口头答复 · 2026-09-10 · 届国会 15
共担责任框架能否延伸至授权转账诈骗
共担责任框架能否延伸至授权转账诈骗
议员贺明(Dr Hamid Razak)询问总理兼财政部长:鉴于投资诈骗在2026年上半年损失最高,金融管理局是否检讨将共担责任原则延伸至投资诈骗等授权转账诈骗,以及检讨标准为何。国家发展部长徐芳达(Mr Chee Hong Tat)答复:共担责任框架(SRF)针对涉及未经授权交易的钓鱼诈骗,不适用于自行转账诈骗;通讯平台将被要求限制陌生人接触用户并显示警示,主要零售银行已为高风险活动设冷静期。贺明追问,AI和深度伪造让受害者自以为在进行有效交易,框架能否调整以涵盖这类受害者。徐芳达表示会持续检讨措施,前一天通过的内政部反诈骗法案将加强威慑,强调应针对诈骗者而非金融机构,并指金融机构会在框架之外酌情逐案提供善意赔付。
为什么重要
政府明确表示共担责任框架不适用于自行转账诈骗,AI深度伪造投资诈骗受害者只能靠银行酌情善意赔付
关键要点
- • 诈骗案件和损失在2025年和2026年上半年均下降,但投资诈骗在所有诈骗类型中损失最高
- • 共担责任框架(SRF)针对涉及未经授权交易的钓鱼诈骗,政府认为不适用于自行转账诈骗
- • 网络通讯平台将被要求使陌生联系人更难在未经同意下接触用户,并显示诈骗风险警示
- • 主要零售银行已为添加收款人、提高交易限额和导致账户被转空的大额转账等高风险活动逐步实施冷静期
- • 前一天通过的内政部反诈骗法案将加强对诈骗者的威慑和对消费者的保护
- • 金融机构在SRF之外,根据受害者财务状况逐案酌情提供善意赔付,尤其照顾较弱势的受害者
政府拒绝把共担责任框架延伸至自行转账诈骗,认为这类诈骗需要平台、银行和个人共同警惕;威慑和惩罚应针对诈骗者,金融机构是伙伴而非追责对象。政府只承诺持续检讨措施,没有承诺修改框架。
提问议员贺明认为AI和深度伪造让受害者误以为交易有效,而现行框架以凭证被盗为前提,令投资诈骗受害者得不到保障,希望金融管理局检讨框架以涵盖这类受害者。
面对AI深度伪造诱导的自行转账诈骗,政府坚持不把银行赔偿责任制度化扩大,而以平台义务、冷静期和银行酌情善意赔付替代;损失分担的界线仍按“是否经受害者授权”划分,未因AI欺骗能力提升而调整。
“它并不适用于涉及自行转账的诈骗。”
参与人员 (2)
完整译文(中文)
Hansard 原始记录 · 2026-09-26
14 号,贺明博士询问总理兼财政部长:鉴于投资诈骗在2026年上半年所有诈骗类型中损失最高,(a) 新加坡金融管理局是否正在检讨共担责任原则能否调整适用于投资诈骗等授权转账诈骗;以及 (b) 如果是,这类检讨将以什么标准为指导。
国家发展部长(徐芳达先生):议长先生,诈骗案件数量和损失金额在2025年和2026年上半年都有所下降。尽管如此,诈骗仍令人担忧,而且正如议员所指出的,投资诈骗在所有诈骗类型中损失最高。
政府已加大力度打击涉及自行转账的诈骗,包括投资诈骗。例如,网络通讯平台将被要求实施措施,使陌生联系人在未经终端用户同意的情况下更难与用户接触,并显示警示,提醒用户这类联系人可能带来的诈骗风险。
主要零售银行已逐步为高风险活动实施冷静期,例如添加收款人、提高交易限额,以及进行导致账户被转空的大额转账,让消费者有机会重新考虑他们打算进行的转账是否合法。政府也将继续推动公众教育,帮助公众更好地保护自己免受投资诈骗之害,并作出更明智的理财决定。
议长先生,共担责任框架(SRF)着重于涉及未经授权交易的钓鱼诈骗。它并不适用于涉及自行转账的诈骗。要战胜这类诈骗,需要各方都保持警惕:通讯平台要让诈骗者更难接触受害者;银行要设置认知缓冲,给受害者时间重新考虑。
重要的是,个人可以采取切实步骤保护自己,谨慎小心地对待每一个投资机会。例如,请查证提供该投资产品的是否确实是受新加坡金融管理局(MAS)监管的金融机构,并通过其官方联系渠道直接联系该金融机构。
议长:贺明博士。
贺明博士(西海岸—裕廊西):谢谢议长,也感谢部长的答复。我很赞赏金融管理局在教育居民方面所采取的预防策略。
我之所以特别就共担责任框架提出这个问题,是因为目前该框架取决于诈骗者是否通过伪造平台获取了凭证,因此投资诈骗受害者无法得到这个框架的保护。但今天我们有人工智能(AI)和深度伪造平台,让受害者自己进行交易,因为他们以为自己在进行一项经授权或有效的交易。所以我想知道金融管理局会否检讨这个框架,看看能否作出一些改变,让那些因这类AI生成的深度伪造图像和平台而遭受投资诈骗的受害者,也能通过这个框架获得索赔处理。
徐芳达先生:议长先生,我昨天在问答时间已回答了有关冒充诈骗的问题,并分享了从监管机构、通讯平台、银行到消费者等利益相关者都应采取的几项措施,以保护消费者免受这类风险,并降低深度伪造和AI在这些冒充诈骗中得逞的风险。
所以,我们肯定会继续检讨我们的措施,因为正如我昨天也提到的,这是一场猫捉老鼠的游戏。无论我们采取什么应对措施,诈骗者都会找到新方法设法突破这些防护。所以我们必须不断检讨我们的系统并保持警惕。
昨天通过的法案,即内政部(MHA)处理打击诈骗对策的法案,我认为也将有助于加强对诈骗者的威慑,并加强对消费者的保护。
议长先生,我也想借此简短地提一下,我们在这里要对付的坏人是诈骗者。因此,我们的威慑措施和惩罚确实应该针对这群人,也就是诈骗者。金融机构是我们的伙伴。我们与它们密切合作,事实上,我想借此机会向金融机构,特别是金融机构里的许多员工表示感谢,他们是整体反诈骗防线中非常关键的一环。
议员们应该在媒体上读到过报道,我们金融机构的一些员工一直保持警惕,有时采取措施设法保护消费者,甚至冒着有时被消费者责骂的风险,因为他们会拦截他们认为可疑的交易,而消费者不高兴。消费者会向员工发泄不满,但员工帮助阻止了其中一些诈骗发生。事后,消费者当然心怀感激。但在他们设法完成交易的那段时间,会有一些不愉快。
我认为认识到这一点很重要:金融机构及其员工正尽最大努力与我们合作,设法降低诈骗风险。
我还必须补充,金融机构也主动向前一步,酌情设法提供善意赔付。这意味着这不属于共担责任框架的一部分。这是它们自己做的,即善意赔付,根据受害者的财务状况,特别是那些来自较弱势背景的受害者,逐案处理。银行、金融机构会设法为他们提供更多帮助。
英文原文
SPRS Hansard 原始记录 · 抓取日期:2026-09-26
14 Dr Hamid Razak asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance given that investment scams recorded the highest losses among scam types in the first half of 2026 (a) whether MAS is reviewing if shared responsibility principles can be adapted to authorised-transfer scams such as investment scams; and (b) if so, what criteria would guide such a review.
The Minister for National Development (Mr Chee Hong Tat) : Mr Speaker, the number of scam cases and amounts lost have decreased in 2025 and in the first half of 2026. Nevertheless, scams are still a concern and as noted by the Member, investment scams recorded the highest losses among all scam types.
The Government has stepped up efforts to combat scams involving self-effected transfers, including investment scams. For example, online messaging platforms will be required to implement measures that make it more difficult for unknown contacts to engage users without the end-users' consent, and to display warnings alerting users to the potential scam risks posed by such contacts.
Major retail banks have progressively implemented cooling periods for higher-risk activities, such as adding of payees, raising of transaction limits and making large transfers that result in draining of accounts, to give consumers an opportunity to re-consider whether the transfer they intend to make is legitimate. The Government will also continue to drive public education efforts to help the public better protect themselves against investment scams and make more informed financial decisions.
Sir, the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) focuses on phishing scams involving unauthorised transactions. It is not suitable for scams involving self-effected transfers. Defeating such scams requires all parties to exercise vigilance: the messaging platforms to make it more difficult for scammers to engage victims; and the banks putting in place cognitive breaks to give time for victims to reconsider.
And importantly, individuals can take practical steps to protect themselves and approach every investment opportunity with care and caution. For example, please check whether it is indeed a Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)-regulated financial institution offering the investment product and contact the financial institution directly through its official contact channels.
Mr Speaker : Dr Hamid Razak.
Dr Hamid Razak (West Coast-Jurong West) : Thank you, Speaker, and I thank the Minister for his response. I do appreciate the preventative strategy that MAS is taking in educating our residents.
I thought to ask this question particular with respect to SRF, because, today, it hinges on the fact that a scammer acquires the credentials through a fabricated platform and therefore, investment scam victims would not get the benefit of being protected through this framework. But today we have artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake platforms that then allow victims to do the transaction themselves because they think they are making an authorised or a valid transaction. So, I am wondering whether MAS will review this framework to see whether some changes can be made so that scam victims that are affected by investment scams through this sort of AI-generated deepfake images and platforms can also get the claims seen through this framework.
Mr Chee Hong Tat : Mr Speaker, I addressed this question about impersonation scams yesterday during Question Time, and I shared several measures in which the stakeholders, from the regulators to the messaging platforms to the banks to consumers, should all take to protect consumers against such risks and to reduce the risk of the deepfakes and the AIs succeeding in these impersonation scams.
So, we will certainly keep on reviewing our measures, because as I mentioned yesterday as well, this is a cat and mouse game. Whatever countermeasures we put in place, the scammers will find new ways of trying to break through these safeguards. So, we have to continuously review our systems and to be vigilant.
The Bill that was passed yesterday, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Bill that deals with countermeasures against scams would also help, I think, to strengthen the deterrence against scammers and also to enhance the protection for consumers.
Sir, I would also like to just briefly mention that in this regard, the bad guys that we are dealing with here are the scammers. Therefore, we should really point the attention of our deterrence measures and our penalties towards this group of individuals – the scammers. The financial institutions (FIs) are our partners. We work closely with them and in fact, I want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the FIs and, in particular, the many employees working in the FIs who are a very key part of this overall defence against scams.
Members would have read reports from the media about how some of the staff in our FIs have been on their guard and sometimes, taking measures to try and protect consumers, at the risk of being scolded sometimes by the consumers, because they will block what they think are suspicious transactions and the consumers are not happy. They would vent their frustrations toward the staff, but the staff helped to prevent some of these scams from happening. Afterwards, of course, the consumers are appreciative. But during that time when they were trying to get the transaction through, there was some unhappiness.
I think it is important to recognise this: that the FIs and the staff working in the FIs are trying their best to work together with us to try and reduce the risk of scams.
I must also add that the FIs have also leaned forward to try and help on a discretionary basis to provide goodwill payment. That means this is not part of the SRF. This is what they do on their own – goodwill payment – on a case-by-case basis, based on the financial situation of the victims, especially those who come from more vulnerable backgrounds. The banks, the FIs will try to do more to help them.