預算辯論 · 2023-02-24 · 屆國會 14
國防預算與安全趨勢質詢
議員質詢國防部關於當前全球及區域安全形勢的評估,特別關注美中戰略競爭、俄烏戰爭及朝鮮導彈試驗等風險。政府回應了對多邊主義衰退和地區安全複雜化的關注,強調新加坡需加強防務準備以應對不確定性。核心爭議在於如何平衡國防投入與區域外交策略,確保國家安全與穩定。
關鍵要點
- • 多邊主義承諾減弱
- • 美中戰略競爭加劇
- • 區域安全環境複雜
加強防務準備應對複雜安全環境
關注國防預算及安全威脅評估
強化國防應對區域風險
“Every time an act of aggression takes place without consequences for the aggressor, the more each country has to fear for its own safety.”
參與人員 (10)
完整譯文(中文)
Hansard 原始記錄 · 2026-05-02
主席:國防部J項負責人。Vikram Nair先生。
安全趨勢
Vikram Nair先生(實龍崗):主席,我提議“將預算中J項的總撥款減少100元”。
新加坡獨立之路波折重重,我們的開國元勳經歷了二戰,以及獨立前夕印尼與馬來西亞的對峙。我們於1967年開始實行國民服役,多年來逐步穩健地將新加坡武裝部隊建設成一支強大且可信賴的防衛力量。自此,新加坡一直享有相對和平與繁榮。
我們和平環境的重要原因之一,是二戰後八十餘年來主要世界強國根據聯合國憲章承諾和平共處。
然而,多邊主義的承諾隨著時間逐漸削弱,最近的例子是俄羅斯去年二月入侵烏克蘭。雖然部分國際社會迅速譴責這一侵略行為及違反國際法,但並非所有國家都如此。每當侵略行為未對侵略者產生後果時,各國對自身安全的擔憂便加劇。
我們周邊也出現令人擔憂的發展。美中戰略競爭日益激烈。近期事件如時任美國眾議院議長南希·佩洛西訪臺,以及美國擊落中國熱氣球,令局勢升級,導致本可促進建設性對話的外交會談取消。臺灣海峽作為傳統熱點,軍事演習也日益頻繁。
兩國在貿易和技術領域也加大排他性措施的實施力度。隨著兩大強國戰略競爭加劇,新加坡可能被捲入交火。
此外,中等強國對我們地區興趣增加,開始制定更有力的戰略以擴大其在亞太地區的存在。雖然許多是友好國家,但隨著此類國家數量增多,區域安全環境可能變得更加複雜和緊張。
在朝鮮半島,朝鮮進行了更多彈道導彈試驗,迅速遭到鄰國韓國、日本及國際社會的譴責。日本自二戰以來一直保持和平主義立場,但面對周邊軍事壓力,已開始重新軍事化。
新加坡面臨諸多挑戰。國防部長能否就國防部和武裝部隊密切關注的主要全球及區域趨勢作出更新,並說明這些趨勢將如何影響國防部和武裝部隊?
烏克蘭戰爭
我之前提及了塑造我們周邊環境的主要地緣政治和安全發展。現在我想聚焦於俄烏衝突,特別是其對新加坡安全的影響。
戰爭爆發時,許多人認為俄羅斯會迅速擊敗烏克蘭並佔領該國。但事實是,烏克蘭進行了堅決有力的防禦,並獲得了周邊大國至少在裝備和資金上的支援。雙方均不願讓步,戰爭可能持續一段時間。
儘管距離較遠,我們仍應密切關注烏克蘭及歐洲的事態發展。
俄烏戰爭產生了溢位效應,根本改變了全球秩序。其中包括北大西洋公約組織(NATO)等軍事聯盟的強化,這些聯盟已重新活躍並開始擴張,歐洲國家的國防開支也有所增加。
俄羅斯宣佈暫停其在《新削減戰略武器條約》(New START Treaty)中的承諾,該條約旨在防止兩大核大國核武器擴散。這可能重新引發自1980年代以來暫停的核軍備競賽。
隨著戰爭持續,可能出現更多意外和非預期後果,各國包括新加坡需應對。國防部長能否就烏克蘭戰爭對新加坡安全的影響及我們從戰爭中汲取的關鍵教訓發表評論?
(程式文本)提案提出。(程式文本)
國防計劃與優先事項
Alex Yam先生(馬西嶺-裕廊西):主席,正如尊敬的Vikram Nair先生所述,今天是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭一週年,許多人曾不相信此事會發生。它顛覆了世界秩序,強調了維護國際法和框架的重要性,當然還有捍衛國家主權。
即使按照聯合國難民署較低估計,確認的平民傷亡超過8,006人死亡,13,287人受傷,烏克蘭有760萬難民,近800萬國內流離失所者。
這對我們所有人,尤其是像我們這樣的小國,是一個嚴峻的提醒。全球格局日益複雜,因此更需審視我們在外交和國防方面的計劃與優先事項。
區域強國變得更自信、更強勢。我們如何在意識到大國競爭在我們後院上演的同時,妥善處理與鄰國的關係?威脅和非對稱戰爭也在演變,包括日益增長的數字威脅和恐怖主義。
在持續轉型武裝部隊的同時,我們必須意識到人口減少對國防人力的影響,全球尤其是區域國防開支增加,以及維持對武裝部隊的信心和信任的必要性。
因此,我請求國防部更新我們針對全球秩序變化所制定的計劃和優先事項。
安全及海空通道通達性
Dennis Tan Lip Fong先生(後港):主席,最近一枚疑似中國大陸偵察氣球進入美國領空並被美軍擊落,凸顯華盛頓與北京間日益加劇的摩擦。此前,時任美國眾議院議長南希·佩洛西訪臺後,中國人民解放軍在臺灣周邊舉行大規模軍事演習。近期,中國在東海、南海及臺灣附近的軍事活動增加,美國等國軍隊也相應加強活動。
總理及副總理兼財政部長近期均提及美中緊張關係升溫,涉及多領域及廣泛地域。馬尼拉最近指出中國海軍在南海爭議水域對菲律賓海軍艦艇使用雷射,暫時致使艦橋船員失明。
這些事件及日益加劇的分歧目前與新加坡無直接關聯,但可能以重大且潛在負面方式影響新加坡及其利益。我相信外交部的專業外交官正努力推動友好解決方案,尋求降低新加坡風險的途徑。
通過謹慎外交,若緊張局勢進一步升級,我們將繼續支援國際法及公認的行為準則,這些準則長期促進了新加坡的繁榮、安全與穩定。
然而,我也意識到外交、法律及機構有時可能不足以應對現實。
作為一個依賴貿易的島國,新加坡需要開放的海上航道、海底電纜及空中航線,連線東亞、東南亞、南亞及西方夥伴。若發生涉及美國、中國及其他國家的重大緊急事件,這些通道可能面臨威脅。此類事件還可能對新加坡施加政治和軍事壓力,要求我們在危機各方間提供或拒絕通行權,造成更廣泛的中斷。貿易、通訊、食品和能源進口,乃至通過新加坡海峽東西向航運及海上交通的安全通行,以及區域內民用和商業航空交通,都可能受影響。這不僅關係新加坡的繁榮,甚至可能影響穩定和生存。
這種壓力和中斷可能表現為物理甚至動能形式,而不僅限於資訊、網路空間和政治影響。
我想了解國防部和武裝部隊在提升抵禦具備重大能力行為者軍事壓力和脅迫的能力方面的努力,特別是在南海及亞太地區國家間緊張局勢背景下,如何保障新加坡關鍵的海空通道通達性。近年來為增強此類能力採取了哪些措施?值得注意的是,新加坡歷來在專業軍隊和國民服役方面的投資主要集中於陸軍。儘管如此,我對最近任命首位來自新加坡共和國海軍(RSN)的國防軍總司令感到鼓舞。
除了能力建設,我還想了解為可能在遠離本土的地區維持作戰所做的準備。這對於預防並儘量減少區域重大緊急事件對新加坡及新加坡人的威脅可能至關重要。有人可能認為此類擔憂過於危言聳聽或不切實際,但作為國家,我們必須為潛在問題做好準備並保持警惕,避免不必要的意外,尤其在當前不確定時期。
全球國防開支
Don Wee先生(蔡厝港):主席,自俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以來,許多國家開始增加國防預算比例。各國認識到安全不容忽視。
德國計劃將國防開支提高至GDP的至少2%。日本也在加大國防投入,力爭超過GDP的1%。美國和中國持續擴大年度預算,且將繼續如此。許多國家可能效仿。
國防部長能否介紹全球國防開支的一些趨勢?鑑於我們國家規模小且處境脆弱,這些趨勢將如何影響新加坡?
新加坡國防開支
新加坡過去五十年持續穩定投資國防,確保擁有強大軍力以實現堅實防禦。
為維持國防承諾,我們付出了權衡和機會成本。我們堅持不懈,因為深知作為小島國,既不能對自身防禦掉以輕心,也不能指望他人保護。許多先驅者在1942年新加坡迅速淪陷給日本時犧牲,當時英國正專注於歐洲戰事。
因此,獨立後,我們的開國領導人高度重視國防,深知沒有安全保障,新加坡無未來。
財政部最新報告指出,政府需採取更多措施增加收入。鑑於經濟不確定性、人口老齡化及成本上升,財政壓力將持續。維持武裝力量成本高昂,建設強大先進軍隊更是如此。作為小國,我們在武器採購等方面缺乏規模經濟,談判價格更具挑戰。
晚上7點30分
鑑於上述情況,國防部長能否說明未來數年我們的國防開支走勢?今年國防開支預測如何?疫情影響後,開支是否會迴歸以往基線?
軍事開支
Gerald Giam Yean Song先生(亞歷山大):先生,國防部2023財年的總開支預計較2022財年增長5.6%,此前2021至2022財年增長了11.3%。2023/2024財年收入與開支預算中,軍事開支僅以單行專案列出,金額為170億新元,未作進一步細分。國防部解釋稱,運營開支包括軍事裝備採購、裝備及營區維護、國民服役人員津貼及現役軍人薪資。
我理解軍事保密的必要性,但國防部能否至少提供上述四項的預計開支?這是其他地區如臺灣、拉脫維亞和芬蘭等面臨真實生存威脅的國家在公共預算中常見做法。
我知道公共賬目委員會(PAC)負責審查政府開支和賬目,包括國防預算。但該委員會是否能獲得軍事開支的任何細分資料?若不能,鑑於軍事開支佔國防部總預算近95%,委員會將難以有效審查國防預算。
先生,我為完成全職國民服役及所有預備役週期感到自豪。我支援維持強大可信賴的武裝部隊以有效保衛新加坡的必要性。因此,我相信更徹底審查國防部預算和開支,有助於公眾信心,確保179.7億新元的撥款全部用於實現國防使命。
武裝部隊能力發展
Kwek Hian Chuan Henry先生(格文巴魯):主席,過去幾年,我們談論武裝部隊到2040年轉型為下一代防衛力量。為此,武裝部隊投資於人工智慧(AI)、無人系統、機器人技術和資料分析等技術。
到2040年,武裝部隊將獲得新能力和裝備,包括下一代步兵營、新型裝甲履帶車和榴彈炮,海軍的多功能作戰艦艇、無敵級潛艇和無人艦艇,以及空軍的F-15SG、F-35戰鬥機和下一代無人機。
除了提升裝備,武裝部隊也在轉變組織方式。去年,武裝部隊成立了第四軍種——數字與情報軍(DIS),提供增強的情報、先進的連線性和網路防禦韌性。
武裝部隊還設立了新的陸軍“感知與打擊”指揮部,幫助以更少人力提升戰鬥表現。
然而,武裝部隊必須考慮戰爭形態的快速變化。例如,我們應考慮俄烏戰爭如何改變戰爭形態;還應考慮如何利用快速、低成本適應民用技術的趨勢,如星鏈系統和無人機。
簡言之,儘管武裝部隊已打下堅實基礎並有良好轉型計劃,我們必須確保計劃適應不斷變化的現實。
因此,國防部長能否更新武裝部隊如何提升能力以建設下一代武裝部隊?
武裝部隊轉型計劃
Chong Kee Hiong先生(碧山-大巴窯):主席,烏克蘭戰爭提醒我們絕不能把和平與穩定視為理所當然。
雖然此類暴力衝突似乎離新加坡很遠,但它們嚴肅提醒我們必須具備自衛和威懾潛在威脅的能力。
烏克蘭戰爭表明,即使在混合戰爭和灰色地帶戰術時代,常規戰爭仍是現實可能。烏克蘭總統澤連斯基曾呼籲盟友提供坦克、戰鬥機和遠端重武器。
此外,數字領域已與空、陸、海領域同等重要。《金融時報》報道俄羅斯在戰爭初期利用惡意軟體滲透烏克蘭政府和金融系統,製造干擾,甚至破壞關鍵衛星連線。
新加坡必須準備應對來自各方面的威脅。武裝部隊因此必須保持威懾和防禦物理及數字領域威脅的能力。
去年預算委員會辯論中,國防部長黃永宏博士談及武裝部隊轉型以應對未來安全威脅和挑戰。
我很高興我們多年來採取漸進措施建設和轉型武裝部隊,不僅應對當前威脅,也預見未來潛在新威脅。最大挑戰之一是低生育率影響未來預備役人數。武裝部隊需通過技術應用或政策調整適應,推動進一步轉型。
國防部能否更新武裝部隊轉型進展?
主席:亞歷克斯·嚴先生,請將您的兩段發言合併發言。
防禦網絡威脅
數字與情報部最新情況
亞歷克斯·嚴先生(馬西嶺-裕廊西選區):謝謝主席先生。我們現在生活在數字時代。不可否認,我們在元宇宙中緊密相連。這為世界經濟帶來了巨大機遇,同時也帶來了巨大挑戰,甚至在安全和防務領域,我們看到越來越多的威脅在網路上出現。因此,現實世界的威脅現在也體現在數字戰場上。我們在烏克蘭已經看到大規模針對烏克蘭及其歐洲盟友資產的網路攻擊行動。
基於此,我讚賞成立數字與情報部這一新加坡武裝部隊第四軍種的遠見卓識。
數字與情報部於2022年10月28日正式成立,雖然其部分職能在此之前已開始運作。我想請問部長,自成立以來進展如何?
國防部如何評估當前的數字戰場態勢?自數字與情報部成立以來,已預防或阻斷了哪些威脅?數字與情報部如何與民間機構如網路安全域性(CSA)協同工作?數字與情報部如何吸引普通公民參與,共同提升網路安全?
雖然問題是數字化的,但解決方案仍在現實世界。數字與情報部的人力資源狀況如何?例如,與南洋理工大學合作的國家服役數字工作學習計劃今年四月啟動,參與率如何?國防部將如何鼓勵更多人加入數字與情報部?
此外,統一指揮迄今帶來了哪些優勢?數字與情報部將如何加強與其他三個軍種及其他安全機構的合作,確保在保障新加坡現實世界安全的同時,也保護公民和基礎設施在數字領域的安全?
數字與情報部
王瑞秋女士(西海岸選區):主席先生,俄烏衝突揭示了網路攻擊作為戰爭數字空間延伸的強大威力和廣泛應用,這些攻擊影響關鍵基礎設施,不僅影響軍事行動,也影響平民生活。這些攻擊對社群造成毀滅性後果,無論是惡劣天氣下的大規模停電,還是傳播虛假資訊以破壞團結或士氣。
僅烏克蘭過去一年遭受的網路攻擊就增長了三倍。網路和平研究所資料顯示,截至2023年2月17日,除烏克蘭和俄羅斯外,已有627起針對政府機構和關鍵基礎設施企業的網路攻擊事件。
去年十月,國防部成立了數字與情報部,旨在應對數字領域對新加坡安全的威脅。這一舉措極受歡迎,有助於加強武裝部隊在多元和新興領域的防禦能力。
為履行使命,數字與情報部需要一支高技能、協作的數字化人才隊伍,持續提升新加坡的數字防禦能力。與此同時,科技行業對這類人才的競爭激烈。國防部能否分享數字與情報部如何吸引合適人才,以及自去年成立以來的招聘進展?
新興軍事威脅
黃偉中先生(裕廊選區):進入21世紀,戰爭性質持續演變。與過去不同,今天的戰鬥不僅在傳統的海、空、陸領域進行,也在網路空間展開。
我們還需應對另一個維度——技術快速發展和顛覆,這將塑造戰爭和未來衝突的形態,對武裝部隊的軍事學說和未來戰場戰術產生關鍵影響。私營部門主導了許多技術創新,人工智慧、機器人和自主平臺等領域的關鍵技術具有高度顛覆性和雙重用途潛力。
請國防部長談談國防部/武裝部隊需要防範的新興軍事威脅,以及國防部/武裝部隊如何保持領先應對這些威脅?
新軍事技術
維克拉姆·奈爾先生:主席先生,技術已經改變了軍事領域。當前俄烏衝突似乎推動了新技術的採用,我們看到無人機被用於致命打擊。這極大降低了作戰人員的生命風險。
我一直支援新技術,特別是無人作戰平臺甚至自動化戰爭。
去年預算委員會辯論期間,國防部公佈了建設下一代武裝部隊的進一步計劃。在這些新資產和能力中,無人技術被確定為重點。
因此,我想請國防部長談談武裝部隊採用新興和尖端軍事技術的看法,這是否有助於保持靈活性和應對各種威脅的能力?武裝部隊將如何利用這些新軍事技術持續發展?
主席:副領袖發言。
國會副領袖(扎基·穆罕默德先生):先生,我請求您的同意,允許主席離席,以便我提出動議,將今天預算議程的討論延長至晚上8點以後。
議長:我同意。
【(程式文本)決議:主席離席。——[扎基·穆罕默德]。(程式文本)】
【(程式文本)隨後議長離開委員會主席席,回到議會主席席。(程式文本)】
英文原文
SPRS Hansard · Fetched: 2026-05-02
The Chairman : Head J, Ministry of Defence. Mr Vikram Nair.
Security Trends
Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang) : Chairman, I beg to move "That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100".
Singapore had a turbulent journey to Independence, with our pioneer generation of leaders living through both World War II, and at the cusp of independence, the Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia. We started National Service in 1967 and over the years, have slowly and steadily built the SAF into a strong and credible defence force. Singapore has lived with relative peace and prosperity ever since.
An important reason for our peaceful environment was the commitment of the major world powers to peaceful co-existence in accordance with the UN Charter for the last eight decades or so since World War II.
However, the commitment to multi-lateralism has eroded over time and one recent example would be Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February last year. While some parts of the world community were quick to condemn the aggression and breach of international law, this cry was not universal. Every time an act of aggression takes place without consequences for the aggressor, the more each country has to fear for its own safety.
There are also worrying developments closer to home. The strategic rivalry between the US and China is intensifying. Recent incidents, such as then-US Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the more recent shooting of China’s hot air balloons over the US have upped the ante, resulting in the cancellation of diplomatic meetings that could have facilitated constructive dialogue. There have also been more military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, one of the traditional flash points in the relationship.
Both countries have also doubled down on the implementation of exclusionary measures, especially in the trade and technology spheres. As the strategic competition worsens between the two major powers, Singapore may be caught in the cross-fire.
In addition, middle powers have also taken a greater interest in our region and started to develop more robust strategies to grow their presence in the Asia Pacific. While many of these are friendly nations, with the growing number of such powers seeking to establish a foothold here, the regional security environment could become increasingly contested and busier.
On the Korean peninsula, North Korea has conducted further ballistic missile tests, drawing swift condemnation from neighbours South Korea and Japan and many parts of the world community. Japan, which had remained a generally pacifist nation since World War II has started to remilitarise in response to the rising military pressures around it.
The challenges ahead for Singapore are many. Could the Minister for Defence therefore provide an update on the major global and regional trends that MINDEF and SAF are closely monitoring, and how MINDEF and SAF will be affected by these trends?
War in Ukraine
I had earlier highlighted the major geopolitical and security developments that have shaped the environment around us. I would like to now focus on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and in particular, the implications for Singapore’s security.
When the war broke out, many believed that Russia would quickly overwhelm Ukraine and take over. But instead, what has happened is that Ukraine has put up a spirited and vigorous defence, and they have gotten support, at least in terms of the equipment and finances from powers around them. With both sides unwilling to yield, the war will likely persist for some time.
Although quite far away, we should monitor events unfolding in Ukraine and Europe.
The Russia-Ukraine war has had spill-over effects, which have fundamentally changed the global order. Some of these include the hardening of military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which have now awakened and started growing again and increased defence spending amongst European countries.
Russia for its part has announced the suspension of its commitment to the New Start Treaty which the US and Russia entered into to stop nuclear proliferation amongst the two largest nuclear powers. This may restart the nuclear arms race, which has been suspended since the 1980s.
As the war continues, there may be more unintended and unexpected consequences that countries, including Singapore, have to deal with. Could the Minister for Defence therefore comment on the implications of the war in Ukraine for Singapore’s security, as well as the key lessons learnt from the war for us?
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
Defence Plans and Priorities
Mr Alex Yam (Marsiling-Yew Tee) : Mr Chairman, as mentioned by the hon Mr Vikram Nair, today marks the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an act that many did not believe would happen. It has tipped the world order on its head and underscored the importance of upholding international laws and frameworks and, of course, defending national sovereignty.
Even by the lower UNHCR estimates, confirmed civilian casualties number over 8,006 killed, 13,287 injured, 7.6 million refugees and, almost 8 million internally displaced in Ukraine.
This is a stark reminder for all of us in the world and especially for small states like ourselves. The global landscape is becoming more contested. It is therefore ever more critical to review our own plans and priorities in diplomacy and in defence.
Regional powers are becoming more confident and assertive. How do we navigate relations with our neighbours while being acutely aware of the great power rivalry also playing out in our backyard? Threats and asymmetrical warfare have evolved as well. Growing digital threats, terrorism.
As we continue to transform our SAF, we must be cognisant of the challenges of a shrinking population and its impact on our defence manpower, increase global spending on defence, especially in the region, and the need to maintain confidence and trust in the SAF.
Therefore, I ask the Ministry for an update on the plans and priorities that we have put in place in light of the changes in the global order.
Security and Access to Seas and Airspace
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang) : Mr Chairman, the recent incursion of an alleged PRC surveillance balloon into US airspace and its subsequent shoot down by the US military underscore growing friction between Washington and Beijing. This comes after the large-scale PLA military exercises bracketing Taiwan following the then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei. These actions follow increasing PRC military activity in the East and South China Seas and near Taiwan in recent times, to which other militaries, including those of the United States, are mounting their own activities in response.
The Prime Minister, and more recently the Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, have noted rising tensions between the United States and the PRC, which play out over a range of issues and wide swathes of territory. Manila recently pointed to the PLA Navy using lasers on the Philippine Navy vessel in the disputed South China Seas waters, supposedly blinding crew on the bridge temporarily.
These incidences and growing cleavages do not have anything directly to do with Singapore, at least for the moment. However, they could well affect Singapore and our interest in significant and potentially negative ways. I have little doubt that our professional foreign service officers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are working very hard to encourage some amicable solutions and searching for means to mitigate risks for Singapore.
Through careful diplomacy in the event tensions should further escalate, this reinforces efforts to support international law and accepted rules of the road that have facilitated Singapore's prosperity, safety and stability for so long.
Nonetheless, I am mindful of the very real possibility that diplomacy law and institutions sometimes may not be enough.
As a commerce-dependent island, Singapore needs open use of sea lanes, submarine cables and air routes that link us to partners in all of East Asia, across Southeast Asia, South Asia and points West. These could potentially be in jeopardy in the event of a major contingency involving the United States, the PRC and others that may occur around our region. Such an event could also spell political and military pressure on Singapore to provide or deny access to one party involved in a crisis or another in addition to broader disruption. This could also affect trade and communication and even the import of food and energy, not to mention safe passage for the shipping trade and maritime traffic passing through the straits of Singapore going both east and westwards, to near and far shores for which we are so heavily dependent on and possibly also civilian and commercial air traffic in the region. This may prove consequential for not just Singapore's prosperity, but possibly even stability and survival.
Such pressure and disruption may take physical even kinetic form and not just be limited to information, cyberspace and political influence.
I would like to ask for an update on the efforts of MINDEF and the SAF in building the capacity to withstand military pressure and coercion from actors with significant capabilities and safeguard Singapore's critical access to the air and sea in the event of an emergency, particularly in view of the tensions in the South China Sea and between different countries in the Asia Pacific region. What is being done to enhance such capacity in recent times, noting that much of Singapore investment in our professional military and national service has historically focused on the Army? Although I am greatly encouraged by the recent announcement of the appointment of our first Chief of Defence Force from the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN).
Apart from capacity, I would like to ask what preparations are in place to potentially sustain operations at longer distances from our shores. This may be important if we wish to prevent and perhaps minimise any dangers to Singapore and Singaporeans in the event of some major emergency in our region. Some people may well, see such concern as unnecessarily alarmist or dismiss them as remote and unrealistic. But as a nation, we must be prepared and vigilant for issues that may be looming to avoid any unwanted surprises, especially in these uncertain times.
Global Defence Spending
Mr Don Wee (Chua Chu Kang) : Chairman, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many countries have started to allocate a bigger share of their budgets to defence. Countries understand that they can no longer take their security for granted.
Germany intends to raise its defence spending by at least 2% of its GDP. Likewise, Japan is stepping up its defence spending and seeking to move beyond 1% of its GDP too. It goes without saying that the US and China have consistently expanded their annual budgets and will continue to do so. Many countries are likely to follow suit.
Could the Minister for Defence tell us what some of the global trends in defence spending are? Given our small size and vulnerable position, how will these spending trends affect Singapore?
Singapore's Defence Spending
Singapore has consistently and continuously invested in defence over the last five decades to ensure we have a strong military force capable of a robust defence.
There are trade-offs and opportunity costs as a result of our efforts to sustain our commitment to defence. We have persisted, despite the challenges, as we are cognisant that Singapore, as a small island-state, can neither take its own defence for granted nor count on others to defend us. Many of our pioneers were sacrificed when Singapore quickly fell to the Japanese in 1942 when Great Britain was distracted by events in Europe.
Hence, upon our Independence, our founding leaders heavily prioritised national defence as they were keenly aware that without ensuring our own security, there would be no future for Singapore.
A recent MOF report states that the Government will need to make further moves to boost revenue. These fiscal pressures will continue, given the uncertain economic conditions, our ageing population and rising costs. Maintaining armed forces is expensive. Building a strong and advanced military is even more so. Being a small country, it is more challenging for us to negotiate prices for weapons and such as we do not have the economies of scale.
7.30 pm
Given these developments, could the Minister for Defence please tell us what will our defence spending look like in the coming years? What are the projections for defence spending this year? Will spending return to the past baseline following the impact of COVID-19?
Military Expenditure
Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song (Aljunied) : Sir, MINDEF's total expenditure of FY 2023 is projected to increase 5.6% for over FY 2022, on top of an 11.3% increase from FY2021 to 2022. In the revenue on expenditure estimates for FY 2023/2024, military expenditure is just a single-lined item with an amount of $17.0 billion, without any further breakdown. MINDEF does explain that operating expenditure includes the payments for the purpose of military equipment, maintenance of equipment and camps, allowances for National Servicemen (NSmen) and salaries of regular servicemen and women.
While I understand the need for military secrecy, can MINDEF minimally provide the estimated expenditure for just these four items. This is a common practice in public budget estimates in other territories, including Taiwan, Latvia and Finland, all of whom face real and existential threats.
I am aware that the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) conducts scrutiny of the Government's expenditure and accounts, including the defence budget. However, does the PAC have access to any breakdown of military expenditure? If not, it will be difficult for the Committee to scrutinise the defence budget, given that military expenditure comprises almost 95% of the Ministry's total budget.
Sir, I am proud that I served my full-time NS and completed all my operationally-ready NS cycles. I support the need to maintain a strong and credible SAF to effectively defend Singapore. This is why I believe that more thorough scrutiny of MINDEF's budget and expenditure will help maintain public confidence that the $17.97 billion allocated to the Ministry, the highest among all the Ministries, is going entirely towards achieving its mission.
SAF's Capability Developments
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Kebun Baru) : Chairman, for the last few years, we spoke about SAF's transformation into a next-generation defence force by 2040. To achieve this, SAF has been investing in technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, robotics and data analytics.
By 2040, SAF will acquire new capabilities and assets, where we will have, then will include Next Generation Infantry Battalions, new armoured tracked carriers and Howitzers for the Army, Multi-Role Combat Vessels, Invincible-class submarines, and unmanned vessels for the Navy, as well as F-15SG and F-35 fighter jets and Next Generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for the Air Force.
Beyond enhancing assets, SAF is also transforming the way it is organised. Last year, SAF set up the fourth service – the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) – to provide enhanced intelligence, advanced connectivity and resilience cyber defence.
SAF has also set up a new Army "Sense and Strike" headquarters to help the SAF perform better in battle with less manpower.
However, SAF must also factor in rapidly changing warfare. For example, we should consider how the recent events such as the Russia-Ukraine War has changed warfare; we should also consider how to tap on the growing trends of adopting quick, low-cost adaptation of civilian technology, like Starlink systems and drones into warfare.
In short, even as SAF has built a strong foundation, and has a good transformation plan, we must always make sure that we adapt our plans to evolving realities.
Therefore, can Minister for Defence provide an update on how SAF is enhancing our capabilities to build our Next Generation SAF?
SAF Transformation Plans
Mr Chong Kee Hiong (Bishan-Toa Payoh) : Chairman, the attack on Ukraine was a wake-up call that we should never take peace and stability for granted.
While such violent conflicts may seem far from our realities here in Singapore, they serve as a stark reminder that we must be able to defend ourselves and deter threats that may come our way.
The war in Ukraine has shown that even in the age of hybrid warfare and grey zone tactics, conventional warfare remains a real possibility. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had to appeal for tanks, fighter aircraft and long-range heavy weaponry from its allies and partners.
In addition, the digital terrain has become as real as the air, land and sea domains. The Financial Times had reported on Russia’s use of malware to infiltrate Ukrainian government and financial systems to create disruption in the early days of the war and even to disrupt crucial satellite connectivity.
Singapore must be prepared for threats from all sources. The SAF must therefore maintain its ability to deter and defend against threats in both the physical and digital realms.
At last year’s Committee of Supply debate, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen talked about the SAF’s transformation efforts to meet future security threats and challenges.
I am glad that we have taken incremental steps to build up and transform the SAF over the years, not just to meet current security threats, but also to anticipate potential new threats that we may face in the future. One of the biggest challenges is our low fertility rate which affects the future number of NSmen. SAF would have to adapt through technology utilisation or policy changes, leading to further transformation.
Can MINDEF provide an update on the progress of the SAF’s transformation?
The Chairman : Mr Alex Yam, please take your two cuts together.
Defending against Cyber Threats
Update on Digital and Intelligence Service
Mr Alex Yam (Marsiling-Yew Tee) : Thank you, Mr Chairman. We are now living in the digital age. There is no denying that we are bound together in the metaverse. This poses great opportunities for the world economy but also great challenges and even in the field of security and defence, we are seeing more and more threats emerged online. The threats of the physical world are now, therefore, manifest in the digital battlefield. We have seen it in Ukraine with large scale online campaigns against Ukrainian, assets as well as those of their allies in Europe.
In this vein, I applaud the foresight in forming the Digital and Intelligence Service, the fourth service of the SAF.
With its formal beginning just three months ago on 28 Oct 2022, but with different parts of it already functioning before that, I would like to ask the Minister how has the progress been since its formation?
What is the assessment of the Ministry of the current digital battle terrain and what threats have been prevented or disabled since the formation of the DIS? How does the DIS work in tandem with civilian agencies like CSA? And, how can the DIS bring ordinary citizens on board to play a part in improving cyber security?
While the problems are digital, the solution still lies in the real world. What is the manpower situation for the DIS? For example, how has the take-up rate been for the NS Digital Work-Learn Scheme in partnership with NTU, which is due to start in April of this year? How will MINDEF encourage more to come on board DIS?
In addition, what have been the advantages of the unified command so far and how will the DIS strengthen its work with the three other services and other security agencies to ensure that while we keep Singapore safe in the physical world, we also keep our citizens and our infrastructure safe in the digital one?
Digital and Intelligence Service
Miss Rachel Ong (West Coast) : Chairman, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has revealed the might and widespread use of cyber-attacks as an extension of warfare into the digital space, affecting critical infrastructure that not only impacts military efforts but also the lives of civilians. These attacks have devastating aftermath on communities, be it in the form of mass power shutdowns in times of harsh weather conditions or in the form of propagating false information to destroy unity or morale.
Ukraine alone has suffered a threefold growth in cyber-attacks over the past year. The Cyber Peace Institute reveals that as of 17 February 2023, there have already been 627 cyber attacks on government entities and corporations in critical infrastructure sectors, excluding attacks on Ukraine and Russia.
Last October, MINDEF established the Digital and Intelligence Service (DIS) with an eye on dealing with threats to Singapore’s security in the digital domain. This was a more than welcome development, to build on SAF’s abilities to defend Singapore on multiple and emerging fronts.
To fulfil its mandate, the DIS will need a highly-skilled and collaborative digital workforce to continue to grow Singapore’s digital defence capabilities. At the same time, there is fierce competition for such talent in the technology sector. Can the Ministry of Defence share how DIS plans to attract appropriate talent to the service as well as how recruitment for the DIS has progressed since its establishment last year?
Emerging Military Threats
Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong (Jurong) : The nature of warfare continues to evolve going into the 21st century. Unlike the past, battles today are no longer fought in the traditional physical domains of the sea, air, and on land, but also in cyberspace.
We will also need to contend with another dimension – the rapid pace of technological evolution and disruption, which will also shape the texture of war and future conflict, and thus have a critical impact in shaping the SAF’s military doctrines and future battlefield tactics. With the private sector leading much of the technological innovation today, key technologies with high disruptive and dual-use potential are in the fields of AI, robotics and autonomous platforms.
Could the Minister for Defence provide views on the emerging slate of military threats that MINDEF/SAF will need to guard against, and how MINDEF/SAF will stay ahead of these threats?
New Military Technologies
Mr Vikram Nair : Chairman, technology has transformed the military domain. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict appears to have spurred the adoption of new technologies and we see drones being used with lethal force. This has the crucial benefit of reducing the risk of losing lives by combatants.
I have been a big supporter of new technologies, particularly unmanned battle platforms and even automated warfare.
During last year’s Committee of Supply debate, the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) unveiled further plans to build up the Next Generation SAF. Of these new assets and capabilities, unmanned technologies were identified as a focal point.
I would therefore like to seek views from the Minister for Defence on the SAF’s adoption of emerging and cutting-edge military technologies, and whether this would help it to remain agile and capable in responding to the range of threats. How will the SAF use these new military technologies as it continues to develop?
The Chairman : Deputy Leader.
The Deputy Leader of the House (Mr Zaqy Mohamad) : Sir, may I seek your consent to move that the Chairman do leave the Chair? This is to enable me to move a Motion to take the proceedings on the business of Supply today beyond 8.00 pm.
Mr Speaker : I give my consent.
[(proc text) Resolved, That the Chairman do leave the Chair. – [Mr Zaqy Mohamad]. (proc text)]
[(proc text) Thereupon Mr Speaker left the Chair of the Committee and took the Chair of the House. (proc text)]