepfake cases surge in countries holding 2024 elections, Sumsub research shows. https://sumsub.com/newsroom/deepfake-cases-surge-in-countries-holding-2024-elections-sumsub-research-shows/
2 Verian. (2024) Three quarters of Singaporeans concerned about the use of deepfakes in scams. https://www.veriangroup.com/press-release/three-quarters-of-singaporeans-concerned-about-the-use-of-deepfakes-in-scams