口頭答覆 · 2026-09-10 · 屆國會 15
共擔責任框架能否延伸至授權轉賬詐騙
議員賀明(Dr Hamid Razak)詢問總理兼財政部長:鑑於投資詐騙在2026年上半年損失最高,金融管理局是否檢討將共擔責任原則延伸至投資詐騙等授權轉賬詐騙,以及檢討標準為何。國家發展部長徐芳達(Mr Chee Hong Tat)答覆:共擔責任框架(SRF)針對涉及未經授權交易的釣魚詐騙,不適用於自行轉賬詐騙;通訊平臺將被要求限制陌生人接觸使用者並顯示警示,主要零售銀行已為高風險活動設冷靜期。賀明追問,AI和深度偽造讓受害者自以為在進行有效交易,框架能否調整以涵蓋這類受害者。徐芳達表示會持續檢討措施,前一天通過的內政部反詐騙法案將加強威懾,強調應針對詐騙者而非金融機構,並指金融機構會在框架之外酌情逐案提供善意賠付。
為什麼重要
政府明確表示共擔責任框架不適用於自行轉賬詐騙,AI深度偽造投資詐騙受害者只能靠銀行酌情善意賠付
關鍵要點
- • 詐騙案件和損失在2025年和2026年上半年均下降,但投資詐騙在所有詐騙型別中損失最高
- • 共擔責任框架(SRF)針對涉及未經授權交易的釣魚詐騙,政府認為不適用於自行轉賬詐騙
- • 網路通訊平臺將被要求使陌生聯絡人更難在未經同意下接觸使用者,並顯示詐騙風險警示
- • 主要零售銀行已為新增收款人、提高交易限額和導致賬戶被轉空的大額轉賬等高風險活動逐步實施冷靜期
- • 前一天通過的內政部反詐騙法案將加強對詐騙者的威懾和對消費者的保護
- • 金融機構在SRF之外,根據受害者財務狀況逐案酌情提供善意賠付,尤其照顧較弱勢的受害者
政府拒絕把共擔責任框架延伸至自行轉賬詐騙,認為這類詐騙需要平臺、銀行和個人共同警惕;威懾和懲罰應針對詐騙者,金融機構是夥伴而非追責物件。政府只承諾持續檢討措施,沒有承諾修改框架。
提問議員賀明認為AI和深度偽造讓受害者誤以為交易有效,而現行框架以憑證被盜為前提,令投資詐騙受害者得不到保障,希望金融管理局檢討框架以涵蓋這類受害者。
面對AI深度偽造誘導的自行轉賬詐騙,政府堅持不把銀行賠償責任制度化擴大,而以平臺義務、冷靜期和銀行酌情善意賠付替代;損失分擔的界線仍按“是否經受害者授權”劃分,未因AI欺騙能力提升而調整。
“它並不適用於涉及自行轉賬的詐騙。”
參與人員 (2)
完整譯文(中文)
Hansard 原始記錄 · 2026-09-26
14 號,賀明博士詢問總理兼財政部長:鑑於投資詐騙在2026年上半年所有詐騙型別中損失最高,(a) 新加坡金融管理局是否正在檢討共擔責任原則能否調整適用於投資詐騙等授權轉賬詐騙;以及 (b) 如果是,這類檢討將以什麼標準為指導。
國家發展部長(徐芳達先生):議長先生,詐騙案件數量和損失金額在2025年和2026年上半年都有所下降。儘管如此,詐騙仍令人擔憂,而且正如議員所指出的,投資詐騙在所有詐騙型別中損失最高。
政府已加大力度打擊涉及自行轉賬的詐騙,包括投資詐騙。例如,網路通訊平臺將被要求實施措施,使陌生聯絡人在未經終端使用者同意的情況下更難與使用者接觸,並顯示警示,提醒使用者這類聯絡人可能帶來的詐騙風險。
主要零售銀行已逐步為高風險活動實施冷靜期,例如新增收款人、提高交易限額,以及進行導致賬戶被轉空的大額轉賬,讓消費者有機會重新考慮他們打算進行的轉賬是否合法。政府也將繼續推動公眾教育,幫助公眾更好地保護自己免受投資詐騙之害,並作出更明智的理財決定。
議長先生,共擔責任框架(SRF)著重於涉及未經授權交易的釣魚詐騙。它並不適用於涉及自行轉賬的詐騙。要戰勝這類詐騙,需要各方都保持警惕:通訊平臺要讓詐騙者更難接觸受害者;銀行要設定認知緩衝,給受害者時間重新考慮。
重要的是,個人可以採取切實步驟保護自己,謹慎小心地對待每一個投資機會。例如,請查證提供該投資產品的是否確實是受新加坡金融管理局(MAS)監管的金融機構,並通過其官方聯絡渠道直接聯絡該金融機構。
議長:賀明博士。
賀明博士(西海岸—裕廊西):謝謝議長,也感謝部長的答覆。我很讚賞金融管理局在教育居民方面所採取的預防策略。
我之所以特別就共擔責任框架提出這個問題,是因為目前該框架取決於詐騙者是否通過偽造平臺獲取了憑證,因此投資詐騙受害者無法得到這個框架的保護。但今天我們有人工智慧(AI)和深度偽造平臺,讓受害者自己進行交易,因為他們以為自己在進行一項經授權或有效的交易。所以我想知道金融管理局會否檢討這個框架,看看能否作出一些改變,讓那些因這類AI生成的深度偽造影像和平臺而遭受投資詐騙的受害者,也能通過這個框架獲得索賠處理。
徐芳達先生:議長先生,我昨天在問答時間已回答了有關冒充詐騙的問題,並分享了從監管機構、通訊平臺、銀行到消費者等利益相關者都應採取的幾項措施,以保護消費者免受這類風險,並降低深度偽造和AI在這些冒充詐騙中得逞的風險。
所以,我們肯定會繼續檢討我們的措施,因為正如我昨天也提到的,這是一場貓捉老鼠的遊戲。無論我們採取什麼應對措施,詐騙者都會找到新方法設法突破這些防護。所以我們必須不斷檢討我們的系統並保持警惕。
昨天通過的法案,即內政部(MHA)處理打擊詐騙對策的法案,我認為也將有助於加強對詐騙者的威懾,並加強對消費者的保護。
議長先生,我也想借此簡短地提一下,我們在這裡要對付的壞人是詐騙者。因此,我們的威懾措施和懲罰確實應該針對這群人,也就是詐騙者。金融機構是我們的夥伴。我們與它們密切合作,事實上,我想借此機會向金融機構,特別是金融機構裡的許多員工表示感謝,他們是整體反詐騙防線中非常關鍵的一環。
議員們應該在媒體上讀到過報道,我們金融機構的一些員工一直保持警惕,有時採取措施設法保護消費者,甚至冒著有時被消費者責罵的風險,因為他們會攔截他們認為可疑的交易,而消費者不高興。消費者會向員工發洩不滿,但員工幫助阻止了其中一些詐騙發生。事後,消費者當然心懷感激。但在他們設法完成交易的那段時間,會有一些不愉快。
我認為認識到這一點很重要:金融機構及其員工正盡最大努力與我們合作,設法降低詐騙風險。
我還必須補充,金融機構也主動向前一步,酌情設法提供善意賠付。這意味著這不屬於共擔責任框架的一部分。這是它們自己做的,即善意賠付,根據受害者的財務狀況,特別是那些來自較弱勢背景的受害者,逐案處理。銀行、金融機構會設法為他們提供更多幫助。
英文原文
SPRS Hansard 原始記錄 · 抓取日期:2026-09-26
14 Dr Hamid Razak asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance given that investment scams recorded the highest losses among scam types in the first half of 2026 (a) whether MAS is reviewing if shared responsibility principles can be adapted to authorised-transfer scams such as investment scams; and (b) if so, what criteria would guide such a review.
The Minister for National Development (Mr Chee Hong Tat) : Mr Speaker, the number of scam cases and amounts lost have decreased in 2025 and in the first half of 2026. Nevertheless, scams are still a concern and as noted by the Member, investment scams recorded the highest losses among all scam types.
The Government has stepped up efforts to combat scams involving self-effected transfers, including investment scams. For example, online messaging platforms will be required to implement measures that make it more difficult for unknown contacts to engage users without the end-users' consent, and to display warnings alerting users to the potential scam risks posed by such contacts.
Major retail banks have progressively implemented cooling periods for higher-risk activities, such as adding of payees, raising of transaction limits and making large transfers that result in draining of accounts, to give consumers an opportunity to re-consider whether the transfer they intend to make is legitimate. The Government will also continue to drive public education efforts to help the public better protect themselves against investment scams and make more informed financial decisions.
Sir, the Shared Responsibility Framework (SRF) focuses on phishing scams involving unauthorised transactions. It is not suitable for scams involving self-effected transfers. Defeating such scams requires all parties to exercise vigilance: the messaging platforms to make it more difficult for scammers to engage victims; and the banks putting in place cognitive breaks to give time for victims to reconsider.
And importantly, individuals can take practical steps to protect themselves and approach every investment opportunity with care and caution. For example, please check whether it is indeed a Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)-regulated financial institution offering the investment product and contact the financial institution directly through its official contact channels.
Mr Speaker : Dr Hamid Razak.
Dr Hamid Razak (West Coast-Jurong West) : Thank you, Speaker, and I thank the Minister for his response. I do appreciate the preventative strategy that MAS is taking in educating our residents.
I thought to ask this question particular with respect to SRF, because, today, it hinges on the fact that a scammer acquires the credentials through a fabricated platform and therefore, investment scam victims would not get the benefit of being protected through this framework. But today we have artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake platforms that then allow victims to do the transaction themselves because they think they are making an authorised or a valid transaction. So, I am wondering whether MAS will review this framework to see whether some changes can be made so that scam victims that are affected by investment scams through this sort of AI-generated deepfake images and platforms can also get the claims seen through this framework.
Mr Chee Hong Tat : Mr Speaker, I addressed this question about impersonation scams yesterday during Question Time, and I shared several measures in which the stakeholders, from the regulators to the messaging platforms to the banks to consumers, should all take to protect consumers against such risks and to reduce the risk of the deepfakes and the AIs succeeding in these impersonation scams.
So, we will certainly keep on reviewing our measures, because as I mentioned yesterday as well, this is a cat and mouse game. Whatever countermeasures we put in place, the scammers will find new ways of trying to break through these safeguards. So, we have to continuously review our systems and to be vigilant.
The Bill that was passed yesterday, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Bill that deals with countermeasures against scams would also help, I think, to strengthen the deterrence against scammers and also to enhance the protection for consumers.
Sir, I would also like to just briefly mention that in this regard, the bad guys that we are dealing with here are the scammers. Therefore, we should really point the attention of our deterrence measures and our penalties towards this group of individuals – the scammers. The financial institutions (FIs) are our partners. We work closely with them and in fact, I want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the FIs and, in particular, the many employees working in the FIs who are a very key part of this overall defence against scams.
Members would have read reports from the media about how some of the staff in our FIs have been on their guard and sometimes, taking measures to try and protect consumers, at the risk of being scolded sometimes by the consumers, because they will block what they think are suspicious transactions and the consumers are not happy. They would vent their frustrations toward the staff, but the staff helped to prevent some of these scams from happening. Afterwards, of course, the consumers are appreciative. But during that time when they were trying to get the transaction through, there was some unhappiness.
I think it is important to recognise this: that the FIs and the staff working in the FIs are trying their best to work together with us to try and reduce the risk of scams.
I must also add that the FIs have also leaned forward to try and help on a discretionary basis to provide goodwill payment. That means this is not part of the SRF. This is what they do on their own – goodwill payment – on a case-by-case basis, based on the financial situation of the victims, especially those who come from more vulnerable backgrounds. The banks, the FIs will try to do more to help them.