MDDI 演講稿 · 2024-10-15
張莉媚部長在《ELIONA 法案》二讀時的開幕演講
要點
- • 倫敦科技公司Sumsub的研究顯示,2024年各選舉國深度偽造事件同比激增——印度增至3倍、印度尼西亞超15倍、韓國超16倍。
- • 多國已立法限制選舉深度偽造內容:韓國禁止在選舉前90天釋出AI競選影片(最高7年監禁或約5萬新元罰款);巴西禁止合成選舉宣傳;美國加利福尼亞州要求平臺在選舉日前120天起遮蔽候選人的深度偽造內容。
- • Meta、微軟、OpenAI及TikTok等二十家科技公司於2024年2月在慕尼黑安全會議上籤署《科技協議》,承諾打擊選舉中具欺騙性的AI應用。
- • 調查顯示逾六成新加坡人擔憂深度偽造對選舉的衝擊,新加坡為此提出《ELIONA法案》,修訂《國會選舉法》與《總統選舉法》。
- • 法案禁止釋出經數字生成或篡改、且逼真描繪候選人從未發表或實施的言行的線上選舉廣告,無論內容對候選人有利與否,轉發、分享及提升曝光等傳播行為同屬違法。
- • 法案豁免AI生成的卡通及動畫人物、美顏濾鏡等無害外觀修飾,以及明顯不具真實感的娛樂性內容(如表情包)。
完整譯文(繁體中文)
MDDI 英文原文譯文 · 翻譯日期: 2026-06-21
部長Josephine Teo就《選舉(網路廣告誠信)(修正)法案》二讀開場演講,2024年10月15日
引言
1. 副議長女士,我提請動議,"請現對法案進行二讀。"
深度偽造內容對選舉的威脅
2. 女士,2024年是全球選舉大年。今年,全球近半數人口已經或即將參與投票。
3. 遺憾的是,在已舉行或計劃舉行選舉的國家,深度偽造事件明顯增多。總部位於倫敦的科技公司Sumsub的研究顯示,相關資料觸目驚心。與一年前相比,印度的深度偽造事件數量增至三倍;印度尼西亞增至逾15倍;韓國增至逾16倍。¹
4. 今年1月,美國總統喬·拜登的聲音遭到偽造,被用於自動撥號電話,企圖阻止民主黨人參與新罕布什爾州初選。這些自動撥號電話觸達了數千人。美國聯邦通訊委員會此後宣佈AI生成的自動撥號電話為違法行為,指出其具有以虛假資訊誤導消費者的潛力。傳輸這些偽造自動撥號電話的電信公司被處以100萬美元罰款,幕後主使個人則面臨600萬美元的罰款及刑事指控。
5. 去年斯洛伐克議會選舉期間,網路上流傳著一段政客討論選舉舞弊的深度偽造音訊。不出所料,該音訊迅速病毒式傳播。其影響因釋出時機而進一步放大——恰好在斯洛伐克選舉"靜默期"(類似於我們的冷靜日)之前。該候選人最終落選,儘管此前一直在民調中領先。深度偽造音訊是否導致了他的落敗?沒有人能夠確定,但我們當然不希望選舉遭受此類事件的影響。
海外司法管轄區與行業行動
6. 深度偽造內容為何如此氾濫?簡單來說,製作起來已變得非常容易且成本低廉。議長先生,在您允許的情況下,我是否可以在LED螢幕上播放一段影片?
表格說明
部長深度偽造影片演示
你好,今天辦公室裡非常忙碌,我剛喝了一杯咖啡。
(停頓)您以為影片中說話的真的是我本人Jo Teo嗎?實際上,這是一段由人工智慧生成的深度偽造影片。
製作這段影片只需一人花費一小時,使用任何人現在都可以從網際網路上輕鬆獲取的軟體即可。
試想,若有人制作出逼真的深度偽造內容,描繪本院議員說出或做出我們實際上並未說過或做過的事,並將其廣泛傳播。這類技術只會持續進步,深度偽造內容可能變得愈加逼真、更具說服力、也更易於製作。
7. 議長先生,議員們能夠體會到AI技術正在快速進步。如果您剛才觀看的深度偽造影片未能讓您相信它是在模仿我本人,更先進的版本很快便會做到。
8. 世界各地,各國已認識到有必要減輕深度偽造內容對本國選舉造成的危害。
a. 例如,韓國修訂了《公職人員選舉法》,禁止在選舉前90天內播出使用AI生成內容的政治競選影片。該修訂法律於今年1月生效,違者可被判處最高七年有期徒刑,或處以最高5000萬韓元(約合新加坡元5萬元)的罰款。迄今為止,韓國國家選舉委員會已在其選舉期間下架了388條深度偽造內容。
b. 另一個例子是巴西,該國已禁止在選舉期間釋出任何有損或有利於任何候選人的合成選舉宣傳內容。相關制裁措施包括撤銷候選人的參選資格,或若其已當選則撤銷其授權。
c. 上個月,加利福尼亞州將《2024年捍衛民主免受深度偽造欺騙法》(Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024)簽署成法,要求社交媒體平臺在選舉前120天至選舉當日期間遮蔽針對候選人的實質性欺騙性深度偽造內容。
d. 澳大利亞政府也在考慮採納其選舉委員會的建議,對選舉中AI的使用加以規範。該委員會近期警告稱,其在保護選民免受深度偽造影片及模仿政客的電話騷擾方面能力有限,而此類深度偽造內容可能出現在澳大利亞即將舉行的選舉中。
9. 感到憂慮的不僅僅是各國政府。科技行業也已認識到選舉深度偽造內容的危險性,以及確保選民能夠自由行使選擇權、免受基於AI操控的重要性。包括Meta、Microsoft、OpenAI和TikTok在內的二十家領先科技公司於2月在慕尼黑安全會議上籤署了《科技協議》(Tech Accord),承諾打擊今年選舉中AI的欺騙性使用。
維護新加坡選舉的誠信
10. 面對上述發展,新加坡人的擔憂是有充分理由的。一項研究²顯示,超過十分之六的新加坡人擔憂深度偽造內容對下屆選舉可能造成的影響。
11. 在2021年一宗涉及虛假資訊與網路謊言的案件裁決中,我國最高法院指出:"通過散佈虛假資訊與謊言來左右公職人員選舉或公民投票的結果,與民主的核心原則根本不相容。"
12. 議長先生,我希望議員們能夠認同,AI生成的虛假資訊可能嚴重威脅我國的民主根基,需要我們作出同等嚴肅的回應。《選舉(網路廣告誠信)(修正)法案》(ELIONA)是我們經過審慎權衡後的應對舉措,旨在強化《國會選舉法》和《總統選舉法》下的選舉法律,確保候選人陳述的真實性以及我國選舉的誠信得以持續維護。
法案範圍
主要法律要求
13. 議長先生,我現在將向議員們介紹法案的主要內容。
14. ELIONA法案將修訂我國選舉法律,禁止釋出符合以下條件的內容:
a. 屬於或包含網路選舉廣告,即「OEA」;
b. 經數字生成或處理;且
c. 描繪某候選人作出其實際上未曾作出的言論或行為;
d. 但其逼真程度足以使部分公眾在看到或聽到該內容後,合理地相信該候選人確實作出了上述言論或行為。
15. 我將逐一詳細闡述上述各項條件。
16. 第一,根據我國現行選舉法律,網路選舉廣告是指任何在網路上釋出的資訊或材料,可合理視為旨在促進、爭取或損害某候選人或政黨在選舉中的成功或前景。現行OEA條款指導網際網路在選舉期間的透明、負責任使用,包括競選活動,並確保選舉以公平方式進行。ELIONA法案通過針對OEA的實質內容,進一步強化了OEA制度。
17. 第二,ELIONA法案的適用範圍涵蓋經數字生成或處理的內容。這包括使用生成式AI等AI技術生成或處理的內容,也涵蓋Photoshop、配音和剪接等非AI技術。上述技術目前被視為較為傳統的編輯手段,但仍可用於處理描繪候選人的內容,與AI生成的深度偽造內容同樣具有危害性和誤導性。
18. 第三,ELIONA法案的適用範圍針對選舉情境下危害最大的內容型別,即通過對候選人言論或行為的虛假呈現,對公眾產生誤導或欺騙,且其逼真程度足以讓部分公眾合理相信的內容。
19. 是否具備逼真性這一條件將進行客觀評估。沒有放之四海而皆準的標準,但可以提出若干一般性要點:
a. 第一,此類內容應與候選人已知的外貌特徵、表情及言行舉止高度吻合。從技術層面而言,我們預期其具備一定程度的精密性,使得光線、肢體動作或音訊失真等方面的不一致之處降至最低。
b. 第二,內容可能借助真實人物、事件和地點,使虛假呈現顯得更為可信。例如,一段涉及時事的虛假競選集會演講,若以真實且為人熟知的集會現場為背景,看起來會更加真實。
c. 我們還須認識到,受眾會通過由其個人經歷、信念和認知偏見所塑造的不同視角,來感知和處理相同的內容。例如,我們許多人都覺得總理會在社交媒體上提供投資建議這一說法難以置信。但作為國會議員,我們都曾接觸過遭受此類AI詐騙侵害的居民。在這方面,只要有部分公眾會合理地相信候選人確實作出了內容所描繪的言論或行為,該法律即適用。
20. 此外,在評估內容是否與候選人的言論或行為相符時,我們將主要依賴候選人就其是否確曾作出該言論或行為所作的宣告。我將在發言後段進一步闡述這一點。
21. 內容須同時滿足全部四項法律要件,方可被列為禁止內容。即該內容
a. 屬於或包含OEA;
b. 經數字生成或處理;且
c. 描繪某候選人作出其實際上未曾作出的言論或行為;
d. 但其逼真程度足以使部分公眾在看到或聽到該內容後,合理地相信該候選人確實作出了上述言論或行為。
22. 議長先生,經您允許,可否請書記員向各位分發一份說明材料,以闡明在新條款下哪些內容將被允許、哪些將被禁止?先生,議員們也可通過MP@SGPARL應用程式查閱該說明材料。
23. 將被禁止的內容示例包括:
a. 以逼真方式呈現候選人發表其從未說過的言論的音訊偽造內容;
b. 以逼真方式呈現候選人參與實際未曾發生的活動、或會見其從未見過的人員的AI生成影像;
c. 斷章取義並歪曲候選人行為的逼真處理影像或影片。
24. 無論內容對任何候選人有利或不利,均不影響上述規定的適用。在選舉期間釋出此類被禁止的內容,包括通過推廣、分享和轉發現有內容,將構成違法行為。
不太可能受到規管的內容之相關保證
25. 在提出這一應對候選人網路上逼真虛假呈現的新措施的同時,我們也注重不禁止在競選活動中合理使用AI或技術。雖然每個案例將逐案評估,但有若干情形不在禁止之列。
a. 第一類是AI生成或動畫人物及卡通內容。此類動畫大多並非真實人物的照片級逼真複製品;受眾通常能夠判斷所描繪的言論或行為並非真實。
b. 第二類是無害的外觀修飾,例如使用美顏濾鏡,或對影像和影片進行色彩和光線調整。此類修改通常不會實質性地影響真實性,也不會造成對候選人言論或行為的虛假呈現。
c. 第三類是娛樂性內容,例如網路表情包(memes)。我們認識到此類內容可能在選舉期間的網路討論中出現。只要網路表情包被評估為不具逼真性,且不會誤導受眾對候選人言論或行為的判斷,即不受該法律的規管。
26. 部分議員可能存有顧慮——候選人在集選區(GRC)或單選區(SMC)背景下的普通競選海報,若上傳至網路,是否會受到禁止?此類海報通常是明顯的合成影像,例如候選人被不成比例地疊加於某一地標或背景之前。公眾不會合理地認為此類內容是對候選人行為的真實描繪。此類競選海報不太可能落入禁止範圍之內。禁令不適用於某些通訊及出版物
27. 議長先生,我想明確說明,禁令不適用於某些型別的內容。
28. 第一,該法案不延伸至私人或家庭通訊。出於使用者隱私考量,這是指在個人之間或封閉群體內分享的內容,例如與家人或一小群朋友的群聊。
a. 話雖如此,我們知道虛假內容可能在開放的 WhatsApp 或 Telegram 頻道中迅速傳播。若有舉報指出,禁止內容正在涉及眾多互不相識使用者、且公眾可自由訪問的大型群聊中傳播,此類通訊將受法案約束,我們將評估是否應採取行動。
b. 確定通訊是否屬於私人或家庭性質的相關因素,已在各相關選舉法令中列明。
29. 第二,禁令不適用於經授權新聞機構釋出的新聞報道。此舉旨在為就禁止內容進行公正報道留有空間,以便公眾能及時獲悉有關候選人的虛假內容。
30. 第三,我們認識到,普通人可能在未意識到內容已被篡改的情況下,不慎轉發訊息和連結。若某人並不知情、且沒有理由相信該候選人實際上並未說過或做過相關事情,並因此無意間觸犯禁令,法例將為其提供免責辯護。
禁令的持續時間及適用物件
31. 議長先生,加強保障措施將在選舉期間適用,即從頒發選舉令狀之日起至投票日投票結束為止。
32. 從頒發令狀至提名日期間,我們將對希望以準候選人身份自我認定、並希望受《ELIONA 法案》保障措施保護的個人引入雙重要求:
a. 第一,繳付選舉押金;以及
b. 第二,同意由選舉局(ELD)公開其姓名。同意表格將通過 ELD 網站提供,相關網站將每日更新。
33. 繳付選舉押金是參選的先決條件,也是個人有意參選之認真程度的指標。
a. 這比單純公開宣告有意參選更進一步。
b. 公佈繳付押金者的姓名,也將使公眾清楚瞭解哪些個人受法律保障。
c. 候選人可完全自主決定何時在提名日前向公眾告知其參選意向。候選人可選擇繳付選舉押金,但暫不同意公開其姓名,直至提名日方才同意。
34. 提名程式完成後至投票日投票結束期間,《ELIONA 法案》的保障措施將適用於涉及所有成功獲提名候選人的內容。
35. 與此同時,個人本身也應主動站出來,澄清並闢除其認為對自己存在誤導性描述的內容。
法案的執法
技術評估
36. 政府將使用一系列檢測工具,評估相關內容是否經由數字手段生成或篡改。我們可呼叫的工具包括商業工具,以及內部開發的工具,或與研究人員合作開發的工具,例如網路安全先進技術中心(CATOS)的研究人員所開發的工具。
37. 這些工具持續更新,以跟上技術發展。持續大力投資研究是確保我們保持領先的方式之一。我們已向 CATOS 撥款 5000 萬元,為期五年,用於開發檢測網路危害的新技術能力,包括檢測有害的數字篡改內容。
候選人宣告
38. 在審查依據這一新禁令所舉報的虛假內容時,政府將優先處理候選人向選舉主任(RO)提交的報告。除就內容是否被篡改進行技術評估外,選舉主任還將依賴候選人的宣告,以判斷內容是否對其言行存在虛假描繪。
39. 在這一新禁令下,我們高度重視候選人向選舉主任作出的宣告,因為候選人最能迅速澄清相關內容是否如實、準確地反映了其本人的言行。政府不太可能掌握候選人是否確實說過或做過某事的全部證據,尤其是在私下場合發生的情況。
40. 候選人將向選舉主任作出宣告,以證明其陳述的真實性。該宣告表格將通過 ELD 網站上的候選人門戶向候選人開放。
虛假宣告的處罰
41. 為遏制濫用法律的行為——例如候選人要求刪除實為如實描述其言行的不利內容——候選人在請求中故意作出虛假或誤導性宣告將被列為違法行為。
42. 違法行為的處罰已在各選舉法令中列明。若被裁定犯有違法行為,當事人可面臨不超過 2,000 元的罰款,並喪失被選為國會議員或總統的資格。此外,若已當選,該候選人作為國會議員或總統的當選結果也可能被宣告無效。
選舉主任的權力
43. 目前,選舉官(RO)有權向任何相關人士(包括社交媒體服務)發出糾正指令,要求刪除或禁止在新加坡訪問被禁止的網路競選廣告,或停止或減少其電子通訊活動。
44. ELIONA 法案將上述權力延伸,使 RO 得以就這一新類別的內容發出糾正指令,且相關糾正措施須在規定期限內完成。
45. 如前所述,政府將優先處理候選人向 RO 提交的報告和宣告。如經評估屬於真實情況,RO 將發出糾正指令。僅在特殊情況下,才會考慮在沒有候選人宣告的情況下就虛假陳述發出指令。這類情況可能出現在客觀事實已廣為人知,或政府掌握可靠資料足以確認候選人實際言行之時。
46. 公眾也可向當局舉報候選人疑似被禁止的內容,以供審查。
47. 為更好地協助公眾在選舉期間作出知情選擇,當局將就已對違規內容發出的糾正指令通知公眾。
不遵從糾正指令
48. 不遵從 RO 所發出的糾正指令即構成違法。鑑於社交媒體服務所具有的廣泛影響力及其應承擔的責任,我們已將社交媒體服務提供商不遵從糾正指令的罰款上限提高至 100 萬元。
49. 這是一項合理的調整——修訂後的罰則與其他內容監管工具下的類似違法行為相當,包括《防止網路虛假資訊和網路操縱法》("POFMA")、《廣播法》("BA")及《網路犯罪危害法》("OCHA")。
50. 對於所有其他人士(包括個人),不遵從糾正指令的財務及監禁處罰維持不變,罰款上限為 1,000 元,或監禁不超過 12 個月,或兩者兼施。
51. 我們已就 ELIONA 法案下的相關要求與主要社交媒體服務進行溝通,並明確表達我們的期望:上述指令須被迅速遵從,以維護我國選舉的公正性。
將 ELIONA 納入我們的一攬子措施
52. 議長先生,正如政策研究所(Institute of Policy Studies)的 Carol Soon 博士所指出,ELIONA 法案在"內容"、"時間"及"物件"三個維度上經過審慎校準,是我國在選舉事務管理方面一貫堅守原則做法的延續。
53. 首先,該法案針對最具危害性的數字生成及篡改內容(包括深度偽造內容),此類內容可能影響選舉結果;與此同時,該法案也認可新型內容創作技術的價值,以及候選人採用創新方式與選民互動的意願。
54. 其次,該法案僅在選舉期間適用,即從令狀頒發之日起至投票日投票結束為止,旨在維護選舉程式的公正性,並在選舉期間為公平、正當的政治討論保留空間。
55. 第三,上述保障措施適用於所有候選人,不論其所屬政黨,亦不論虛假內容的潛在影響。這是因為,有利於某位候選人的虛假內容必然對另一位候選人不利,反之亦然。我們的選民必須能夠依據對未來政治領袖真實、如實的呈現作出知情選擇。候選人在選舉期間同樣有責任以誠信方式行事。
56. ELIONA 法案是對我們歷年來為應對各類有害網路內容所推出的一攬子措施的更新。在選舉期間及選舉期間以外,現有內容監管工具將繼續適用於某些型別的人工智慧生成虛假資訊及深度偽造內容。
a. 例如,根據 POFMA,部長或在選舉期間獲委任的代理權力機構,可向收件人發出指令,要求其傳達更正通知。部長或代理權力機構亦可以深度偽造內容含有虛假事實陳述且發出指令符合公共利益為由,指令刪除或禁止訪問相關深度偽造內容。
b. 根據 OCHA,可就具有刑事性質的網路活動發出指令加以處理,例如涉及深度偽造的詐騙活動。
c. 根據《防止騷擾法》,個人可就某些對其造成騷擾、驚嚇或困擾的內容尋求補救。
POFMA 新行為準則
57. 除 ELIONA 法案在選舉期間所訂立的期望外,社交媒體服務在任何時候均應就數字生成或篡改內容承擔更大責任。大多數主要社交媒體服務亦是 POFMA 下的指定網際網路中間商,將須通過即將頒佈的 POFMA 行為準則("準則")隨時防止和應對數字生成或篡改內容遭到濫用。
58. 這包括 PII 須建立完善的系統和流程,以加強對數字生成或篡改內容的透明度,例如通過標註方式實現。與目前已生效的其他三項 POFMA 行為準則一樣,新準則正在與指定網際網路中間商協商制定,我們計劃於 2025 年完成準則的制定並予以頒佈。
結語
59. 議長先生,請允許我以華語繼續發言。
60. 我相信許多人都有過這樣的經歷:身邊的親友對網上的深偽內容深信不疑。無論我們怎麼解釋,對方仍舊把假訊息信以為真。有時,甚至連我們自己也上當,受騙,假內容的散播,讓人防不勝防。
61. 在人工智慧的迅速發展下,深偽內容只會變得更普及,更逼真,讓別有居心的人能夠更輕易,更快速地在我們的社會散播懷疑的種子。如果這種假內容在大選期間廣泛傳播,其後果將不堪設想。
62. 事實上,這並非無稽之談。近期,不少國家的大選中,已經看到了假內容的危害。這項新法令旨在禁止在網上釋出和傳播歪曲候選人言行舉止的假內容,讓我們才可以更好地保障民主程序和選舉的公平性。
63. 然而,法令並非靈丹妙藥。增強公眾辨別內容真偽的能力,才是最有效的預防針。因此,讓我們同心協力,對網上內容提高警惕,必要時,向可靠來源求證。每個人從自身做起,成為抵禦假內容的第一道防線。
64. 議長先生,請允許我作出總結。
65. 在深度偽造的時代,眼見不再為實。我們不僅要質疑來源和言論的真實性,更要質疑那些通常被視為事實依據的東西:我們所看到的影像和影片,以及我們所聽到的音訊片段,即便那是一把熟悉的聲音。
66. ELIONA法案將為我們的選舉增添額外一層保障,但每個人——候選人、公民、科技平臺——都在保護我們的民主方面各有其責。
67. 我們必須保持選舉的公平與誠信,以事實而非虛構為依據。總體而言,本院議員無論黨派立場,均支援這些理念,我呼籲各位議員支援本法案,以便我們能夠繼續維護選舉廉正。
68. 議長先生,我就此提請付議。
1 Sumsub。(2024年)深度偽造案例在舉行2024年大選的國家激增,Sumsub研究顯示。https://sumsub.com/newsroom/deepfake-cases-surge-in-countries-holding-2024-elections-sumsub-research-shows/
2 Verian。(2024年)四分之三的新加坡人對詐騙中使用深度偽造技術感到擔憂。https://www.veriangroup.com/press-release/three-quarters-of-singaporeans-concerned-about-the-use-of-deepfakes-in-scams
英文原文
MDDI 官網原始記錄 · 抓取日期: 2026-06-21
SECOND READING OPENING SPEECH BY MINISTER JOSEPHINE TEO ON THE ELECTIONS (INTEGRITY OF ONLINE ADVERTISING) (AMENDMENT) BILL, 15 OCT 2024
Introduction
1. Madam Deputy Speaker, I beg to move, “That the Bill be now read a second time.”
Threat of deepfakes to elections
2. Madam, 2024 is a bumper year for elections around the world. Almost half of the world’s population have gone or will go to the polls this year.
3. Unfortunately, there has been a noticeable increase of deepfake incidents in countries where elections have taken place or are planned. Research conducted by London-based tech company Sumsub suggests that the numbers are alarming. In India, compared to a year ago, there are three times as many deepfake incidents. In Indonesia, more than 15 times and in South Korea, more than 16 times. 1
4. Earlier in January this year, a fake version of U.S. President Joe Biden’s voice was featured in robocalls that sought to discourage Democrats from participating in the New Hampshire Primary. The robocalls reached thousands of people. The US Federal Communications Commission has since declared AI-generated robocalls illegal, noting that they have the potential to confuse consumers with misinformation. The telecommunications company which transmitted the fake robocalls has been fined US$1 million, and the individual behind it faces a fine of US$6 million and criminal charges.
5. During the Slovakian parliamentary elections last year, a deepfake audio of a politician discussing electoral rigging was posted online. Unsurprisingly, the audio went viral. Its impact was amplified by its timing – right before Slovakia’s electoral “silence period”, which is like our cooling-off day. The candidate lost the elections, despite having earlier led in the polls. Did the deepfake audio contribute to his loss? No one can say with certainty, but surely we prefer not to have elections subject to such incidents.
Overseas jurisdictions and industry action
6. Why have deepfake content proliferated? The short answer is that they have become very easy and cheap to produce. With your permission, Mr Speaker, may I play a video on the LED screens?
Table caption
Minister’s deepfake video presentation
Hello, it’s been a busy day in the office, and I’ve just had a cup of coffee.
(Pause) Did you think this was really me, Jo Teo, speaking in this video? Actually, this is a deepfake generated by artificial intelligence.
It only took one person one hour to create this, using easily accessible software that anyone can use right now from the Internet.
Imagine if someone produced realistic deepfakes, depicting Members of this House saying or doing something we did not actually say or do, and disseminated it. Such technology will only improve, and deepfakes may become even more realistic, convincing, and easy to make.
7. Sir, Members will appreciate that AI technology is improving quickly. If the deepfake video you just watched did not convince you of its impersonation of me, more advanced versions soon will.
8. Around the world, countries have recognised the need to mitigate the harms of deepfakes to their elections.
a. For example, South Korea revised its Public Official Election Act to ban political campaign videos that use AI-generated content 90 days prior to an election. Violations of the revised law, which took effect in January this year, can lead to jail time of up to seven years, or a fine of up to 50 million won, which is almost S$50,000. To date, 388 deepfakes have been taken down by the National Election Commission of South Korea during its elections.
b. Another example is Brazil, which has banned synthetic electoral propaganda that will harm or favour any candidate during an election. The sanctions include the revocation of the candidate’s registration or their mandate, if they had been elected.
c. Last month, the state of California passed into law the “Defending Democracy from Deepfake Deception Act of 2024”, which requires social media platforms to block materially deceptive deepfakes of candidates from 120 days before the election to the day of the election.
d. The Australian government is also considering the advice of its Electoral Commission to regulate the use of AI in elections, given the Commission’s recent warning that it has limited scope to protect voters from deepfake videos and phone calls imitating politicians in Australia’s upcoming elections.
9. It is not just Governments which are concerned. The tech industry has also recognised the dangers of electoral deepfakes, and the importance of ensuring voters can exercise their choice, free from AI-based manipulation. Twenty leading tech companies, including Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, and TikTok, signed the Tech Accord at the Munich Security Conference in February, committing to combat the deceptive use of AI in elections this year.
Upholding the integrity of elections in Singapore
10. In the face of these developments, Singaporeans are rightly concerned. One study 2 shows that more than 6 in 10 Singaporeans are worried about the potential impact of deepfakes on the next election.
11. In a 2021 ruling on a case related to misinformation and online falsehoods, our apex court had said: “It is simply incompatible with the core principles of democracy to procure the outcome of an election to public office or a referendum by trading in disinformation and falsehoods.”
12. Mr Speaker, I hope Members will agree that AI-generated misinformation can seriously threaten our democratic foundations and demands an equally serious response. The Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Bill, or ELIONA, is our carefully calibrated response to augment our election laws under the Parliamentary Elections Act and the Presidential Elections Act, ensuring that the truthfulness of candidate representation and the integrity of our elections continues to be upheld.
Scope of the Bill
Key legal requirements
13. Sir, I will now bring Members through the key aspects of the Bill.
14. The ELIONA Bill will amend our election laws to prohibit the publication of content that:
a. is or includes online election advertising, or “OEA”;
b. Is digitally generated or manipulated; and
c. depicts a candidate saying or doing something that he or she did not in fact say or do;
d. But is realistic enough that some members of the public who see or hear the content would reasonably believe that the candidate did in fact say or do that thing.
15. I will go through each of these criteria in detail.
16. First, online election advertising under our existing election laws refers to any information or material published online that can reasonably be regarded as intended to promote or procure, or prejudice the electoral success or prospects of a candidate or political party. The existing OEA provisions guide the transparent and responsible use of the Internet during elections, including for campaigning, and ensure that the elections are contested fairly. The ELIONA Bill strengthens the OEA regime by targeting the substantive content of the OEA.
17. Second, the ELIONA Bill is scoped to address content that is digitally generated or manipulated. This includes content generated or manipulated using AI techniques such as generative AI. It also includes non-AI techniques such as Photoshop, dubbing, and splicing. These are now seen as more traditional editing methods. But they can still be used to manipulate content depicting candidates, making them as harmful and misleading as AI-generated deepfakes.
18. Third, the ELIONA Bill is scoped to address the most harmful types of content in the context of elections, which is content that misleads or deceives the public about a candidate, through a false representation of his speech or actions, that is realistic enough to be reasonably believed by some members of the public.
19. The condition of being realistic will be objectively assessed. There is no one-size-fits-all set of criteria but some general points can be made:
a. First, such content should closely match the candidates’ known features, expressions, and mannerisms. Technically, we would expect a degree of sophistication resulting in minimal inconsistencies in aspects like lighting, body movements, or audio distortions.
b. Second, content may make use of actual persons, events and places so that the false representation appears more believable. For example, a fake rally speech touching on current affairs looks more real when placed against the backdrop of an actual and familiar rally site.
c. We must also recognise that audiences perceive and process the same content through different lenses shaped by their individual experiences, beliefs, and cognitive biases. For example, many of us find it incredible that the Prime Minister would be giving investment advice on social media. But as Members of Parliament, we have all met residents who have fallen prey to such AI-enabled scams. In this regard, the law will apply so long as there are some members of the public who would reasonably believe that the candidate did say or do what was depicted.
20. Also, in assessing whether content matches a candidate’s speech or actions, we will be relying primarily on declarations by the candidate if he or she had said or done that thing. I will elaborate on this later in my speech.
21. All four legal limbs have to be met for the content to be prohibited. That is, the content
a. is or includes OEA;
b. Is digitally generated or manipulated; and
c. depicts a candidate saying or doing something that he or she did not in fact say or do;
d. But is realistic enough that some members of the public who see or hear the content would reasonably believe that the candidate did in fact say or do that thing.
22. Mr Speaker, with your permission, may I ask the Clerks to distribute a handout that will illustrate our thinking on what will be allowed or disallowed under the new provisions? Sir, Members can also access this handout through the MP@SGPARL App.
23. Examples of content that would be prohibited include:
a. Realistic audiofakes featuring a candidate saying things he did not say;
b. Realistic AI-generated images of a candidate participating at events that did not happen, meeting people that he or she did not meet;
c. Realistic manipulated images or videos taken out of context and misrepresenting a candidate’s actions.
24. It does not matter if the content is favourable or unfavourable to any candidate. The publication of such prohibited content during the election period, including by boosting, sharing, and reposting existing content, will be an offence.
Assurances on content that are unlikely to be caught
25. As we propose this new measure to tackle realistic misrepresentations of candidates online, we are mindful not to disallow reasonable use of AI or technology in electoral campaigning. While each case will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, there are several scenarios that the prohibition will not extend to.
a. The first is AI-generated or animated characters and cartoons. Most of these animations are not photorealistic replicas of real persons; audiences will generally be able to tell that the speech or actions depicted are not real.
b. The second is benign cosmetic alterations, such as the use of beauty filters, or colour and lighting adjustments of images and videos. Such alterations typically involve modifications that do not materially affect truthfulness, and do not result in a misrepresentation of a candidate’s speech or actions.
c. The third is entertainment content, such as memes. We recognise that such content can arise as part of online discourse during the election period. Memes will not be caught under the law as long as they are assessed to be unrealistic and do not mislead audiences about a candidate’s speech or actions.
26. Some Members may be concerned – will candidates’ regular campaign posters, showing individuals against the backdrop of a GRC or a SMC, be prohibited if they are put online? Such posters are usually obvious composite images, such as candidates disproportionately superimposed in front of a landmark or backdrop. Members of the public would not reasonably believe such content to be realistic depictions of a candidate’s action. Such campaign posters are unlikely to fall within the scope of prohibitions. Ban will not apply to certain communications and publications
27. Mr Speaker, I would like to make clear that the ban will not apply to certain types of content.
28. First, the Bill does not extend to private or domestic communications. This refers to content shared between individuals or within a closed group, like group chats with family or a small group of friends, in view of user privacy.
a. That said, we know that false content can circulate rapidly on open WhatsApp or Telegram channels. If it is reported that prohibited content is being communicated in big group chats that involve many users who are strangers to one another, and are freely accessible by the public, such communications will be caught under the Bill and we will assess if action should be taken.
b. The factors that determine whether communications are private or domestic are set out in the respective election Acts.
29. Second, the prohibition does not apply to news published by authorised news agencies. This is to give space to fair reporting on prohibited content, such that the public can be alerted to the false content about candidates in a timely manner.
30. Third, we recognise that a layperson may carelessly reshare messages and links without realising that the content has been manipulated. The legislation provides for a defence if a person did not know and had no reason to believe that the candidate did not in fact say or do the thing and inadvertently commits the offence.
Duration of the ban, and who the ban applies to
31. Sir, the enhanced safeguards will apply during the election period, from the issuance of the Writ of Election to the close of polling on Polling Day.
32. From the issuance of the Writ to Nomination Day, we will introduce a two-part requirement for individuals who would like to identify themselves as prospective candidates and have the safeguards of the ELIONA Bill apply to them:
a. First, pay the election deposit; and
b. Second, consent for their names to be made public by the Elections Department (“ELD”). The consent form will be made available via the ELD website. The intention is for the website to be updated daily.
33. Paying the election deposit is a pre-requisite for standing in an election and an indicator of an individual’s seriousness of intent to be a candidate.
a. It is a step up from simply making a public declaration of one’s potential candidacy.
b. Publishing the names of those who placed the deposit will also make clear to the public which individuals are covered by the law.
c. It is the candidate’s choice entirely when to inform the public about his or her intention to stand for election before Nomination Day. Candidates can choose to put down the election deposit but withhold consent to make their names public until Nomination Day.
34. After nomination proceedings are completed, and up to the close of polling on Polling Day, the safeguards of the ELIONA Bill will apply to content depicting all successfully nominated candidates.
35. At the same time, individuals themselves should also readily come forward to clarify and debunk content that they believe misrepresents them.
Enforcement of the Bill
Technical assessment
36. The Government will use a range of detection tools to assess if the content has been generated or manipulated using digital means. We have at our disposal commercial tools, and also those developed in-house, or in partnership with researchers, such as those at the Centre of Advanced Technologies in Online Safety, or CATOS.
37. These tools are constantly updated to keep up with technology. Continuing strong investment in research is one way to ensure that we stay ahead. We have channelled $50 million in funding over five years to CATOS, which will develop new technological capabilities to detect online harms, including harmful digitally manipulated content.
Declaration by candidates
38. In reviewing reports of false content flagged under this new prohibition, the Government will prioritise candidates’ reports to the Returning Officer (“RO”). Besides the technical assessment on whether content has been manipulated, the RO will also rely on candidates’ declarations on whether the content falsely depicts their speech and actions.
39. We have placed significant weight on candidates’ declarations to the RO under this new prohibition, as a candidate is in the best position to speedily clarify if the content is a truthful and accurate representation of himself or herself. The Government is unlikely to have all the evidence of whether a candidate actually said or did something, especially if it was in a private setting.
40. The declaration by candidates will be made to the RO, for candidates to attest to the veracity of his or her claim. This declaration form will be made available to candidates via the Candidate’s Portal on ELD’s website.
Penalties for false declaration
41. To deter the abuse of the law, such as candidates requesting to take down unfavourable content that is in fact a factual representation of their speech or action, it will be made an illegal practice for candidates to knowingly make a false or misleading declaration in a request.
42. The penalties for an illegal practice are set out in the election Acts. If convicted of an illegal practice, one may face a fine not exceeding $2,000, and become ineligible to be elected as a Member of Parliament or the President. Further, if already elected, the election of a candidate as a Member of Parliament or President may also be invalidated.
Powers of the Returning Officer
43. Currently, the RO has powers to issue corrective directions to any relevant person, including social media services, to remove or disable access in Singapore to prohibited online election advertising, or to stop or reduce its electronic communication activity.
44. The ELIONA Bill extends these powers for the RO to issue corrective directions against this new category of content, and corrective actions must be taken within the specified period of time.
45. As mentioned earlier, the Government will prioritise candidates’ reports and declarations to the RO. If assessed to be a genuine case, the RO will issue corrective directions. Only in exceptional cases will directions be considered against false representations without a candidate’s declaration. This may arise when the objective facts are widely known or if the Government has access to data that reliably confirms the candidate’s actual speech or action.
46. The public can also report potentially prohibited content of candidates to the authorities for review.
47. To better equip the public to make informed choices during the elections, the public will be notified about corrective directions that have been issued against offending content.
Non-compliance with corrective direction
48. Non-compliance with a corrective direction issued by the RO is an offence. Recognising the extensive reach and responsibility that social media services must uphold, we have raised the fine of up to $1 million for a provider of a social media service that fails to comply with a corrective direction.
49. This is a reasonable adjustment – the revised penalty is on par with similar offences under other content regulation tools like the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (“POFMA”), the Broadcasting Act (“BA”), and the Online Criminal Harms Act (“OCHA”).
50. For all others, including individuals, there is no change to the financial and custodial penalties for non-compliance with a corrective direction, and remains at a fine not exceeding $1,000, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to both.
51. We have engaged major social media services on the requirements under the ELIONA Bill and shared our expectation that such directions are to be promptly complied with to uphold the integrity of our elections.
Adding ELIONA to our suite of measures
52. Mr Speaker, as noted by Dr Carol Soon of the Institute of Policy Studies, the ELIONA Bill is carefully calibrated in its scope of the “what”, “when”, and “whom”, and is a continuation of our principled approach towards the conduct of elections in Singapore.
53. First, the Bill addresses the most harmful digitally generated and manipulated content, including deepfakes, that can influence electoral outcomes, while recognising the value of novel content creation techniques and the desire of candidates to employ innovative methods to engage voters.
54. Second, it applies only during the election period, from the issuance of Writ to the end of polling on Polling Day, to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and preserve space for fair and legitimate political discourse during the elections.
55. Third, the safeguards apply to all candidates regardless of political party and potential impact of the fake content. This recognises that fake content favourable to one candidate must be unfavourable to another, and vice versa. Our voters must be able to make informed choices based on factual and truthful representation of our prospective political leaders. Candidates too have a responsibility to conduct themselves with integrity during the elections.
56. The ELIONA Bill updates our suite of measures introduced over the years to address various forms of harmful online content. During and outside the election periods, existing content regulation tools will continue to apply to certain types of AI-generated misinformation and deepfakes.
a. For example, under POFMA, a Minister, or an appointed Alternate Authority during the election periods, may issue a direction for a recipient to communicate a correction notice. The Minister or Alternate Authority may also direct the removal or disabling of access to deepfakes on the grounds that they contain false statements of fact and it is in the public interest to issue the direction.
b. Under OCHA, directions may be given to deal with online activities that are criminal in nature, such as deepfake-related scams.
c. Under the Protection from Harassment Act, individuals may seek recourse for certain content that have caused personal harassment, alarm or distress to the individual.
New POFMA Code of Practice
57. Beyond the expectations set out in the ELIONA Bill during the election period, social media services should also bear greater responsibility for digitally generated or manipulated content at all times. Most major social media services are also prescribed Internet intermediaries under POFMA, and will be required to prevent and counter the abuse of digitally generated or manipulated content at all times through an upcoming Code of Practice under POFMA (“Code”).
58. This includes an obligation for PIIs to put in place adequate systems and processes to enhance the transparency about digitally generated or manipulated content, such as through labelling. Like the three other POFMA Codes in effect today, the new Code is being formulated in consultation with the prescribed Internet intermediaries, and we intend to finalise the Code for issuance in 2025.
Conclusion
59. Mr Speaker, may I continue in Mandarin, please.
60. 我相信许多人都有过这样的经历: 身边的亲友对网上的深伪内容深信不疑。无论我们怎么解释,对方仍旧把假消息信以为真。有时,甚至连我们自己也上当,受骗, 假内容的散播,让人防不胜防。
61. 在人工智能的迅速发展下,深伪内容只会变得更普及,更逼真,让别有居心的人能够更轻易,更快速地在我们的社会散播怀疑的种子。如果这种假内容在大选期间广泛传播,其后果将不堪设想。
62. 事实上,这并非无稽之谈。近期,不少国家的大选中,已经看到了假内容的危害。这项新法令旨在禁止在网上发布和传播歪曲候选人言行,举止的假内容,让我们才可以更好地保障民主进程,和选举的公平性。
63. 然而,法令并非灵丹妙药。增强公众辨别内容真伪的能力,才是最有效的预防针。因此,让我们同心协力,对网上内容提高警惕,必要时,向可靠来源求证。每个人从自身做起,成为抵御假内容的第一道防线。
64. Mr Speaker, let me conclude.
65. In the age of deepfakes, seeing is no longer believing. We have to question not only the authenticity of sources and statements, but the very thing that usually counts as truth: what we see as images and videos, and what we hear through audio clips, even if it is a familiar voice.
66. The ELIONA Bill will add an additional layer of safeguards to our elections, but everyone – candidates, citizens, tech platforms – have a part to play in protecting our democracy.
67. We must keep our elections fair and honest, conducted on the basis of fact, not fiction. By and large, Members of this House regardless of party allegiance have supported these ideals, and I appeal to Members to stand behind this Bill so that we can continue to uphold the integrity of our elections.
68. With that Sir, I beg to move.
1 Sumsub. (2024) Deepfake cases surge in countries holding 2024 elections, Sumsub research shows. https://sumsub.com/newsroom/deepfake-cases-surge-in-countries-holding-2024-elections-sumsub-research-shows/
2 Verian. (2024) Three quarters of Singaporeans concerned about the use of deepfakes in scams. https://www.veriangroup.com/press-release/three-quarters-of-singaporeans-concerned-about-the-use-of-deepfakes-in-scams