口頭答覆 · 2025-02-18 · 屆國會 14

美出口管制對新加坡晶片業影響

AI 治理與監管 AI 經濟與產業 AI 與公共部門 爭議度 3 · 實質辯論

議員質詢美出口管制對新加坡半導體產業及經濟的影響,及政府如何防止企業利用新加坡規避美國限制。政府強調新加坡作為法治透明的國際商業樞紐,嚴厲打擊違法行為,維護國家信譽。核心爭議在於新加坡是否被列為美出口管制第二等級,及如何修復與美國的信任關係。

關鍵要點

  • 防止規避美出口管制
  • 維護國際商業信譽
  • 爭取提升出口管制等級
政府立場

堅持法治嚴懲違規,維護國際信譽

質詢立場

關注美出口管制對產業影響及政策應對

政策訊號

強化出口管制合規監管

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參與人員 (7)

完整譯文(中文)

Hansard 原始記錄 · 2026-05-02

3 葉漢榮議員問副總理兼貿易與工業部長:(a) 貿易與工業部如何確保新加坡的營商便利不會被企業利用以規避美國貿易限制;(b) 部門能否提供關於美國晶片出口管制規則對我國半導體產業及更廣泛經濟影響的最新評估。

4 喬安·佩雷拉女士問副總理兼貿易與工業部長,是否有措施確保在新加坡運營的實體遵守出口管制和國際法律,以維護新加坡作為備受尊敬的國際商業樞紐的地位。

5 林佔武副教授問副總理兼貿易與工業部長:(a) 部門是否知悉新加坡將被列入美國新的人工智慧出口管制第二級別;(b) 政府是否有具體外交政策目標,爭取(i) 國家驗證終端使用者身份及(ii) 在這些管制下獲得第一級別重新分類;(c) 美國方面是否已傳達任何作為此類身份變更前提條件的具體技術和監管改進。

6 林佔武副教授問副總理兼貿易與工業部長,鑑於美國機構已將新加坡標記為向被列入黑名單的中國人工智慧企業非法轉運晶片的樞紐:(a) 政府是否能夠(i) 公開自2023年以來其對該類晶片再出口監管立場背後的外交政策理由,(ii) 詳述導致此情況的任何或所有跨部門決策;(b) 政府如何打算修復因相關報道對新加坡信譽及與美國關係造成的損害。

貿易與工業第二部長(陳志凌博士):議長先生,懇請允許我一併回答今天議程上由葉漢榮議員、喬安·佩雷拉女士及林佔武副教授提出的第3至第6號口頭質詢。

議長:請繼續。

陳志凌博士:這些問題均涉及美國出口管制及新加坡對此類措施的應對。我的答覆還將涵蓋李顯龍議員提交的類似議會質詢,該質詢安排在後續會議中答覆。

新加坡是一個穩定、值得信賴、可靠且聯通良好的國際商業樞紐。我們的經濟競爭力基於對法治的承諾、零容忍腐敗、透明的法規及開放包容的營商環境。我們經過長期努力建立了這一聲譽。因此,我們對違反法律的個人和企業採取堅決果斷的行動,這是我們競爭力的基礎。

關於受美國出口管制影響的輝達晶片問題,我們正在仔細審查,並將持續關注。迄今為止,我們的核查顯示,輝達向新加坡銷售的產品實物交付佔其整體收入不到1%。這些晶片主要部署於新加坡的主要企業及政府。我們瞭解到,輝達向新加坡商業實體開具賬單的其餘收入並未涉及實物運入新加坡。

若新加坡企業從事欺騙或不誠實行為以規避其所受出口管制,我們將依法調查並採取適當行動。保障獲取尖端技術及維護營商環境的誠信符合國家利益。

在新加坡,戰略物資及技術的轉讓和經紀受《戰略物資(管制)法》管轄。該框架堅實,與聯合國安理會等主要多邊出口管制機制保持一致。

除多邊機制外,國家有時對特定物品實施單邊出口管制。美國對先進半導體晶片的出口管制即為一例。

根據這些規則,美國期望企業確保其商業交易符合要求,包括對先進半導體晶片買方進行必要的“瞭解你的客戶”(KYC)審查。雖然我們目前無法律義務執行其他國家的單邊出口管制,但期望所有在新加坡運營的企業在其國際業務活動中考慮相關法規,確保業務透明。

我們絕不容忍企業故意利用與新加坡的關聯規避或違反其他國家的出口管制。在操作層面,新加坡關稅局與包括美國在內的外國同行密切合作,回應其關切,適當且在法律允許範圍內協助調查。

必須強調的是,這一開放、包容且透明的監管體系適用於我們所有貿易伙伴。

部分議員還詢問美國對先進半導體晶片管制對新加坡經濟的影響。就製造和出口晶片能力而言,影響有限。美國當前的技術管制針對的是一小部分先進半導體晶片,而新加坡半導體產業專注於生產成熟工藝晶片,這些晶片廣泛應用於家電、汽車及工業裝置。

然而,在獲取先進人工智慧計算資源方面,例如輝達H100圖形處理單元(GPU),前任美國政府於2025年1月引入了人工智慧擴散規則,旨在按國家層面管理對H100或同等級GPU的訪問。新加坡與約150個國家一樣,被劃分為第二級別。當前美國政府尚未最終確定該規則細節,也未傳達任何作為國家級別變更前提條件的具體要求。

我們的目標是確保本地及在新加坡運營的國際企業均能充分獲取人工智慧計算資源。我們將確保總部設在美國的雲端計算巨頭繼續作為通用驗證終端使用者在新加坡運營,並支援希望申請成為國家驗證終端使用者以獲取人工智慧計算資源的本地企業。

最後,我向議員們保證,我們將繼續與在新加坡的企業合作,促進其從所有主要來源國獲取先進半導體晶片及技術。同時,我們也將持續與美國政府溝通,回應其關切。

議長:葉漢榮議員。

葉漢榮議員(楊厝港):謝謝議長。我感謝部長的答覆。我宣告我在一家總部設於新加坡的全球投資公司工作。我很高興部委強調遵守國際貿易規則,並且新加坡認真履行我們的義務。

部長能否詳細說明有哪些保障措施防止企業利用新加坡作為通道規避美國出口限制,尤其是在美中貿易緊張加劇的背景下?部委如何在這些保障措施與確保我們繼續成為吸引企業的目的地之間取得平衡?

陳志凌博士:感謝葉議員的追加問題。新加坡擁有健全的出口管制體系,基於全面的戰略物資管制立法。《2002年戰略物資(管制)法》及其附屬法規管理和規範戰略物資及技術的轉讓和經紀。

新加坡的管制物資和技術清單與四個多邊出口管制機制保持一致,分別是瓦森納協定、澳大利亞集團、導彈技術控制制度和核供應國集團。如我先前所述,執法由新加坡關稅局負責。

我想更具體說明我們如何管理出口。潛在違規行為包括無適當許可證出口、轉運、過境戰略物資,提供虛假或誤導性檔案或資訊,錯誤申報,以及無許可證或未註冊經紀戰略物資——這些行為將受到刑事處罰。

我們如何平衡與外國同行合作?如我先前答覆所述,雖然我們目前無法律義務執行其他國家可能不時變化的單邊出口管制,但在新加坡運營的企業若其國際業務活動涉及相關法規,應予以考慮。

外交部和新加坡關稅局與部分外國同行(如美國)已有現有安排,便於調查相關企業。我們不時收到指控資訊,若知悉違規,將自行展開調查。

我們的做法系統且徹底,繼續強調我們擁有開放、包容且透明的監管體系,適用於所有合作伙伴。希望這回答了葉議員的追加問題。

議長:喬安·佩雷拉女士。

喬安·佩雷拉女士(丹戎巴葛):謝謝議長。我有一個追加問題。請問部長是否計劃釋出行業指引,支援在新加坡運營的企業遵守出口管制和國際制裁?

陳志凌博士:感謝喬安女士的追加問題。如我先前所述,國家可能不時單方面實施出口管制。我們已明確且透明告知在新加坡運營的企業,須遵守相關國家的出口管制,不得利用新加坡作為規避或繞過出口管制的渠道。

正如議員所指出,無法涵蓋所有潛在、可能或未來單邊出口管制。但指導我們成為聲譽良好商業樞紐的原則將持續保持一致,我們將堅守這些原則。單邊出口管制一旦引起我們關注,我們將與相關國家溝通,積極與美國這一重要夥伴接觸,探討如何更好管理並教育本地企業確保合規。希望這能給議員以信心。

議長:林佔武副教授。

林佔武副教授(盛港):先生,我最初向外交部提交了兩項議會質詢,後被轉交貿易與工業部。我理解此舉的動機,但希望部長或外交部部長能回應需要更外交政策視角的問題。

儘管陳部長稱輝達產品實物銷售僅約1%,但輝達最新向美國證券交易委員會提交的檔案顯示,截至2024年10月的九個月內,公司總收入為910億美元,其中不到一半為美國國內收入;其次是新加坡,約70億美元;中國(含香港)約120億美元。這意味著新加坡約佔輝達全球收入的20%。[參見《個人說明》,官方報告,2025年2月26日,第95卷,第153期,個人說明部分。]

像我們這樣的轉口樞紐出現此類收入膨脹並不罕見,即使我們的增值部分很小或幾乎沒有,這也不完全是欺詐,正如部長似乎暗示的,而是合法的會計慣例和原產地規則操作。

無論如何,這種收入不平衡引發了商業行動,如我們所見。因此,我想詢問外交部是否知曉這些不平衡,若知曉,是否評估促進轉運貿易從外交政策角度對國家利益是正面還是負面?此外,外交部是否有正式機制審查或對貿易與工業部的貿易決策提供意見,這些決策不可避免地涉及外交政策影響?

最後,針對貿易與工業部的問題,鑑於美國已將新加坡列為第二級別,政府將採取或計劃採取哪些具體措施防止進一步降級,這可能危及我們的人工智慧樞紐願景?

議長:外交部長維文·巴拉克裡希南。

外交部長(維文·巴拉克裡希南博士):議長先生,新加坡是轉運樞紐,是數千家國際公司的重要區域及全球總部。我們的貿易額是國內生產總值的三倍,我們企業所從事的活動範圍廣泛,不僅限於新加坡及新加坡人擁有的公司,還包括這些公司的全球所有者,具有區域及國際影響力。因此,我不確定林佔武副教授所說的不平衡具體指什麼。

這些獨特特徵是新加坡在全球經濟中獨特角色的正常表現。例如,正如議員所言,輝達在其報告中稱22%的晶片銷售歸屬於在新加坡運營的實體,但我的同事已向議員解釋,只有1%的晶片實物運抵新加坡並部署於資料中心,服務政府及其他主要企業,包括超大規模雲服務商。因此,這並無異常或不平衡。

問題的核心是這些企業是否利用新加坡規避單邊出口管制。我的同事已向本院詳細說明,新加坡通過《戰略物資管制法》依法執行多邊出口管制機制,包括瓦森納協定、澳大利亞集團及導彈技術控制制度。這些機制主要針對武器、大規模殺傷性武器、化學及生物威脅及其他潛在重要的雙用途裝置,具有法律效力,我們以聯合國安理會為依據。

全球約有200個國家,可能各自頒佈單邊出口措施。我們已說明無法律義務執行所有200個國家的單邊出口措施,但會執行多邊達成一致的出口管制機制。

話雖如此,我們國家利益不允許被利用,也不會允許企業為規避適用的單邊出口管制措施,利用與新加坡的關聯——因為新加坡以清潔、規範、透明和聲譽良好著稱——進行欺騙或規避行為。

關鍵在於責任在於企業,我們不容忍規避、欺騙、虛假申報或錯誤會計,並將採取行動。

當貿易伙伴向我們表達關切時,我們會協助調查或深入審查資料,確保國家利益。針對先進半導體晶片,我們也需要半導體。確實,我們是全球半導體制造和出口鏈條的一部分。

但目前新加坡製造的並非用於人工智慧的高階H100晶片。我們需要這些晶片用於自身用途,因此必須監控晶片製造商的出口管制。

議員提及我們的第二級別分類。首先,該規則稱為人工智慧擴散規則,最初由拜登政府末期釋出。目前規則仍在徵求意見,形勢尚在演變。我們不屬於第一級別,而是與約150個國家同屬第二級別。我不便詳述晶片數量及是否構成限制。我們將繼續與主要先進晶片出口國溝通,確保供應充足。

我相信議員們也明白,涉及此類敏感議題時,維護國家利益不應損害我們在戰略物資談判中的立場。希望議員理解,當前形勢源於:一、新加坡獨特且成功地履行全球角色;二、我們是值得信賴、可靠且誠實的合作伙伴。

如果你放眼更廣,不僅僅是晶片和出口管制,關鍵是:作為一個小小的島國城市國家和貿易樞紐,新加坡確實需要支援自由貿易。我們確實需要在全球供應鏈中發揮關鍵作用。

第二點,因為我們規模小,我們必須遵守國際法和多邊規則,以及實施多邊規則的程式和機構。這是作為小國的必然。

第三點,我們始終必須尋求對世界保持相關性,對大國和中等強國有用,但我們不會被其他大國利用,也不會被追求金錢利益的公司利用。

最後一點,在一個正在分裂、破碎或極化分裂的世界裡,我們更應堅持正直,我在北京和華盛頓說同樣的話,並且保持公正。這就是為什麼陳部長所說的一切都適用於我們所有的貿易伙伴。

我想我已經說得夠多了。希望我已經讓議員和本院其他議員放心。

議長:陳部長。

陳志龍博士:謝謝議長。我也想回應林副教授剛才提到的關於輝達季度收入的問題。

我想為議員澄清一個非常明確的情況:在2024年第三季度,輝達季度收入中歸屬於新加坡的比例是22%。這反映的是輝達客戶收到賬單的地點;這並不意味著貨物運到了這裡。因此,這與輝達及其客戶實際交付貨物的物理地點無關。

讓我大致向本院議員說明。全球企業將採購商品和服務的賬單集中在其樞紐是常見做法,但這與產品實際運送到哪裡是分開的。根據我們目前的核查和掌握的資料,顯示在該季度,輝達整體收入中實際運入新加坡的不到1%。其餘在這裡開具賬單的收入並不涉及貨物實際運入新加坡。

議長:李馬克先生,最後一個追加問題。

李馬克先生(提名議員):感謝部長詳盡的答覆。部長提到新加坡在美國人工智慧晶片出口管制中被歸為二級國家。我的追加問題是:作為二級國家的經濟影響是什麼?這種分類是否影響新加坡吸引人工智慧晶片投資、高階半導體研發,甚至阻礙我們成為人工智慧發展樞紐的雄心?

陳志龍博士:感謝李先生的追加問題。正如我尊敬的同事維維安部長所說,我們屬於150個國家的較廣泛基礎。我認為我們處於良好陣營。

正如我之前答覆中提到的,美國人工智慧擴散規則尚未由現任政府最終確定;維維安部長也提到該規則是在拜登政府任期最後幾天釋出的。實際上是在2025年1月13日,剛剛一個多月前。隨後有120天的評論期,將於2025年5月13日結束。新政府尚未對該規則的政策或立場發表評論。因此,我們是這150個二級國家之一。

雖然美國將18個國家歸為一級,但並未具體說明分級標準,也未說明國家如何從二級重新分類為一級的要求。

獲得人工智慧計算能力對我們的國家人工智慧雄心至關重要。正如我們《國家人工智慧戰略2.0》中闡述的,我們採取多管齊下的策略,支援產業、學術界和政府開展高價值人工智慧活動。除了確保獲得先進人工智慧硬體和計算資源外,我們還將重點發展人才和基礎設施。我們將繼續支援在新加坡運營的公司獲得先進晶片,包括受人工智慧擴散規則管控的晶片。

目前,我們產業界對先進晶片的大部分需求來自總部設在美國的雲端計算巨頭,如Meta、亞馬遜、谷歌等。我們將與他們合作,申請成為通用認證終端使用者,以允許他們將一定數量的先進晶片轉移到新加坡,用於創新和業務需求。

對於本地有大量人工智慧計算需求的公司,可以申請成為國家認證終端使用者。認證終端使用者分為兩級:通用認證終端使用者和國家認證終端使用者。它們可以申請國家認證終端使用者身份,以獲得先進人工智慧晶片的訪問許可權,我們將支援本地公司申請。

通用和國家認證終端使用者進口的晶片不計入對二級國家施加的國家配額。

我們正在與新加坡產業界溝通,收集對草案規則可能對其業務活動影響的反饋。這將幫助我們更好地考慮支援企業的適當措施。正如我之前所說,我們也在與美國進行接觸,解決他們的關切,並更好地理解他們對人工智慧擴散規則的態度。

英文原文

SPRS Hansard · Fetched: 2026-05-02

3 Mr Yip Hon Weng asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) how does the Ministry ensure that the ease of doing business in Singapore is not exploited by companies seeking to bypass US trade restrictions; and (b) whether the Ministry can provide an update on its assessment of the effects of the US chips export control rules on our semi-conductor industry and the broader economy.

4 Ms Joan Pereira asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry whether there are measures in place to ensure that entities operating in Singapore are compliant with export controls and international laws in order to protect Singapore’s status as a well-respected international business hub.

5 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Ministry is aware that Singapore will be placed under the new US AI export controls' Tier Two status; (b) whether it is a specific foreign policy objective of this Government to secure (i) the National Validated End-User status and (ii) Tier One reclassification under these controls; and (c) what specific technical and regulatory enhancements, if any, have been communicated by US counterparts as prerequisites for such status changes.

6 Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim asked the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry in light of how US agencies have flagged Singapore as a hub for illicit chip transshipments to blacklisted Chinese AI firms (a) whether the Government is able to (i) disclose the foreign policy rationales behind its regulatory stance with regard to re-exports of such chips since 2023 and (ii) detail any or all inter-agency decisions that led to this situation; and (b) how does the Government intend to rectify any damage to Singapore’s credibility and ties with the US arising from such reports.

The Second Minister for Trade and Industry (Dr Tan See Leng) : Mr Speaker, may I have your permission to answer oral Question Nos 3 to 6 on today's Order Paper, filed by Members Mr Yip Hon Weng, Ms Joan Pereira and Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, together, please?

Mr Speaker : Please go ahead.

Dr Tan See Leng : These pertain to questions over the United States (US) export controls and Singapore's approach to such measures. My response today will also cover a similar Parliamentary Question that has been filed by Mr Mark Lee 1 , that has been scheduled for a subsequent Sitting.

Singapore is a stable, trusted, reliable and well-connected international business hub. Our economic competitiveness is based on our commitment to the rule of law, zero tolerance for corruption, transparent regulations and an open inclusive business environment. We have painstakingly built up this reputation over time. That is why we take firm and decisive action against individuals and companies that violate our laws. It is the foundation of our competitiveness.

Questions have been raised about Nvidia chips that were subject to US export controls. We are scrutinising this issue carefully and will continue to do so. So far, our checks indicate that physical delivery of products sold by Nvidia to Singapore represent less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue. These are mainly deployed in Singapore for major enterprises and the Singapore Government. We understand that the remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities in Singapore did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

If a company in Singapore is engaged in deceptive or dishonest practices to evade export controls that it is subject to, we will investigate and we will take the appropriate action in accordance with Singapore laws. It is in our national interest to secure access to leading edge technology and to maintain the integrity of our business environment.

Within Singapore, the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology is governed by the Strategic Goods (Control) Act. This is a robust framework that is aligned with major multilateral export control regimes, including those imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

Outside of these multilateral regimes, countries sometimes impose unilateral export controls on specific items. The US' export controls on advanced semi-conductor chips are one example.

Under these rules, the US expects companies to ensure their business transactions adhere to their requirements, including doing the required Know Your Customer (KYC) on the buyers of the advanced semi-conductor chips. While we currently do not have legal obligations to enforce the unilateral export controls of other countries, we expect all companies operating in Singapore to take into account such regulations if they apply to their international business activities. Their international business activities should be conducted transparently.

We certainly do not condone businesses deliberately using their association with Singapore to circumvent or violate the export controls of other countries. At the operational level, Singapore Customs works closely with its foreign counterparts, including those from the US to address their concerns and to facilitate their investigations where appropriate and to the extent our law permits.

It is important to emphasise that this open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime applies to all our trading partners.

Some Members also had questions about the economic impact on Singapore arising from US controls on advanced semi-conductor chips. There is limited impact, in terms of our ability to manufacture and export chips. The US' current technology controls are aimed at a narrow subset of advanced semi-conductor chips, whereas Singapore's semi-conductor industry focuses on producing mature node chips which are used globally in appliances, automotives and industrial equipment.

However, in terms of access to advanced artificial intelligence (AI) compute – for example Nvidia H100 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), the previous US administration had introduced an AI Diffusion Rule in January 2025 aimed at managing access to H100 or equivalent GPUs on a country-level basis. Singapore, like around 150 countries, has been classified as Tier Two. The details of the US AI Diffusion Rule have not yet been finalised by the current US administration, and the US has not communicated any specific requirements as prerequisites for changes to countries' tiering classifications.

Our objective is to ensure adequate access to AI compute by both local and international companies with operations in Singapore. We will ensure that US-headquartered cloud hyperscalers can continue to operate in Singapore as Universal Verified End Users and also support local companies that wish to apply to be National Verified End Users with access to AI compute.

In closing, I wish to assure Members that we will continue to work with companies based in Singapore to facilitate their access to advanced semi-conductor chips and technologies from all the major source countries. We will also continue to engage the US administration to address their concerns.

Mr Speaker : Mr Yip Hon Weng.

Mr Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang) : Thank you, Mr Speaker. I thank the Minister for his response. I declare that I work in a global investment firm based in Singapore. I am glad that the Ministry has emphasised compliance with international trade rules, and that Singapore takes our obligations seriously.

Could the Minister elaborate on the safeguards in place, to prevent companies from using Singapore as a conduit to bypass US export restrictions, especially in light of heightened US-China trade tensions? And how does the Ministry balance these safeguards with ensuring that we remain an attractable destination for businesses?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Mr Yip for his supplementary question. Singapore has a robust export control regime and this is underpinned by a comprehensive strategic goods control legislation. The Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 and its subsidiary legislation governs and regulates the transfer and brokering of strategic goods and technology.

Singapore's list of control goods and technologies is aligned with four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And as I have alluded to earlier, the enforcement action is undertaken by Singapore Customs.

I wanted to give a bit more granularity in terms of how we manage the exports. Potential contraventions can include export, transshipment, transit of strategic goods without the requisite permits or providing false or misleading documents or information, incorrect declarations and brokering of strategic goods without a permit or being registered – and with that, criminal penalties can then be enforced.

How do we balance working with foreign counterparts? As I have earlier on mentioned in my reply, while we may currently not have legal obligations to enforce unilateral export controls of other countries, which may vary from time to time, companies that are operating in Singapore are expected to take into account such regulations if these apply to their international business activities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Singapore Customs also have existing arrangements with some foreign counterparts, such as those in the US, to facilitate the investigation of companies of interest. From time to time, when we do get information of allegations and if we are aware of breaches, we will undertake to conduct these investigations ourselves.

The approach that we take is systematic and thorough, and we want to continue to emphasise that we have an open, inclusive and transparent regulatory regime and it applies to all of our partners today. I hope that addresses Mr Yip's supplementary question.

Mr Speaker : Ms Joan Pereira.

Ms Joan Pereira (Tanjong Pagar) : Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have one supplementary question for the Minister. May I know if there are plans to issue any industry guidelines to support firms operating in Singapore to comply with export controls and international sanctions?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Ms Joan Pereira for her supplementary question. As I have shared earlier on, countries may have export controls from time to time, unilaterally. Where we have been very clear and transparent to companies operating within Singapore is that they are expected to abide by the countries' export controls, and not use Singapore as a country to bypass or circumvent these export controls.

To this end, as the hon Member has highlighted, it would not be possible to cover every potential, probable or future export controls that countries may unilaterally impose. But those principles that have guided us through to build us up to where we are a reputable business hub, these principles will continue to be consistent and we will hold true to these principles. From time to time, when these unilateral export controls come to our attention, we will work with the relevant countries to gain clarity, to engage them, as we are actively engaging with the US, our very important partner, to see how we can better manage and better educate the businesses that are based here to make sure that they are able to comply. I hope that gives the Member the reassurance.

Mr Speaker : Assoc Prof Jamus Lim.

Assoc Prof Jamus Jerome Lim (Sengkang) : Sir, I had originally posed my two Parliamentary Questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) before they were redirected to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). I understand the motivation behind this redirection, but hopeful that the Minister or a Minister from MFA will be able to respond to questions that call for a more foreign policy approach.

Notwithstanding Minister Tan's assertions about the physical sales of Nvidia products being only around 1%, Nvidia's latest filing with the US Securities Exchange Commission states that for the nine months that ended October 2024, the company booked US$91 billion in total revenue, of which a little less than half is domestic; that is, domestic to the US. The next highest source is actually Singapore, with around $7 billion, and it is more than that for China, which includes Hong Kong, at $12 billion. This means that Singapore accounts for around 20% of Nvidia's global revenue. [ Please refer to "Personal Explanation", Official Report, 26 February 2025, Vol 95, Issue 153, Personal Explanation section. ]

It is not unusual for entrepôt hubs like us to book such inflated revenue figures, even if our value-added component is small or negligible, nor is this really about fraud, as the Minister seems to allude to, but actually legitimate accounting practices and rules of origin machinations.

Regardless, the headline imbalance invites commercial action, like what we have seen. So, if I may enquire if MFA was aware of these imbalances and if so, is it, in its assessment, that facilitating transshipment trade is positive or negative for the national interest from a foreign policy angle? And relatedly, is there a formal mechanism for MFA to review or provide input to MTI's trade decisions that have inevitable foreign policy implications?

And finally, one question directly for MTI, and given that Singapore is now being placed under Tier Two status by the US, what specific steps will the Government take or plan to take to prevent further downgrades of our status, which could jeopardise our AI hub aspirations?

Mr Speaker : Minister Vivian Balakrishnan.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr Vivian Balakrishnan) : Mr Speaker, Singapore is a transshipment hub, a vital regional and global headquarters for thousands of international companies. Our trade volume is three times our gross domestic product (GDP), and the range of activities that our companies are engaged in, and not just companies owned by Singapore and Singaporeans, but by global owners of these companies, have a regional and international footprint. So, I am not sure what Assoc Prof Jamus Lim is referring to when he says imbalances.

These unique characteristics are par for the course for the unique role that Singapore plays in the global economy. So, for instance, when, as the Member correctly said, Nvidia states in its returns that 22% of sales of chips were booked to entities with operations in Singapore, but my colleague has already explained to the Member only 1% physically came to Singapore and was deployed in data centres here, serving the Government and other major enterprises, including, I should add, hyperscalers. So, there is nothing unusual or unbalanced about that.

The nub of the question really is whether Singapore is being used by these enterprises and companies to evade unilateral export controls. And my colleague has very carefully explained to this House that Singapore, by law, through the Strategic Goods Control Act, gives effect to multilateral export control regimes. He referred to the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Basically, these are focused especially on weapons or weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological threats, and other potentially significant dual-use equipment. And these have force of law and we take our reference from the United Nations Security Council.

There are 200 countries in the world. It is possible for 200 countries to promulgate unilateral export measures. We have explained that we are not legally obliged to enforce that unilateral export measures of 200 countries. But we will enforce the multilateral agreed-upon export control regimes.

Having said that, it is not in our national interest to be made use of and for companies who, for whatever reasons, are trying perhaps to evade unilateral export control measures that apply to them, to use their association with Singapore – because people know Singapore is a clean, hygienic, transparent and reputable place – we will not allow them to use that association with us to engage in deceptive or evasive measures to avoid unilateral export measures that apply to them.

The point is the onus is on that company and we will not countenance evasion, deception, false declarations or even mis-accounting; and that we will act on.

And as and when a trading partner comes to us and says, "We have concerns", at that point, we would certainly facilitate investigations or at least, have a deeper look at the data and see whether there is any cause for concern, and we do that in order to protect our own national interest. Specifically for advanced semi-conductor chips. We too have a need for semi-conductors. It is true that we are also part of the global chains that manufacture and export semi-conductors.

But those that are currently manufactured in Singapore are not the H100s, the high-end chips which are used for AI. But we need them for our own purposes and we therefore have to monitor the export regimes of the manufacturers of these chips.

The Member referred to our Tier Two classification. Well, first of all, they call it the AI Diffusion Rule. It was first published near the tail-end of the Biden Administration. In fact, right now, the rules are up for comments and the situation is still evolving. We are not in Tier One, but we are in Tier Two, in good company with about 150 other countries. I do not want to get into detail about the exact number of chips and whether that currently poses a constraint for us. Needless to say, we will continue to engage the major exporting source of these advanced chips to ensure that we have adequate.

And I am sure Members of this House will also be aware, when dealing with sensitive topics like this, it is not in our national interest to compromise our negotiating positions when it deals with strategic items on this score. So, I hope the Member understands that the situation that has arisen is: one, because of our unique role and indeed our successful performance of this unique, global role; and two, the fact that we are a trusted, reliable and honest player.

If you zoom out, beyond chips and export controls, the point is this: Singapore, as a tiny island city-state and a trading hub, we do need to stand in favour of free trade. We do need to play a critical role in global supply chains.

Second point, because we are small, we have to subscribe to international law and multilateral rules, and processes and institutions to give effect to multilateral rules. It comes with being small.

Third point, we always have to seek to be relevant to the world, to be useful to big and middle powers, but we will not be made use of, either by other powers or even by companies pursuing pecuniary interest.

And my final point, in a world which is bifurcating, fracturing or polarising and divided, it is all the more important for us to play it straight, for me to say the same thing in Beijing and Washington, and to be fair. And that is why everything that Minister Tan has said applies to all our trading partners.

I think I have said enough. And I hope I have reassured the Member and other Members of this House.

Mr Speaker : Minister Tan.

Dr Tan See Leng : Thank you, Speaker. I want to also address Assoc Prof Lim's point about Nvidia's quarterly revenue, as he shared earlier on.

I just wanted to put it into very clear perspective for the Member: in the third quarter of 2024, the proportion of Nvidia's quarterly revenue attributed to Singapore is 22%. This reflects the location where Nvidia's customers received the bill; it does not mean that it was shipped here. So, it is independent from the physical location that Nvidia and its customers deliver the goods to.

Let me share broadly with Members of the House. It is common practice for global entities to centralise the billing for procured goods and services in their hubs, but this is separate from where the products are shipped to. So far, from our checks and the data that we have on hand, it is revealed that in that quarter, less than 1% of Nvidia's overall revenue was physically shipped into Singapore. The remainder of Nvidia's revenue billed to business entities here did not involve physical shipments into Singapore.

Mr Speaker : Mr Mark Lee, last supplementary question.

Mr Mark Lee (Nominated Member) : I thank the Minister for the very comprehensive reply. The Minister has mentioned that Singapore has been classified as a Tier Two country under the US AI chip export controls. My supplementary question to the Minister is: what are the economic implications of being in Tier Two and does this classification impact Singapore's ability to attract AI chip investments, high-end semi-conductor research and development or even hinder our ambitions to be an AI development hub?

Dr Tan See Leng : I thank Mr Lee for his supplementary question. As my esteemed colleague, Minister Vivian, has shared, we are in the broader base of the 150 countries. I think we are in good company.

As I have also mentioned in my reply earlier, the US AI Diffusion Rule has not yet been finalised by the current administration; and Minister Vivian has also alluded to the fact that it was released by the Biden Administration in the final days of his administration. Actually, it is on 13 January 2025, just over a month ago. And there is a 120-day comment period, which will end on 13 May 2025. The new administration has not commented on their policy or position towards the rule. So, we are among one of the 150 countries under this Tier Two status.

Whilst the US categorised 18 countries under Tier One, it did not share specific requirements on the tiering classification nor what requirements are required for a country to be reclassified from Tier Two to Tier One.

Access to AI compute is important for our national AI ambitions. As articulated in our National AI Strategy 2.0, we are adopting a multi-prong strategy to enable industry, academia and Government to undertake high-value AI activities. Besides securing access to advanced AI hardware and compute, we will also focus on talent and infrastructure development. We will continue to support companies operating in Singapore to gain access to advanced chips, including those that are under the AI Diffusion Rule.

Presently, most of the demand for advanced chips amongst our industry players come from US headquartered cloud hyperscalers. These are: Meta, Amazon, Google and so on. We will work with them to apply to be universal verified end users, so as to allow them to transfer a certain quantity of advanced chips to Singapore for their innovation and for their business needs.

For the local companies with significant AI compute requirements, they can apply to be the national verified end user. There are two tiers: a universal verified end user and a national verified end user. They can apply for the national verified end user status to receive access to advanced AI chips and we will support our local companies in their application.

Chips that are imported by both universal and national verified end users will not count towards the national cap imposed on Tier Two countries.

We are in consultation with industry players in Singapore to gather feedback on the potential impact of the draft rules on their business activities. This will allow us to better consider appropriate measures to support our companies and we are also, as I have said earlier, engaging the US to address their concerns and to also better understand their approach to the AI Diffusion Rule.