구두 답변 · 2026-04-07 · 국회 15
시민 데이터가 외국 자본 AI/데이터 분석 플랫폼에 의해 처리되거나 공개되는 것을 방지하기 위한 보장 조치
야당 무소속 의원 Low Wu Yang Andre의 핵심 질의: (a) 정부 전체 데이터 아키텍처가 외국 자본 본사의 독점적 AI/데이터 분석 플랫폼이 시민 데이터를 처리하도록 허용하는지; (b) 허용한다면, 외국 정부가 자국 법(미국 CLOUD Act 등)을 근거로 이 데이터를 강제 소환하는 것을 방지하기 위한 법적·기술적 보장이 무엇인지. MDDI 행정부 장관 Jasmin Lau 답변: 정부는 위험 기반 접근법을 채택하고 있으며, 데이터 접근은 「최소 권한/필요에 따른 접근」 원칙을 엄격히 준수하고, 공급업체에 비보관, 암호화, 신원 및 접근 관리 이행을 요구하며, 고민감도 데이터는 데이터 레지던시를 요구할 수 있고, 거버넌스 프레임워크 및 계약 조항을 통해 사용, 저장, 공개를 제한한다고 답했다. Low의 추가 질문은 핵심을 직결했다: 지난 5년간 전 세계 각국 정부의 선호 AI/데이터/보안 솔루션 공급업체가 된 Palantir Technologies를 명시하며, CLOUD Act가 미국 기업의 법적 관할 범위 내 데이터 공개를 강제하며, 「싱가포르에 데이터 레지던시가 있어도 강제 소환될 수 있다」고 명확히 지적했다. Jasmin Lau는 이를 직접 인정했다: 「법적·계약상 약정은 별개로, 현실은 계약에 명시된 어떤 법적 조항이 있든 미국 같은 일부 관할권은 역외 효력을 포함한 법안을 가지고 있으며, 이를 통해 자국 내 기업에 특정 정보 제공을 강제할 수 있다… 그러한 법안은 계약 의무를 무효화할 수 있다」고 했다. 이는 정부가 계약상 데이터 레지던시가 외국의 역외 관할권 법률 앞에서 무효화될 수 있다는 점을 국회에서 처음으로 공개 인정한 것이다.
핵심 요점
- • Foreign-headquartered AI / data platforms may process government data (risk-based)
- • MP names Palantir + US CLOUD Act extraterritorial reach
- • Minister concedes contractual terms can be overridden by foreign law
- • Safeguards lean on technical controls + governance + use-case categorisation
위험 분류 + 기술 통제 + 거버넌스 프레임워크 도입하되, 계약 조항만으로는 외국 법률을 완전히 방어할 수 없음을 인정
CLOUD Act 등 역외 관할권이 싱가포르 데이터 주권에 미치는 실질적 위협 문제 제기
데이터 주권 전략: 계약 보장에서 기술 + 거버넌스 + 유스케이스 분류를 통한 다층 방어로 전환
“Some jurisdictions like the US may have legislation including with extraterritorial reach that empower government agencies to require companies within their jurisdictions to provide certain information... Such legislation can override contractual obligations.”
참여자 (2)
- Low Wu Yang Andre
- Ms Jasmin Lau
영어 원문
SPRS Hansard · Fetched: 2026-05-03
82 Mr Low Wu Yang Andre asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) whether the whole-of-Government data architecture permits proprietary artificial intelligence (AI) or data analytics platforms from foreign-headquartered vendors to process citizen data; and (b) if so, what legal and technical safeguards ensure that such data cannot be compelled for disclosure by a foreign government under that government's domestic laws. The Minister of State for Digital Development and Information (Ms Jasmin Lau) (for the Minister for Digital Development and Information) : Mr Speaker, the Government uses best-in-class technology solutions, including those from international vendors, to deliver effective digital services for citizens and to support our public officers' work. We have established comprehensive safeguards to protect citizen data when working with any vendor. Our risk-based approach ensures that data access is granted strictly on a "needs-basis" following the principle of least privilege. Vendors are expected to implement robust technical safeguards such as non-retention of data, encryption as well as access and identity management.
Data residency may also be required, depending on the sensitivity of the data. This is coupled with proper governance frameworks and contractual agreements on how the data can be accessed, used, stored and retained. These help to prevent vendors from accessing, using or disclosing government data where they are not permitted to do so, including in response to demands from foreign governments. Our approach combines global expertise, technical safeguards, legal protections and ongoing oversight to ensure that citizen data remains secure. We continuously monitor vendor compliance, conduct regular security assessments and update our frameworks to address emerging risks and maintain public trust. Mr Speaker : Mr Low. Mr Low Wu Yang Andre (Non-Constituency Member) : I thank the Minister of State for the response. I would like to share that the primary reason for me to ask this Parliamentary Question was driven by concerns I have over a specific vendor, which is Palantir Technologies, which, over the last five years or so, has become the preeminent supplier to governments around the globe of artificial intelligence, data and security solutions.
I am not sure if the Minister of State is at the liberty to disclose if we do have any ongoing contracts with Palantir, but I think even if the answer is no, the broader concern remains that overseas legislation like the United States' Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act compels these US-based companies to disclose data in their legal system from foreign countries. Even with data residency in mind, the Act still compels them to disclose this data. What assurances can the Minister of State give that we will not be subject to such compulsions? Ms Jasmin Lau : I thank the Member for the question. I understand that the Member may have filed a separate Parliamentary Question on Palantir for the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which I will leave for MOF to answer. I would like to add that he is right. Legal and contractual agreements aside, the reality is that no matter what legal provisions the contracts may contain, some jurisdictions like, as he mentioned, the US, may have legislation or regulations, including with extraterritorial reach, that empower government agencies to require companies or entities within their jurisdictions to provide certain information.
This could include Singapore Government data. Such legislation or regulations can override contractual obligations. This is why the Government's approach is to rely not solely on contractual provisions, but also on other risk mitigation measures, which I have mentioned, such as technical controls and safeguards as well as governance frameworks, which limit what use cases and categories of information may be used with non-government provided tools and platforms.