調查針對新加坡印度裔社群的社媒帖文，及檢討抵禦此類外部影響的國家框架

1 Mr Darryl David asked the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs regarding the 14 online social media posts which seemingly targeted the Indian community and undermined Singapore's multiculturalism (a) whether investigations have revealed the posts to be a coordinated and deliberate effort by any particular agency or organisation; and (b) if so, what action has been or will be taken against such agency or organisation.

2 Dr Neo Kok Beng asked the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs in view of the Disabling Directions recently issued to block online posts targeting the Indian community (a) whether the Ministry will consider reviewing the current national framework and tools to counteract such external influences; and (b) what upcoming programmes or initiatives are being planned to equip residents with the competencies to discern such negative external influences, whether individually or through community efforts.

The Minister of State for Home Affairs (Mr Goh Pei Ming) (for the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs): My response will cover oral Question Nos 1 and 2 on today's Order Paper, and will also address a related question filed by Ms Hany Soh for a later Sitting. There is currently no evidence to suggest that this is a coordinated campaign by any particular government or organisation. Investigations revealed that the content likely originated from a China-based platform, and was subsequently carried on other platforms and websites, including those in our local information space.

The posts attempted to sow discord by inciting ill-will against our Indian community and sought to undermine Singapore's model of multiculturalism. The content was assessed to constitute an offence of knowingly promoting feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different groups on grounds of race and doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony in Singapore under section 298A(a) of the Penal Code. The Government has issued Disabling Directions under the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) to block access by Singapore users to the 14 online social media posts.

In recent years, there has been an increase in artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled and inauthentic content on a range of topics which has seeped into Singapore's online infospace. We monitor the infospace closely and will not hesitate to take measures if it is in Singapore's interests. The Government regularly reviews our laws to ensure that they are updated and fit for purpose to deal with the evolving landscape.

Aside from the legislative measures, building up a discerning and resilient populace against external influences is equally important. The Ministry of Defence drives National Education and Total Defence to build a shared understanding of Singapore's foundational values and principles to deepen our public's sense of identity and nationhood, and to strengthen awareness of and collective resolve against threats that may undermine social cohesion and resilience, including foreign interference. The SG101 website is a one-stop Government site that consolidates educational resources on foreign interference, as well as Singapore's positions on sensitive issues to help the public better understand our national positions and to stay resilient against attempts to divide us.

The National Library Board works to cultivate critical reading as a foundational skill and to engage the public through its Source, Understand, Research, and Evaluate (S.U.R.E) programme, and this equips our citizens with the skills to verify and fact-check online content. In addition, we regularly conduct briefings, dialogues and workshops to raise awareness of foreign interference amongst groups including our public servants, national servicemen and students. The Ministry of Home Affairs also rolled out a campaign in 2025 on the use of deepfake videos, AI-generated content and other inauthentic online posts to influence overseas jurisdictions to alert Singaporeans to this threat. This effort will continue, so as to raise awareness of the role that our Singaporeans can play.

Ultimately, a discerning population is the most important defence against attempts to influence or divide our society. We urge Singaporeans to be discerning when consuming and disseminating information online, and to reject all attempts to divide our society. We take a serious view of threats to our social cohesion and racial harmony, including external actors, and will act resolutely against them.

Mr Darryl David (Ang Mo Kio): I have two supplementary questions. While it is heartening to know that there has been no evidence of external influence in this case, I would like to ask if the Government does indeed keep track of possible cases that fuel the possible coordinated efforts of organisations and agencies that may not be made so public and if so, are such cases on the rise? The second question would be, if these cases show evidence also of the influence of state actors, what actions would our Government typically take?

Mr Goh Pei Ming: Like I said in my response earlier, we have noticed an increase in the number of such posts, especially given the use of AI enabling the creation of such posts. So, we do see an increase and we do track very carefully every single case, including investigating whether there are possibly state actors behind the posts. Some of this information, we may not find that it is suitable to release to the public, but we do look at every single case. We track the data over time to ensure that there is no coordinated campaign. More importantly, we will not hesitate to take action if there is a need to protect Singapore's interests. Ultimately, we hold the view that any country out there would agree with us that we are just safeguarding our information space.

Dr Neo Kok Beng (Nominated Member): Our current framework of preventing external influences is primarily based on a couple of Acts: the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA), the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and also OCHA. These are, in the view of our population, pretty much reactive in nature. The question is, how effective are they and how do we measure this effectiveness? Is the Ministry exploring more preventive measures? What are the programmes or initiatives that are preventive in nature and how effective are they? Specifically, how to educate or train or inoculate our residents from believing or disseminating such malicious influence?

Mr Goh Pei Ming: The Government had to act decisively against these videos because they seek to undermine Singapore's cohesion, and they seek to attack our multi-racial society and attempt to divide us based on our race. Our societal harmony cannot be taken for granted because it has been painstakingly developed over decades and every community in Singapore is valued. This diversity in Singapore's fabric is our greatest strength, but it requires deliberate and constant protection against division. The Government has various legislative levers, some more recently introduced, in place to deal with such threats. These include FICA, the Maintenance of Racial Harmony Act, POFMA, as well as OCHA. Having these laws allows us to be very proactive, going upstream. Our online directions under FICA were first issued or first used in July 2024. They have been generally effective as the social media companies have worked with us and complied with the directions issued by the Government. In my main reply earlier, I have also listed various efforts in terms of public education. A discerning public is the most effective tool to fight against such interferences to split our society.