預算辯論 · 2022-03-02 · 屆國會 14
國防預算與安全挑戰
議員質詢國防預算，強調俄烏戰爭暴露小國自衛重要性及資訊戰威脅。辯論聚焦地緣政治緊張、技術競爭及網路資訊戰的安全影響。政府回應強調加強自衛能力與技術防禦，核心爭議在於如何平衡預算與應對新興安全威脅。
關鍵要點
- • 小國自衛重要性
- • 資訊戰與假旗行動
- • 美中技術競爭加劇
加強國防與技術防禦能力
預算應更審慎分配
強化國防科技與資訊安全
“We cannot assume other countries will come to our assistance when we are at war.”
參與人員 (11)
完整譯文（中文）
Hansard 原始記錄 · 2026-05-02
主席：國防部J項負責人。Vikram Nair先生。
安全趨勢與新加坡武裝部隊的優先事項
Vikram Nair先生（實巴旺選區）：主席，我提議“將預算中J項的總撥款減少100元”。
我們生活在一個危險的世界。過去一週，我們目睹了俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，這是自二戰以來歐洲大陸最大的戰爭。這場衝突的跡象已經醞釀了很長時間。俄羅斯軍隊在烏克蘭邊境的集結持續了數月，北約多個國家，包括美國，都預料到衝突將會爆發。
然而，當戰鬥真正開始時，儘管國際社會廣泛譴責，烏克蘭不得不獨自面對武裝更為強大的鄰國。這對所有國家，尤其是像我們這樣的小國，是一個重要的提醒：我們不能假設其他國家在我們開戰時會來援助我們，我們必須盡全力自我防衛。
俄烏衝突揭示了一些令人擔憂的脅迫手段，包括“假旗”行動——本質上是虛假資訊宣傳——以製造開戰的藉口。
這並非唯一的熱點。過去一年，我們見證了國際安全環境的其他重大變化。美中競爭持續加劇，我們看到這在兩國貿易和技術領域的法規中日益顯現。我們也看到針對臺灣的言辭和行動更為強硬，這似乎越來越可能成為兩大國之間爆發衝突的催化劑，無論是有意還是無意。
近年來，評論員還指出，國際秩序的走向將由亞太地區的發展決定。因此，全球重心明顯向這裡轉移，區域外國家也越來越關注這裡。這包括歐盟國家如英國、法國和德國。有一種觀點認為，這是好事，因為國家在該地區投入越多，就越可能在該地區權力平衡中發揮作用。
然而，隨著對亞太地區關注的增加，我們也見證了新的安全安排的出現，例如澳大利亞、英國和美國之間的三邊安全協定。其負面影響是，有人擔心此類發展可能在該地區產生分裂效應，甚至可能引發軍備競賽。
另一個趨勢是地緣戰略問題與技術的日益交織。
技術是美中戰略競爭的主要爭奪領域。技術也被國家和非國家行為者用來採取非常規方式脅迫對手，包括通過網路攻擊和資訊戰。
雖然新加坡遠離俄烏衝突，但我看到一些資訊在聊天群中傳播，似乎旨在影響新加坡公眾輿論，我懷疑這些資訊可能是外國勢力的資訊戰行動的一部分。
儘管疫情推動我們積極利用數字平臺，但這也使我們的社會更易受到數字威脅。
國防部長能否評論國防部關注的安全環境趨勢？國防部長能否更新這些及其他地緣政治安全發展如何影響國防部和新加坡武裝部隊的計劃和優先事項？國防部和武裝部隊將如何應對外部環境的挑戰？又將如何與志同道合的夥伴合作應對這些威脅？
（程式文本）提案提出。（程式文本）
主席：Alex Yam先生不在。Vikram Nair先生，請繼續您的下一個削減。
下午6時45分
全球抗擊新冠肺炎
Vikram Nair先生：主席，作為一個小國，新加坡的安全依賴於更廣泛地區的穩定。由於新加坡經濟的開放和互聯互通，其他地方的重大動盪會對我們這裡的生活產生切實影響。
持續的抗擊新冠肺炎就是一個明顯例子。即使新加坡看似較好地控制了病毒，我們也看到其他國家在掙扎。我們對貿易和旅行的依賴也意味著病毒最終會回到新加坡。
新加坡武裝部隊在鄰國危機時發揮了重要作用，包括在鄰國遭遇自然災害時協助救援。
多年來，國防部長曾向議會通報國防部和武裝部隊與國際夥伴合作維護地區和平與安全的努力。
因此，我有一個問題想問國防部和武裝部隊，即是否採取了任何措施協助鄰國抗擊新冠肺炎？如果有，具體如何實施？
新冠肺炎與能力發展計劃
黃偉中先生（裕廊選區）：儘管面臨百年疫情，新加坡武裝部隊表現出色。即使在“斷路器”最嚴峻時期，關鍵行動也未曾中斷。武裝部隊現已為幾乎100%計程車兵、水手和空軍人員接種疫苗。
然而，去年國防部長黃永宏博士提到，由於疫情，武裝部隊一些重大專案和計劃出現延誤。這無疑影響了武裝部隊的中長期能力發展計劃。
新冠肺炎擾亂了全球供應鏈。它是否也會影響武裝部隊採購下一代平臺和技術的供應鏈？
同樣，我也想了解疫情如何影響武裝部隊在海外開發和測試新訓練理論的能力。我知道有些軍事演習在土地稀缺的新加坡無法進行。我擔心過去幾年疫情導致的旅行限制可能使武裝部隊難以獲得寶貴的海外訓練機會。
國防部長能否說明新冠肺炎疫情如何影響武裝部隊的中長期能力發展計劃？
疫情期間的訓練
黃俊賢先生（蔡厝港選區）：主席，疫情造成巨大幹擾。我們的武裝部隊訓練可能是受影響最嚴重的領域之一，因為陸軍訓練中只有有限部分可以遠端或線上進行。疫情初期，基礎軍事訓練和國民服役召集一度暫停。部分海外訓練和演習也因旅行限制受影響。
去年國防部提到，在實施嚴格檢測和安全管理措施後，一些海外訓練和大規模演習已恢復。我很高興盡管有些干擾，武裝部隊訓練沒有停滯，各方找到辦法繼續進行部分演習。國家面臨的外部威脅在疫情期間並未減少，因此我們的防務準備和訓練也不應停滯。歐洲當前局勢提醒我們，安全威脅不會因疫情而消失。
隨著新加坡逐步恢復大部分活動，我們現在處於比疫情初期更有利的位置，因為大量人口已接種疫苗。此外，民眾也更熟悉如何在病毒持續存在的情況下安全互動。
因此，國防部能否分享武裝部隊國內外訓練的最新情況？哪些訓練已恢復到疫情前水平？
疫情期間的國民服役訓練
朱德明先生（淡濱尼選區）：主席，隨著新加坡過渡到與新冠共存，武裝部隊也逐步恢復國民服役人員訓練。我注意到這伴隨著安全管理措施、檢測和分組安排，以保障國民服役人員安全。國防部未來一年召回國民服役人員的計劃如何？
許多國民服役人員未能參與大型海外演習。即使武裝部隊在2021年成功完成“袋鼠演習”，但規模有限，因擔憂病毒傳播。
各國正過渡到與新冠共存。隨著全球邊境逐步開放，海外演習必須逐步恢復到疫情前水平。國防部能否分享2022年恢復大型海外演習的計劃？
主席：Vikram Nair先生。如果您願意將兩個削減合併發言，請告知。
武裝部隊的作戰準備
Vikram Nair先生：主席，謝謝。即使我們抗擊新冠肺炎，外部威脅依然存在。疫情及其影響帶來了新的脆弱點，潛在對手可能利用這些漏洞針對新加坡。
去年總參謀長辯論時，國防部長黃永宏博士談到疫情對武裝部隊訓練活動的干擾。他強調，藉助嚴格的安全管理措施和強有力的檢測，駐營訓練和演習穩步恢復。我之前提到的國際形勢發展使武裝部隊必須保持作戰準備，確保即使在疫情環境下也能隨時行動。
現在疫情已過去一年，懇請部長更新疫情如何影響武裝部隊的作戰準備，以及是否仍能在必要時迅速投入行動。
武裝部隊的新冠安全措施
訓練是國家防務的重要且必要部分。正如我之前提到的，即使在困難時期，訓練也必須繼續。這是我之前削減的另一面。
鑑於武裝部隊訓練和行動可能需要人員密切接觸——無論是在營區、艦船、軍用車輛還是演習中——顯然存在新冠病毒傳播風險。我也預計武裝部隊需要制定方案應對部分作戰單位感染新冠的情況。
因此，懇請更新目前採取了哪些安全措施保護官兵，減少因新冠導致嚴重疾病傳播的風險。其次，國防部採取了哪些措施管理新冠風險並確保持續作戰？
主席：Dennis Tan先生。
武裝部隊訓練與戰備
Dennis Tan Lip Fong先生（後港選區）：謝謝主席。過去兩年，新冠肺炎幾乎影響了我們生活的所有方面，包括工作場所、企業、公共機構、學校、活動等。武裝部隊和軍事訓練也未能倖免。武裝部隊克服了疫情對訓練計劃、訓練方法、海外演習旅行限制以及士氣可能造成的挑戰，包括限制凝聚力活動等，同時確保戰備和訓練質量不受影響。
俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭提醒我們，新加坡必須擁有強大的防衛力量，作為有效的威懾，防止外來侵略和野心。無論面臨何種挑戰，如新冠肺炎，防衛力量的質量和可信度必須始終保持。
去年總參謀長辯論時，國防部長黃永宏向議會介紹，儘管面臨疫情挑戰，關鍵設施保護、海上安全、防空和反恐工作仍全天候進行。部長還提到疫情影響了一些訓練專案、演習和部署。雖然部分大型演習藉助安全管理措施恢復，但其他演習或訓練達到疫情前水平可能需要更多時間。
希望部長再次向議會介紹武裝部隊在疫情第二年如何維持訓練和高水平戰備，以及克服了哪些挑戰。
去年總參謀長辯論時，國防部長還通報了許多武裝部隊人員參與社群新冠相關行動，如口罩包裝、穩定宿舍疫情、協助設立社群護理設施、支援接觸者追蹤和醫療物流。
我理解並支援武裝部隊人員在這些領域的貢獻，但這也意味著他們暫停了訓練和常規部署。隨著我們邁向後疫情時代——包括更多國家開放邊境——我想問部長，武裝部隊有何計劃恢復訓練和演習至疫情前水平？是否會加強訓練，彌補因疫情而缺席訓練或作戰崗位的時間？
主席：He Ting Ru女士不在。Henry Kwek先生。
下一代武裝部隊轉型
郭顯泉先生（芽籠巴魯選區）：主席，俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭及隨之而來的新世界秩序正在我們眼前展開。我們可以從新現實中汲取許多教訓。
強大的武裝部隊對於威懾潛在侵略者、保護新加坡和平穩定至關重要。
我們不能指望別人為我們流血。
因此，我們必須努力建設下一代武裝部隊，領先於快速變化的防務和戰爭形態。比如，隨著技術的快速發展，國家間衝突可能不再以傳統的物理或動能方式表現。衝突可能通過灰色地帶戰術，在戰爭門檻以下展開，或通過網路和數字領域發動攻擊——這是大多數人在新冠疫情爆發後生活和工作的主要領域。即使衝突領域和方式不斷擴充套件，恐怖主義等現有威脅依然突出。
我也認識到武裝部隊必須確保其平臺和能力對常規軍事威脅構成可信威懾。
事實上，軍事能力的任何薄弱環節都是潛在漏洞，可能被利用。武裝部隊必須隨時準備應對日益多樣的挑戰，保衛新加坡。
作為一個總生育率下降的小國，我們可以預期未來國民服役兵力規模也將相應減少。與此同時，第四次工業革命帶來的新技術，如人工智慧（AI）、數字分析和物聯網，為武裝部隊提供了利用技術作為兵力倍增器的機會，以克服人力限制。
我歡迎國防部和武裝部隊2019年首次宣佈的下一代武裝部隊建設努力。武裝部隊利用技術更好應對安全威脅，既及時又必要。
國防部長能否向議會通報下一代武裝部隊轉型工作的進展？
無人技術
朱德明先生：主席，我們的低生育率是新加坡防務戰略的重大挑戰。全職國民服役兵人數預計將減少。國防部和武裝部隊需要以更少的人力做更多的事。
同時，新技術使我們能夠更好地最佳化人力資源，更高效地完成任務，且用人更少。我相信國防部和武裝部隊在這方面已有進展。例如，去年總參謀長辯論時，國防部長提到新加坡陸軍總部感知與打擊部（HQ SS）的成立，整合了多種技術能力，使陸軍能夠“看得更清楚，打得更快”，且用人更少。
部長還談到新技術如何使武裝部隊重新設計更多崗位。武裝部隊因此能從更大的人才庫中選拔人員，擔任以往因舊醫療分類系統不合格而無法擔任的崗位，包括部署保護關鍵設施，現在還配備了無人值守的瞭望塔。
武裝部隊一直與防務技術界緊密合作，利用技術進步更好支援防務戰略需求。無人機等技術的使用能顯著彌補人員短缺。國防部能否更新其發展和強化無人技術的計劃，以確保儘管人口下降，我們的防務戰略依然穩健？國防部如何將無人技術納入作戰概念？又如何將人工智慧融入防務計劃？
主席：Gan Thiam Poh先生不在。黃偉中先生。
晚上7時
新興威脅
黃偉中先生：烏克蘭持續的敵對局勢令人難以忽視。烏克蘭政府所面臨的網路攻擊浪潮，揭示了21世紀戰爭的本質。戰鬥不僅在海洋、空中和陸地上進行，也在網路空間展開。烏克蘭並非孤軍奮戰，近期事件強調這些攻擊可能由非國家行為體發起。全球多個地區的關鍵基礎設施遭受重大勒索軟體攻擊，造成嚴重的現實世界干擾。
事實上，新加坡也經歷過類似的網路攻擊。未來幾年，潛在的網路攻擊頻率、規模和複雜性可能持續增加。如果這些攻擊成功針對我們的軍事基礎設施和系統，後果將不堪設想。鑑於此，國防部長能否談談數字領域威脅的發展趨勢，以及國防部和武裝部隊如何更好地應對這些不斷演變的威脅？
網路威脅
鄭德源先生（先鋒選區）：當前數字時代，網路安全威脅格局不斷演變。這些威脅包括勒索軟體、拒絕服務攻擊和高階持續性威脅，正從價值鏈上游影響運營技術，威脅關鍵基礎設施。
因此，網路安全威脅的影響無處不在，可能對政府運作、全球供應鏈、醫療系統以及我們的軍事系統等產生不利影響。
在國防和國家安全方面，我們看到涉及惡意網路行動的灰色地帶行動日益增多。去年預算委員會上，國防部長提到已成立網路安全特別工作組，作為武裝部隊監控並積極尋找網路領域潛在威脅和侵略者的計劃一部分。我認為這是加強新加坡數字領域防禦的正確方向。
鑑於此，我想請國防部長更新武裝部隊加強軍事網路安全以應對新興網路威脅的持續努力。
與美中國防關係
洪偉能先生（西海岸選區）：主席先生，中國崛起及中美地緣政治局勢演變對全球，尤其是新加坡產生重大影響。50年前，尼克松總統訪華時，美國是超級大國，中國被視為“亞洲病夫”。1972年中國經濟規模僅為美國的8.9%。但到2020年，中國經濟已達美國的70.3%，預計2030年將超越美國。兩國競爭激烈，涵蓋技術、創新和國防建設。為遏制中國影響，成立了四方安全對話（Quad）和澳英美安全夥伴關係（AUKUS）。許多東盟國家，包括新加坡，被要求選邊站隊。我們正被捲入這股地緣政治變革浪潮。
我想請國防部長談談四方安全對話和澳英美安全夥伴關係對我們與美中關係的影響，以及對1971年啟動、涵蓋澳大利亞、紐西蘭、英國、馬來西亞和新加坡的五國防務安排（FPDA）的影響。新加坡是否會繼續歡迎美國核潛艇駐紮我們的海軍基地，並最終接納澳大利亞的核潛艇，儘管紐西蘭明確表示反對？
鑑於新冠疫情，尤其是最新的奧密克戎變異株浪潮，這如何影響國防部與美中兩國同行的互動，包括與兩國分別舉行的聯合軍演？持續的烏克蘭戰爭是否影響了我們與美中兩國的防務關係？
防務外交
蘇柏安先生（碧山-大巴窯選區）：主席先生，作為一個小國，新加坡的防務不僅依賴我們自身的意志和能力，也依賴我們與其他國家維持的戰略友誼。新加坡特別容易受到外部環境衝擊，往往源於我們無法控制的發展。因此，與志同道合夥伴在共同利益領域的合作非常重要。
隨著世界逐步走出新冠疫情陰影，我很高興看到外交會議和互動開始恢復。我想虛擬形式可能不是建立相互信任的最佳方式。新加坡-印尼領導人閉門會談簽署的協議就是一個好例子。儘管如此，我相信國防部和武裝部隊已創新方式，在非常時期保持國際交流並推進夥伴關係。
國防部和武裝部隊如何與外國同行合作，應對共同安全挑戰？
還需注意的是，國家安全威脅已演變，可能採取更非常規形式。除了熱戰或武裝衝突，網路攻擊、敵對資訊戰甚至未來疫情等不同威脅，可能同樣甚至更大程度地危及我們的生命和生計。
鑑於此，我們的防務外交努力遵循哪些原則？我們是否會看到更多協議以開展聯合軍事演習和武裝部隊海外訓練，或其他合作形式，如去年美國副總統卡馬拉·哈里斯訪新時與美國國防部簽署的網路安全諒解備忘錄？
與印尼的防務合作協議（DCA）
郭賢泉先生：主席先生，我想請教國防部，印尼防務合作協議對新加坡和武裝部隊意味著什麼？
總理最近訪問印尼，參加由印尼總統佐科主持的新加坡-印尼領導人閉門會談。此次閉門會談不僅是疫情以來首次，也是成功的，簽署了三套協議，解決了擴充套件框架下長期存在的雙邊問題。
我對我們在飛行情報區、引渡和軍事訓練等問題上取得的良好進展感到欣慰，尤其是在自1995年開始的長期討論和談判之後。
三份協議之一是關於2007年防務合作協議及其實施安排的聯合宣告，涉及武裝部隊與印尼國防軍在印尼軍事訓練區的合作。印尼防務合作協議對新加坡、國防部和武裝部隊意味著什麼？
區域安全合作
朱卡納因·阿卜杜勒·拉希姆先生（蔡厝港選區）：烏克蘭近期危機提醒所有國家，無論大小，危難時刻合作至關重要。全球範圍內，中美緊張局勢使包括我們地區在內的國家兩極分化，表現於南海等多個地緣政治舞臺。
東盟內部，許多國家面臨國內、經濟和疫情挑戰。一個分裂和分心的地區不符合我們的利益。鑑於區域形勢日益複雜，新加坡應促進東盟國家間更緊密合作。東盟防長會議（ADMM）是區域安全平臺，促進開放對話和務實合作，維護區域穩定。ADMM以開放包容著稱。
國防部長能否更新國防部通過ADMM促進更大合作的努力？此外，ADMM-Plus包括中國、俄羅斯和美國等八個國家，是區域安全架構，旨在促進18國的和平與穩定。鑑於烏克蘭事態發展，這對ADMM和ADMM-Plus的工作及安全合作有何影響？
環境可持續性
黃俊賢先生：主席先生，氣候變化對全人類構成生存威脅。氣候變化引發的相關危機對國際和平與穩定有深遠影響。新加坡因海平面上升而尤為脆弱。我們已經歷極端天氣，突發暴雨引發洪水。氣候變化也影響糧食供應——令人擔憂，因為我們高度依賴進口食品，出口國將優先滿足自身需求。
雖然新加坡在全球氣候行動中的貢獻有限，但我們有強烈的道德義務和責任。
國防部能否分享其在武裝部隊和國防部內部提升環境可持續性和減少碳排放的措施？我敦促國防部繼續採取系統全面的可持續發展方法，從減少食物浪費到嘗試為空軍戰鬥機使用綠色航空燃料。我期待聽到更多綠色倡議、改進流程和加強檢查以防止浪費，特別是在食物和電力方面。
主席：國防部長黃永宏博士。
國防部長（黃永宏博士）：主席先生，感謝允許我回應議員們的質詢。我會盡量回答他們提出的許多問題，其他問題將由高階國務部長回覆。
主席先生，我說一句顯而易見的話，過去兩年，抗擊新冠疫情一直是全球政府和民眾的核心關注點，包括新加坡。回顧歷史，很少有事件能有如此影響力和廣泛性。近代史上，二戰有此影響力，定義了那一代人的共同經歷。相比之下，新冠疫情雖不及二戰破壞性大，但多年後，我相信經歷過的人仍會銘記。
儘管本世紀面臨新冠疫情這一獨特挑戰，正如一些議員所指出的，其他對新加坡構成安全威脅的挑戰並未暫停。國防部和武裝部隊在投入抗疫戰鬥的同時，始終專注於安全環境。
武裝部隊的核心使命首先是保護新加坡免受所有潛在外部侵略者的威脅。維克拉姆·奈爾先生和丹尼斯·陳先生都提到這一點。作為一個小國，我們的反應空間有限，必須及早識別威脅。為新加坡的生存和福祉，武裝部隊不僅要時刻準備、長遠規劃、組織有序，還需靈活應變，以防範或抵禦迫在眉睫的危險。
因此，儘管我們努力抗擊新冠疫情，國防部和武裝部隊仍認真規劃，建設下一代武裝部隊，不僅能應對當前安全威脅，也能預見未來威脅。我認為這必須是我們的策略。總會有意外威脅，如新冠疫情，但武裝部隊對已知威脅準備越充分，就越有能力應對未知威脅。我稍後會談及議員們關心的一些舉措。
首先，我想說明今年國防部預算的背景。
今年，我部支出將較過去兩年增加。黃偉中先生問及此事。增加原因是因疫情期間中斷的專案、訓練和演習恢復。我必須強調，儘管疫情，我們仍持續採購新裝備，但供應商受影響導致延遲。例如，空軍的H225M中型運輸直升機和CH-47F重型運輸直升機交付分別從2020年底推遲至2021年3月和5月。原計劃去年交付的無敵級潛艇也延遲。今年及以後，延期專案將恢復，新的裝備採購也將繼續。
晚上7點15分
議員們關心訓練問題——黃俊賢、朱德明、丹尼斯·陳和黃偉中先生。武裝部隊預計今年本地和海外訓練數量將恢復至疫情前水平。去年，我們海外演習減少，參演人數也少。例如，美國的“鍛造軍刀”演習有800人參加，澳大利亞的“袋鼠”演習約580人，均低於疫情前水平。國內，國民服役訓練逐步恢復正常，營內訓練召集率預計今年將達疫情前水平。
隨著專案和訓練恢復至疫情前水平，預計本財年支出為163億新元，較去年增長6.5%，預計為一次性增長，彌補2020和2021財年的減少支出。疫情導致支出大幅波動，但未來五年國防部預算預計將與通脹同步增長，每年名義增長3%至4%，我此前已向議會保證。
過去兩年支出減少並未影響戰備水平。維克拉姆·奈爾和丹尼斯·陳先生問及此事。事實上，武裝部隊在疫情期間保持了高水平戰備並執行關鍵任務。部隊嚴格遵守健康安全措施，如對所有新兵和教官進行健康篩查，儘可能小組訓練，測量體溫，檢測，並對返營國民服役人員每七天檢測一次。
國防部和武裝部隊人員中，99.7%已接種疫苗，91%已接種加強針，這幫助我們控制感染。關於建設下一代武裝部隊，我回應郭賢泉和朱德明先生的請求，提供一些細節。
2007年服役的“強襲”級護衛艦已服役15年，正進行中期升級。它們是我們海上打擊、防空和反潛的關鍵平臺，但中期升級不僅是簡單的增改。每次升級，我們都會考慮技術進步、人力資源、設計，甚至人工智慧的應用。
升級後，護衛艦的作戰能力將提升，配備更先進的作戰管理和通訊系統、武器系統，以及改進的維護流程——基本上是以更少資源實現更大效能。下一代武裝部隊將擁有更多無人系統，涵蓋三軍。空軍已採購Orbiter 4近程無人機，體積小、感測器先進、便攜性強，可用於和平與戰鬥多種任務。
今年，海軍將部署首批海上安全無人水面艦艇（USV）巡邏本地水域。海軍還將從2027年起用全無人系統替代掃雷艦。
我們是全球少數幾個運營無人海上系統的海軍之一。這些系統由國防科技研究所（DSO）、國防科技局（DSTA）和海軍本地設計整合。DSO和DSTA是關鍵推動者。
DSO今年迎來成立50週年。我們為DSO的男女員工感到自豪和感激，他們過去五十年默默努力，提供顛覆性防務技術和解決方案，推動武裝部隊成為現代化戰鬥機器。
一些議員可能記得去年預算委員會上，我提到感知與打擊總部（HQ SS）成立，HQ SS去年底首次參加“鍛造軍刀”演習。陸軍也將在本月晚些時候啟用首個獵人裝甲戰鬥群。
主席先生，允許我在螢幕上展示一張圖片。
主席：請展示。[向議員們展示幻燈片。]
黃永宏博士：下一代武裝部隊正在成形。你們現在可以看到它的雛形，隨著時間推移愈發清晰。到2040年，陸軍配備下一代步兵營、新型裝甲履帶車和榴彈炮，將更具機動性，能更快更強地追蹤和打擊。海軍配備多功能作戰艦、無敵級潛艇和無人水面艦艇，將能更遠距離偵察和打擊，保護我們的水域和海上交通線。
下一代空軍配備F-15、F-35和下一代無人機，將更具殺傷力、多功能和效能，更好地守護我們的天空。下一代武裝部隊將為我們和後代提供更大信心，應對潛在侵略者，完成武裝部隊的核心使命。
許多議員都問過我們如何應對日益複雜的地緣政治局勢和競爭。我恐怕沒有哪個國家有魔法公式，也沒有阿拉丁神燈可以許願。我們的理念很簡單。我們與所有國家交朋友，不結敵人。但我們也是現實主義者，善於觀察歷史和周圍的事件，尤其是小而脆弱國家的遭遇。
我們看到1990年，富含石油的科威特被伊拉克入侵。我們也目睹了2017年卡達遭鄰國實施空中、陸地和海上封鎖，這還不算久遠。此刻，我們看到烏克蘭人民深陷困境，思考著未來，處於刀鋒邊緣。不可思議和難以想象的事情發生了。他們的城市遭受轟炸並有外國軍隊駐紮；他們的生活方式和夢想被粉碎；他們的獨立和自由岌岌可危。烏克蘭人口超過4000萬，不是一個小國。但大小和實力是相對的。對他們、科威特人和卡達人來說，這些時刻關乎生死，自由或屈服。
確實，我們奉行的格言是：新加坡武裝部隊（SAF）越強大，交朋友越容易，敵人越少。如果新加坡人不願意或不能捍衛新加坡，就不會有人像我們那樣堅決地保衛新加坡。但如果我們能夠在2040年前建立起那樣的SAF，作為政府領導和本議院議員，我們能否集體滿意地認為，我們已經光榮且滿意地履行了對下一代的職責？
這裡有些人可能會說，肯定可以，因為那樣的SAF令人印象深刻。我認為我們的開國元勳們可能沒想到我們能走到這一步。它肯定會是該地區最現代化、裝備最先進的軍隊之一。但我坦率地說，“幾乎達到了，但還不完全”，因為儘管下一代SAF很優秀且雄心勃勃，但在能力上仍有一些差距，最近的事件和發展已給我們敲響警鐘。
我很高興本議院的議員們也提醒了我們——維克拉姆·奈爾先生、黃紹恩先生和鄭國威先生。我主要談的是數字領域的威脅。要完成2040年的SAF，我們需要第四軍種來補充現有的三個軍種。我將花些時間詳細說明這一重大舉措，因為原因很重要。
首先，讓我們用寬泛的通用術語來描述數字威脅，瞭解包括新加坡在內的國家面臨的挑戰。數字領域已變得和陸、空、海領域一樣真實，我們為此建立了陸軍、空軍和海軍。我想這裡沒人會懷疑這一點。事實上，有人認為，對下一代來說，數字領域是主導領域。以至於出現了“元宇宙”這個新詞，指代那個虛擬宇宙。
數字領域產生的威脅可以直接影響現實物理世界的事件。在安全層面上，虛擬與物理的分界是虛假的，二者實際上緊密交織。我想這裡沒人會反駁這一點。我們已有現例項證證明這一真理，議員們也引用過：去年五月，美國東海岸因殖民地管道遭勒索軟體攻擊而出現燃料短缺；去年十月，伊朗人因支付系統被黑，無法給加油站加油。還有明顯的例子顯示，國家或非國家實體如恐怖組織，利用數字和物理領域的聯合攻擊。
我七年前在2015年總參謀長演講中首次談及這種混合戰爭，但近年來此類行動愈發頻繁。即使現在，我們親眼目睹烏克蘭的這類行動。《金融時報》於2月14日報道，標題為“烏克蘭加強網路防禦”，相當近期。讓我引用一些相關內容，生動展示此類攻擊的預期：“自2014年以來，該國一直遭受持續攻擊，網路間諜破壞資料庫和伺服器，電力和通訊中斷，虛假資訊傳播，都是常見手段。烏克蘭政府和獨立專家預計敵對網路活動將增加，試圖在任何物理攻擊前或期間破壞國家穩定。”
另一段話：“多年來肯定還有許多我們不知道的攻擊，惡意軟體已潛伏在系統中，隨時可能被啟用。”這是美國西北大學電腦科學教授VS Subrahmaniam的說法。他補充道：“這有點像在你家裡埋了炸彈，平時無害，直到有人引爆。”還有：“烏克蘭公共部門網路安全專業人才短缺，監管薄弱，應對能力有限，各機構協調不足。”
我相信所有議員都會同意，我們可以從這不幸的局勢中吸取教訓。最好現在就學習和調整，因為如果等到自己遭受攻擊後才改變，代價將非常高昂。面對數字領域的所有事件，我們的應對措施應是什麼？幸運的是，我們的情報來源尚未發現針對新加坡的此類有組織的混合手段顛覆或征服企圖。
但這當然不意味著威脅永遠不會出現。因此，我認為我們最好現在就做好準備，爭取更長的準備期。對於SAF，明確的回應是設立第四軍種。過去十年，國防部/SAF逐步建立了所謂的C4I——指揮、控制、通訊、計算機和情報。
我們建設了這個群體以增強網路和系統的韌性。2017年成立了國防網路組織（DCO），協調國防部門的網路安全，議員們曾提出問題，我也做過更新。有些議員甚至在總參謀長演講時要求更新。
C4I群體及其前身軍事情報組織和聯合C4，已支援其他三個軍種超過20年。然而，情報群體在數字和物理世界威脅上的需求和直接責任急劇上升。以恐怖主義為例，C4I群體的角色不僅是支援性的，更是直接責任。
議員們應記得，9·11事件被歸因於情報失敗。隨後不久，議員們可能記得，內務情報局基於良好情報果斷行動，挫敗了耶瑪伊亞恐怖組織在新加坡發動襲擊的陰謀。
晚上7點30分
為C4I群體成立新軍種，將極大促進其任務聚焦，明確直接責任和問責，以及能力發展。人力資源對情報部門尤為重要，擁有與陸軍、海軍和空軍同等的軍種地位，將大幅提升招募和職業發展前景。
C4I群體演變為新的第四軍種，將整合並擴充套件我們在數字領域的能力。但要有效應對預計將增多、日益複雜和有組織的外部數字威脅，我們需要的不僅是情報力量，還需要專門的數字力量。現有的DCO正在建設這樣的力量，但不足以滿足SAF不斷擴大的需求和任務。形象地說，如果數字力量現在是一個營級力量，我們實際上需要幾個旅，甚至一個師級力量。
國防部和SAF已考慮這些變化一段時間，探索多種方案以更好應對數字領域威脅。我們的結論是，設立新的第四軍種——數字與情報軍（DIS）——最能體現SAF的第四支力量。
DIS不應也不能僅僅像陸軍、空軍和海軍那樣，只是數字領域的類似部隊。數字領域的性質及其威脅需要不同的技能、思維方式——我們稱之為戰術、技術和程式。我想大多數人對此直覺上都能理解。
SAF設想，為DIS招募計程車兵型別、訓練和部隊結構將不同。但四個軍種計程車兵必須保持某些特質——遵守SAF核心價值觀、具備作戰思維、堅韌不拔以確保任務成功，最重要的是對增強新加坡安全與和平的共同使命的承諾。
技術，尤其是資訊科技和通訊，將在DIS中發揮重要作用。但它還需要在核心IT和通訊之外，擁有資料科學、心理學、語言學、人類學和地理學等多樣化專業，以幫助理解有組織的國家和非國家團體如何動機和手段上對新加坡構成威脅。
增設第四軍種DIS，將使SAF更好地訓練和作為一個網路化、整合且擴充套件的力量作戰，應對我們已知存在的威脅譜系，以及未來數字領域將增加的威脅。其他國家也得出類似結論，已在三軍基礎上增設數字力量。例如德國成立了網路與資訊領域軍，整合了其通訊與資訊系統司令部和地理資訊中心。
設立第四軍種DIS需完成許多程式和流程。儘管如此，我們預計將在今年最後一個季度成立。
國民服役者是SAF陸、空、海三軍的骨幹，未來也將是數字領域的骨幹。無論我們的計劃如何，最終決定SAF能否成功的是國民服役者的素質和承諾。
今年是國民服役55週年紀念，正如我們以往所做，我們將舉辦多項活動以表彰他們的貢獻。未來幾個月將公佈更多細節。
我們也希望改進國民服役制度。這些新舉措來自國民服役審查委員會，部分議員曾詢問，該委員會由國防部副秘書（行政）和陸軍參謀長共同主持。提出了三項關鍵變革。
第一，為最佳化寶貴的人力資源，我們將把功能評估納入入伍前體檢。我想林標泉先生和莫哈末·法米·阿里曼先生問過這個。功能評估是什麼？相比一般體檢，功能評估更精確地衡量服役人員是否能勝任特定職業。同時，我們重新設計了1000個崗位，使更多服役人員能在此前不具資格的領域貢獻力量。
第二，補發薪酬。這是長期存在的問題。我很高興宣佈，政府各部門和機構間更好的資料管理將使補發薪酬申請流程更簡化，且實現自動化。簡化且自動化。將設定預設的基本國服薪酬，國民服役者可申領營內訓練期間的薪酬。這對非正式就業和訓練人員尤其有用。基本國服薪酬定為每月1600新元，按國服召集時間比例計算。超過10萬國服者和2.5萬僱主將受益於自動化的補發薪酬申請和基本國服薪酬。
第三，我們將提高國服家庭獎（NS HOME）現金部分——每名國服者額外獲得2000新元現金。
高階國務部長王瑞傑將提供這些變革及其他若干事項的更多細節。
這支四軍合一的下一代SAF，配備有承諾和能力的國民服役者，將更好地使新加坡應對傳統和新興威脅。我們的威懾力依賴於強大的下一代SAF。這是主要方面。另一個方面是良好關係，許多議員談及，尤其是與志同道合夥伴的防務關係。
洪偉能先生和薩克提安迪·蘇帕特先生問及我們的做法。作為小國，新加坡需要儘可能多的朋友。擁有強大的防務夥伴網路，使我們能夠提升防務能力，海外訓練，並在對我們安全至關重要的戰略問題上合作。
過去一年，我們保持了高層防務接觸。例如，美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀於七月首次訪新，八月我們與美國國防部簽署了網路空間合作諒解備忘錄。與中國方面，我於六月與國防部長魏鳳和將軍進行了影片會晤。海軍去年通過“無接觸”方式兩次與中國人民解放軍舉行聯合海軍演習。
與印度方面，我們於一月簽署諒解備忘錄，允許SAF在印度昌迪普爾綜合試驗場進行武器射擊。二月，我們續簽了新加坡-越南防務合作協議。我們還與幾個波羅的海國家簽署了新的防務合作協議，制度化專業交流。這很有趣。我們決定波羅的海國家值得關注，這發生在烏克蘭事件之前。現在，我們更感興趣。我認為這合作將結出更多成果。
在近鄰方面，去年十一月我們與印尼陸軍舉行了Safkar Indopura演習，這是我們陸軍與外國軍隊的首次實兵演習。今年一月，印尼國防部長普拉博沃·蘇比安託與我簽署聯合宣告，同意生效2007年國防合作協議及其實施安排，涉及SAF與印尼武裝部隊的軍事訓練區。
郭振凱先生問這意味著什麼。國防合作協議將加強我們防務機構間的戰略關係，促進武裝力量間更緊密的互動與合作。
朱卡爾奈因·阿卜杜勒·拉希姆先生問我們對東盟防長擴大會（ADMM-Plus）和東盟防長會議（ADMM）的態度。它們確實是亞洲事實上的多邊防務集團，我們在網路和資訊領域威脅方面發揮了領導作用，建立了ADMM網路安全與資訊卓越中心，為所有東盟成員國提供月度報告。同樣，SAF的反恐資訊設施（CTIF）自2020年起運作，駐有11名外國聯絡官，及時提供可操作的反恐情報。
我也很高興，今年香格里拉對話將在六月恢復實體會議，結束兩年中斷。
主席先生，請允許我向議員們更新國防部/SAF的主要綠色舉措，唐偉先生曾問及，我在上次總參謀長演講中宣佈，目標是到2030年將整體排放增長減少三分之二。
SAF可持續發展辦公室由SAF聯合參謀長辦公室領導，召集了外部專家小組，為實現可持續目標的實施計劃提供見解。
議員們要求更新，我來介紹一些。截至今年年底，約四分之一的SAF營區將安裝太陽能電池板，發電峰值達2000萬瓦，相當於約5000戶四房組屋的用電量。到2025年，這一比例將從四分之一躍升至三分之二，發電峰值達5000萬瓦。智慧計量系統也將安裝，用於自動追蹤電力和水的消耗，首批地點包括裕廊營區、巴耶利峇空軍基地和樟宜海軍基地。
RSAF已開始試驗為F-16戰鬥機使用綠色燃料。這些努力及其他措施將幫助我們實現2030年的排放目標。
我感謝本議院議員每年支援我們的預算。國防部和SAF的責任是謹慎有效地支出，建設強大的國家防務，正如我所詳述。
但令我和議員們欣慰的是，SAF是國家資產，可在當前新冠疫情等情況下部署。當新加坡因德爾塔和奧密克戎變異株病例激增時，國防部和SAF人員被召集協助衛生部，提供作戰規劃能力、人員接觸追蹤、呼叫中心或支援急診部門。SAF還成立了居家康復工作組，更好管理患者居家康復計劃，國民服役者也作為居家疫苗接種隊和流動疫苗接種隊提供幫助。我們的國防科學家和工程師貢獻了多種支援系統。
議員們問我們如何協助海外。確實，我們超越新加坡邊界提供了幫助。去年，SAF樟宜區域人道援助與災難救援協調中心協調向受新冠疫情重創的地區國家轉運醫療裝置和物資，包括應印尼請求運送的500多噸氧氣，作為“氧氣穿梭”計劃的一部分。
主席先生，首先讓我感謝本院議員們對通過強大的新加坡武裝部隊（SAF）實現堅實國家防禦的堅定承諾和支援。今年，尤其是由於烏克蘭事件，我認為新加坡人更不需要被說服，因為我們共同有責任為自己和後代保持新加坡的安全與穩定。因此，我們很高興看到其他人代表國防部（MINDEF）和武裝部隊（SAF）以及他們自己的信念，說出了正確的話。
但我認為深刻的教訓已經深入人心，事實上，一些新加坡人還給我發了電子郵件。讓我引用其中兩封。
一封來自Tee KH先生：“我過去把營區訓練當作‘假期’營，直到我意識到當伊拉克入侵小小的科威特時，保衛新加坡的重要性。現在我已退休，屬於獨立世代，我提醒正在服兵役的兒子認真對待訓練。越多盡職的公民積極服役，保衛弱者，爭取自由，做正確的事，戰爭結束得越快，戰爭甚至開始的可能性就越小。”
第二封來自Cheng CF先生：“如果新加坡人不保衛我們的國家，就沒人會幫我們。我67歲，退役國民服役者。但只要我身體健康，我不會猶豫再次穿上制服，幫助我的新加坡同胞保衛我們的國家。這是我的國家，我的家園和土地。”
只要我們有像Tee先生和Cheng先生那樣懷有深刻決心和信念的新加坡人，我說，我們的未來就依然安全。[掌聲]
英文原文
SPRS Hansard · Fetched: 2026-05-02
The Chairman : Head J, Ministry of Defence. Mr Vikram Nair.
Security Trends and SAF's Priorities
Mr Vikram Nair (Sembawang) : Chairman, I beg to move "That the total sum to be allocated for Head J of the Estimates be reduced by $100".
We live in a dangerous world. In the past week, we have witnessed Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the largest war on the European continent since World War II. The signs of this conflict had been brewing for a long time. The Russian troop build-up along the Ukrainian border had taken place over many months and various NATO countries, including the US, had anticipated conflict would break out.
Yet, when the time for fighting came, despite wide-spread condemnation from the international community, Ukraine had to fight alone against a much more heavily armed neighbour. This is an important reminder to all countries, particularly small ones like us, that we cannot assume other countries will come to our assistance when we are at war and we have to do all we can to defend ourselves.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has brought to light some concerning methods of coercion, including "false flag" operations – essentially, disinformation campaigns – to create a pretext for war.
This is not the only hotspot. In the past year, we have witnessed other significant developments in the international security environment. The US-China rivalry has continued to intensify and we see that this is increasingly playing out in both countries' regulations in the trade and technology domains. We have also seen stronger rhetoric and action over Taiwan and this seems to be an increasingly likely catalyst if a conflict, intended or otherwise, were to break out between the two powers.
In recent years, commentators have also suggested that the trajectory of the international order will be determined by developments in the Asia Pacific. As a result, there is a discernible shift in the global centre of gravity and extra-regional countries are increasingly turning their attention here. This includes the European Union countries like the UK, France and Germany. In one view, this is a good thing as the more invested countries are in this region, the more likely they will play a role in balancing the powers in this region.
However, with this growing attention focused on the Asia Pacific, we have also witnessed the emergence of new security arrangements, such as the trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US. The flip side of this is that there are concerns that such developments may have a divisive effect in the region or could, potentially, trigger an arms race.
Another trend that has emerged is the growing intersection between geostrategic issues and technology.
Technology is a major area of contestation in the strategic rivalry between the US and China. Technology is also being used by both state and non-state actors that seek non-conventional ways to coerce their adversaries, including through cyber attacks and information warfare.
Although Singapore is far away from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, I have seen messages being circulated in chat groups that seemed to be targeted at swaying public opinion in Singapore and I have my suspicions that such messages may be part of an info-operations exercise by foreign actors.
While the pandemic has pushed us in the positive direction in terms of leveraging and maximising the use of digital platforms, this has, arguably, left our societies more susceptible to digital threats.
Could the Minister for Defence comment on some of the trends in our security environment that MINDEF is watching? Could the Minister for Defence also provide an update on how these and other geopolitical security developments are shaping MINDEF's and the SAF's plans and priorities? How will MINDEF and the SAF respond to the challenges in our external environment and how will MINDEF and the SAF work with like-minded partners to address these threats?
[(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)]
The Chairman : Mr Alex Yam is not here. Mr Vikram Nair, your next cut, please.
6.45 pm
Global Fight against COVID-19
Mr Vikram Nair : Chairman, as a small nation, Singapore's security is contingent on the stability of the wider region. Because of the open and interconnected nature of Singapore's economy, major destabilising developments elsewhere can have a very tangible impact on our lives here.
The ongoing battle against COVID-19 is a clear example of this. Even at times when Singapore has appeared to be managing relatively well with the virus, we have seen other countries struggling. Our dependence on trade and travel has also meant this virus would, eventually, find its way back to Singapore.
The SAF has played an important role in assisting our neighbours during times of crisis, including assisting with relief efforts, when neighbours faced natural disasters.
Over the years, the Minister for Defence has updated the House on MINDEF's and the SAF's efforts to cooperate with international partners to safeguard the peace and security in the region.
So, I have a question for MINDEF and the SAF and, that is, whether it is taking any steps to assist our neighbours in its battle against COVID-19. And, if so, how has it done?
COVID-19 and Capability Development Plan
Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong (Jurong) : Despite facing the pandemic of a century, the SAF responded admirably. Essential operations were not suspended even during the height of the circuit breaker. The SAF has now vaccinated almost 100% of its soldiers, sailors and airmen.
However, last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen spoke about delays to major SAF programmes and initiatives due to the pandemic. This would, undoubtedly, have led to an impact on SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans.
COVID-19 has disrupted supply chains around the world. Would it also disrupt the supply chains for building the next generation platforms and technologies that the SAF is seeking to acquire?
In the same vein, I would also like to better understand how the pandemic has affected the SAF's ability to develop and test new training doctrines in overseas settings. I am well aware that there are some military manoeuvres that we simply cannot practise in land-scarce Singapore. And I am concerned that the COVID-19 travel restrictions over the past few years may have made it difficult for the SAF to pursue valuable training opportunities overseas.
Could the Minister explain how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the SAF's medium- to long-term capability development plans?
Training amidst COVID-19
Mr Don Wee (Chua Chu Kang) : Chairman, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused huge disruptions. Our SAF training has probably been one of the more heavily impacted since limited aspects of Army training can be done remotely or online. In the early phase of the pandemic, Basic Military Training and National Service (NS) call-ups had to be suspended for a while. Some overseas training and exercises were affected due to travel restrictions as well.
Last year, MINDEF spoke about the resumption of some overseas training and large-scale exercises, after implementing stringent testing and safe management measures. I am glad that despite some disruptions, the SAF's training did not grind to a halt and that all parties managed to find ways to proceed with some exercises. The external threats to our nation do not diminish during pandemics. Hence, neither should our defence preparations and training. What is happening in Europe now is a stark reminder that security threats are not pandemic-proof.
As Singapore is moving forward with our calibrated approach towards resumption of most activities, I feel that we are in a better position now than we were earlier in the pandemic, as a significant proportion of our population now is vaccinated. In addition, our people are much more familiar with how to interact with one another safely, despite the sustained presence of the virus in our community.
Hence, would MINDEF share an update on SAF's training at home and abroad? Which parts of our training have returned to pre-COVID-19 levels?
NS Training amidst COVID-19
Mr Desmond Choo (Tampines) : Chairman, as Singapore transits to living with COVID-19, the SAF has also, gradually, resumed training for NSmen. I note that this is not without the implementation of safe management measures, testing and cohorting arrangements, to ensure the safety of our NSmen. What are MINDEF's plans to recall NSmen in the coming year?
Many of our NSmen have not had the opportunity to participate in large-scale overseas exercises. Even while SAF successfully concluded Exercise Wallaby in 2021, the scale of the exercise was limited, due to concerns relating to the transmission of the virus.
Nations are now transiting to living with COVID-19. With global borders now gradually reopening, overseas exercises must continue to be scaled up to pre-pandemic levels. Can MINDEF share its plans to resume larger-scale overseas exercises in 2022?
The Chairman : Mr Vikram Nair. Mr Nair, if you would like to take your two cuts together, please do.
SAF's Operational Readiness
Mr Vikram Nair : Chairman, thank you. Even as we battle COVID-19, external threats persist. As we grapple with the pandemic and its effects, there have been new vulnerabilities for potential adversaries to exploit in order to target Singapore.
At the COS debate last year, Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen talked about disruptions to SAF's training activities as a result of the pandemic. He highlighted that there had been steady progress on resuming In-Camp Training and exercises, enabled by strict safe management measures and robust testing. The developments in the world that I have highlighted earlier make it imperative that SAF remains operationally ready and able to function at all times, even in this pandemic environment.
So, now that we are one year on, I would be grateful if the Minister can provide an update on how the pandemic has affected SAF's operational readiness and whether it is still able to move into operation if necessary.
SAF's COVID-19 Safety Measures
Training in the SAF is an important and necessary part of our nation's defence. And as I have mentioned in my earlier cut, it is important for such training to continue even during this difficult period. So, this is, in fact, the flipside of my earlier cut.
Now that SAF's training activities and operations are likely to require people to continue to work in close proximity – and these can be in camps, on ships, in military vehicles or even on exercises – there is clearly a risk of COVID-19 transmission. I also expect that SAF will need to work on scenarios on what will happen if parts of operational units come down with COVID-19.
So, I would be grateful if I can get an update, first of all, on what are the safety measures that are being taken to protect Servicemen in relation to COVID-19 and reduce the risk of transmission of serious illness arising from COVID-19. Secondly, what are the measures that MINDEF has taken to manage the risk of COVID-19 and to continue operating?
The Chairman : Mr Dennis Tan.
SAF Training and Combat Readiness
Mr Dennis Tan Lip Fong (Hougang) : Thank you, Mr Chairman. In the last two years, COVID-19 has affected virtually all aspects of our lives. It has affected our workplaces, businesses, public offices, schools, events and many other areas. SAF and military training have not been spared, too. SAF had to overcome the challenges which COVID-19 might have imposed on its training programmes, training methodology, restriction of travel for overseas exercise and, possibly, our morale, due to restriction of activities, including cohesion activities, and so on and so forth. And all these without compromising SAF's combat readiness and maintaining the quality of its training regimes and programmes and the morale of our Servicemen.
The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine is a reminder to us of the importance of Singapore having a strong defence force as an effective deterrent against foreign aggression and ambitions. Both the quality and credibility of our defence force must be maintained at all times, regardless of the challenges, such as COVID-19.
At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen shared with the House that despite the challenges of COVID-19, protection of key installations, maritime security, air defence and counter-terrorism efforts continue around the clock. The Minister also shared that COVID-19 affected some training programmes, exercises and deployments. And while certain major exercises resumed with the help of safe management measures, it might require more time to restart other exercises or for training to reach pre-COVID-19 levels.
I hope the Minister can brief the House again on what was SAF's experience in maintaining its training regime and high-level of combat readiness last year, our second year of fighting COVID-19, and share with us the challenges which SAF had overcomed.
At last year's COS, Minister Ng Eng Hen also updated the House on the involvement of many SAF personnel to assist in COVID-19-related operations for the community, such as packing masks, stabilising the outbreak in dormitories, helping to set up the community care and recovery facilities, supporting contact tracing and medical logistics operations.
While I understand and agree with the support given by our SAF personnel in these areas, it also meant time-out from their training and their usual deployment or roles. As we head towards a post-pandemic world – and this includes more countries opening up their borders – I would like to ask the Minister what are SAF's plans to work towards the resumption of training and exercises back to a pre-COVID-19 level. Will SAF be enhancing training for all our forces and Servicemen and, in a sense, making up for their time spent away from our training or operational role as a result of COVID-19?
The Chairman : Ms He Ting Ru is not here. Mr Henry Kwek.
Next Generation SAF Transformation
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry (Kebun Baru) : Mr Chairman, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and, with it, a new world order, is unfolding before our very eyes. There are many lessons that we can draw from the new reality.
A strong SAF is vital in deterring potential aggressors and in protecting Singapore's peace and stability.
We cannot expect others to shed blood for us.
Therefore, we must work hard to build the Next-Generation SAF and stay ahead of rapidly changing defence and warfare. For example, with the rapid evolution of technology, interstate conflict may no longer manifest in conventional physical or kinetic modes. Conflict could instead be conducted through grey zone tactics below the threshold of war, or through attacks in the cyber and digital domains, where most of us now live and work following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. And even as the domains and modalities for conflict continue to expand and grow, existing threats to our peace and security, such as terrorism, remain salient.
I also recognise the importance of SAF ensuring that its platforms and capabilities serve as a credible deterrent to conventional military threats.
Indeed, any perceived weak point in our military capabilities is a vulnerability that could be exploited and the SAF must remain ready and prepared to respond to the ever-growing range of challenges to defend Singapore.
As a small country with a shrinking total fertility rate, we can expect subsequent National Service cohorts to similarly decrease in size in future. At the very same time, new technologies arising from the fourth Industrial Revolution, such as artificial intelligence (AI), digital analytics and the Internet of Things, offer new opportunities for SAF to leverage as a force multiplier to overcome manpower limitations.
I welcome the efforts to build the Next-Generation SAF, as MINDEF and SAF first announced in 2019. It is timely and necessary that SAF harnesses technology to respond better to security threats.
Could the Minister for Defence update the House on the progress of the transformation efforts towards the Next-Generation SAF?
Unmanned Technology
Mr Desmond Choo : Mr Chairman, our low birth rate is a significant challenge to Singapore's defence strategy. The number of full-time National Servicemen is projected to decrease. MINDEF and SAF will need to do more with less.
At the same time, new technologies have allowed us to better optimise manpower resources and complete tasks better, more efficiently and with less manpower. I believe that MINDEF and SAF have already made strides in this area. For example, at last year's COS, the Minister for Defence spoke about the inauguration of the Singapore Army's Headquarters Sense & Strike (HQ SS), which integrated various technology-enabled capabilities, to allow the Army to "see better and shoot faster" with less manpower.
The Minister also spoke about how new technology had enabled SAF to redesign more jobs. SAF can then tap on a larger pool of Servicemen to serve in roles that they would have previously been ineligible for under SAF's old medical classification system. This included being deployed to protect key installations, now augmented by unmanned watch towers.
SAF has been working closely with the defence technology community to leverage advances in technology to better support the needs of our defence strategies. The use of technology, such as drones, can significantly make up for a shortfall in personnel. Can MINDEF update on its plans to develop and intensify the use of unmanned technologies to ensure our defence strategies remain robust despite our declining population? How has MINDEF developed its concepts of operations to incorporate such unmanned technologies? How has MINDEF incorporated AI also into its defence plans?
The Chairman : Mr Gan Thiam Poh is not here. Mr Shawn Hwang.
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Emerging Threats
Mr Shawn Huang Wei Zhong : The ongoing hostility in Ukraine is difficult to ignore. The onslaught of cyber attacks that the Ukrainian government is facing shines a light on the nature of warfare in the 21st century. Battles are fought not just in the sea, air and on land, but also in cyberspace. Ukraine is not alone when facing such threats. Recent events have underscored that these attacks can be initiated by non-state actors. Major ransomware attacks have targeted critical infrastructure in different parts of the world, causing serious, real-world disruptions.
In fact, Singapore has experienced such cyber attacks as well. In the years ahead, it seems likely that potential cyber attacks will continue to increase in frequency, scale and complexity. If these attacks were to successfully target our military infrastructure and systems, there would be dire consequences. In the light of this, could the Minister for Defence provide views on how threats in the digital domain are evolving and what MINDEF and SAF are doing to better address these evolving threats?
Cyber Threats
Mr Patrick Tay Teck Guan (Pioneer) : The cybersecurity threat landscape is constantly evolving in the current digital age. These threats, which include ransomware, denial-of-service attacks and advanced persistent threats, are originating further up the value chain by impacting operational technology and threatening critical infrastructure.
As a result, the effects of cybersecurity threats have left no stone unturned, as it has the potential to adversely impact governmental operations, global supply chains, healthcare systems and our military systems, among others.
On the defence and national security front, we have seen the increased prevalence of grey zone operations involving malicious cyber campaigns. At last year’s Committee of Supply, the Minister for Defence said that the Cybersecurity Task Force had been stood up, as part of SAF’s plans to monitor and actively seek out potential threats and aggressors in the cyber domain. I think this is a step in the right direction to shore up Singapore’s defences in the digital domain.
In view of this, I would like to ask the Minister for Defence for an update on the SAF’s ongoing efforts to enhance our military’s cybersecurity to address these emerging cyber threats.
Defence Relations with US and China
Mr Ang Wei Neng (West Coast) : Chairman, the rise of China and the evolving geopolitical situation between China and the US had a global impact, especially on Singapore. When US President Richard Nixon visited China 50 years ago in 1972, the US was a superpower while China was seen as the sick man of Asia. In terms of nominal GDP, the size of China's economy in 1972 was just 8.9% of the US economy. But in 2020, China's economy became 70.3% of the US economy. It is projected that China's economy will overtake the US economy by 2030. The rivalry between the two countries has given rise to stiff competition in technology, innovation and defence build-up. As a result, Quad and AUKUS were formed to counter the influence of China. Many ASEAN countries, including Singapore, have been asked to take sides. We are being swept up in this current of geopolitical change.
I would like to ask the Minister for Defence what is the impact of the Quad and AUKUS on our relationship with the US and China and how does it impact the current Five-Power Defence Arrangement, or FPDA, which was started in 1971 as a third security arrangement involving Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia and Singapore? Will Singapore continue to welcome US nuclear submarines at our naval base and, eventually, host Australia's nuclear submarine when New Zealand had categorically said no?
In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the latest Omicron wave, how does it affect MINDEF's engagement with its US and Chinese counterparts, including the joint exercises with these two countries respectively? Has the ongoing Ukraine war affected our defence relations with the US and China?
Defence Diplomacy
Mr Saktiandi Supaat (Bishan-Toa Payoh) : Mr Chairman, as a small state, Singapore’s defence depends not only on our will and ability to defend ourselves, but also the strategic friendships that we maintain with other nations. Singapore is particularly vulnerable to shocks that take place in our external environment, often due to developments outside of our control. Hence, our cooperation with like-minded partners in areas of common interest is important.
As the world looks to step out of the COVID-19 shadow, I am glad to see that diplomatic meetings and engagements are starting to return. I imagine that virtual formats may not be the most conducive means to build mutual trust. The recent agreement signed at the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat is a good case in point. Notwithstanding that, I am sure that MINDEF and SAF have innovated new ways to keep up international engagements and advance partnerships in extraordinary times.
How are MINDEF and SAF cooperating with their foreign counterparts to address common security challenges?
It is also important to note that national security threats have evolved today and may now take less conventional forms. Instead of hot war or armed conflict, different threats, such as cyber attacks, hostile information campaigns and even future pandemics, might endanger our lives and livelihoods, equally or even to a greater extent.
In view of that, what are the principles guiding our defence diplomacy efforts? Will we see more agreements to conduct joint military exercises and our SAF training abroad, or for other types of cooperation like the cybersecurity MOU we signed with the US Department of Defence when US Vice President Kamala Harris visited Singapore last year?
Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Indonesia
Mr Kwek Hian Chuan Henry : Mr Chairman, I would like to ask MINDEF about the implications of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with Indonesia for Singapore and for SAF.
The Prime Minister recently visited Indonesia for the Singapore-Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat hosted by Indonesian President Jokowi. Not only was the Retreat significant because it was the first Retreat since the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also successful in that it saw the signing of three sets of agreements that addressed longstanding bilateral issues under the ambit of the Expanded Framework.
I am heartened by the good progress that we have made in advancing our bilateral interests in issues, such as the Flight Information Region, extradition and military training, especially following the long-drawn discussions and negotiations on these issues, which started back in 1995.
One of the three agreements signed was a Joint Statement on the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementation Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian National Defence Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia. What does the DCA with Indonesia mean for Singapore, MINDEF and SAF?
Regional Security Cooperation
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim (Chua Chu Kang) : The recent crisis in Ukraine has thrown up stark reminders to all nation-states, big or small, that cooperation in times of need is critical. Globally, US-China tensions have polarised countries, both in our region and further afield. These have manifested in various geopolitical theatres, including the South China Sea.
Internally, many ASEAN countries are facing challenges domestically, economically and with the current pandemic. A region that is divided and distracted is not in our interest. Singapore should seek to facilitate stronger cooperation among ASEAN countries, given the increasingly complex regional landscape. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the region's security platform to engage in open dialogue and practical cooperation to foster regional stability. ADMM prides itself as being open and inclusive in this regard.
Can the Minister for Defence provide an update on MINDEF's efforts to foster greater cooperation through ADMM? Further, ADMM-Plus consists of eight other countries, including China, Russia and the US. ADMM and ADMM-Plus are the region's security architecture and are meant to contribute to regional peace and stability among all 18 countries. Given the developments in Ukraine, what is the impact on the work and security cooperation of both ADMM and ADMM-Plus?
Environmental Sustainability
Mr Don Wee : Chairman, climate change poses an existential threat to all humanity. The related crises arising from climate change have deep implications for international peace and stability. Singapore is one of the more vulnerable nations due to the rising sea level. We are already experiencing erratic weather patterns which wreak havoc with sudden downpours causing flooding. Changes in weather patterns are also affecting food supplies – a frightening prospect, as we rely heavily on imported food; exporting nations will prioritise their own nations’ needs first.
While Singapore may be limited in how we can contribute to global climate action, we should spare no effort as we have a strong moral obligation and duty.
Would the Ministry share an update on its measures to improve environmental sustainability and reduce carbon emissions within SAF and MINDEF? I urge the Ministry to continue with its systematic and comprehensive approach to sustainability, from reducing food waste to trying out green aviation fuel for RSAF’s fighter jets. I look forward to hearing more about its green initiatives, improved processes and enhanced inspections to prevent wastage, particularly for food and electricity.
The Chairman : Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen.
The Minister for Defence (Dr Ng Eng Hen) : Mr Chairman, thank you for allowing me to reply to the Members' cuts. I will try to answer as many of the questions that they have asked. The others will be replied to by the Senior Ministers of State.
Mr Chairman, I state the obvious when I say that battling COVID-19 has been the central preoccupation of governments and their citizens all over the world in the last two years, including Singapore. If we think about it, very few events have that power and reach. In recent history, I think World War II did, and that shared experience had defined that affected generation. If you compare, COVID-19 is not as devastating as World War II, but many years on, I suspect that it will likely linger in the memories of all those who have lived through it.
But despite the singular challenge of this century, COVID-19, there is no respite, no temporary cessation of other challenges that pose security threats to Singapore, as some Members have observed. My Ministry and SAF have remained very focused on the security environment even as we went into the trenches to join the whole-of-Government in our fight against COVID-19.
The SAF’s core purpose, first and foremost, must remain to protect Singapore from all potential external aggressors. Mr Vikram Nair alluded to this, Mr Dennis Tan, too. And because we are a small country, with less space figuratively and literally to react, we need to recognise these threats early. For Singapore’s survival and well-being, the SAF not only needs to be always prepared, to plan long term and be well-organised, but also nimble to change, if we are to prevent or ward off imminent danger.
Therefore, despite our efforts to fight COVID-19, MINDEF and SAF have continued to plan in earnest so that we build the next generation SAF that is not only capable of meeting today’s security threats, but anticipating tomorrow’s, too. And I think that must be our approach. There will always be the unexpected threats, just like COVID-19. But the better the SAF is structured to deal with the known threats, the more bandwidth it has to deal with the unknown unknowns. I will deal with some of these initiatives later on, which Members have asked for.
But, first, let me put MINDEF’s budget this year in context.
This year, my Ministry will increase our spending relative to the past two years. Mr Shawn Huang asked about this. That increase is due to the resumption of projects, training and exercises which were disrupted by COVID-19 over the past two years. I should underscore that we continued to purchase and acquire new platforms despite COVID-19. But suppliers were also affected, causing delays. For example, deliveries of RSAF’s H225M Medium Lift and CH-47F Heavy Lift helicopters were delayed from end-2020 to March and May 2021, respectively. The delivery of our Invincible-class submarines, initially planned for last year, has also been delayed. For this year and beyond, projects deferred or delayed will resume, as will the acquisition of new platforms.
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Members have asked about training – Mr Don Wee, Mr Desmond Choo, Mr Dennis Tan and Mr Shawn Huang. SAF expects to increase numbers of training, both locally and overseas, to reach pre-COVID-19 levels later this year. Last year, we, indeed, had fewer overseas exercises and with fewer troops. For example, Exercise Forging Sabre in the US, with 800 personnel, Exercise Wallaby in Australia with around 580 personnel, much fewer than pre-COVID-19 levels. At home, NS training has progressively returned to normalcy and in-camp training call-up rates are on track to reach pre-COVID-19 levels this year.
With the planned resumption of both projects and training to pre-COVID-19 levels in the coming financial year, we are projecting an expenditure of $16.3 billion. This translates to an increase of 6.5%, which is expected to be one-off and a catch-up for the reduced spending for FYs 2020 and 2021. COVID-19 resulted in sharp dips and spikes but, over the next five years, MINDEF's budget is expected to keep pace with inflation, or 3% to 4% nominal growth each year, which I have assured this House previously.
The reduction in spending over the last two years did not occur at the expense of readiness. Members have asked about this – Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Dennis Tan. Indeed, SAF was able to operate at a high level of readiness and conduct critical operations amidst the pandemic. Soldiers within units were disciplined and kept to strict health and safety protocols, such as health screening for all recruits and instructors, training in smaller groups where possible, temperature taking, testing, and testing returning NSmen from their In-Camp Trainings (ICTs) every seven days.
Of our MINDEF/SAF personnel, 99.7% are vaccinated and 91% have received their booster shot. And that has helped us keep our infections at bay. I said that we were determined to keep building up the next-generation SAF – Mr Henry Kwek and Mr Desmond Choo asked for updates. Let me provide some details.
The Formidable-class frigates, first commissioned in 2007, are now 15 years old and due for their midlife upgrade. They are our key fighting platforms for maritime strike, anti-air and anti-submarine warfare, but the midlife upgrade, as we do for all platforms, will be more than just addition and alterations, if I can use the construction term. Because each time we do a midlife upgrade, we look at the technology that has evolved, our manpower, the design and, including artificial intelligence, if we can.
So, after the upgrade, the frigates' combat capabilities will increase and be equipped with better combat management and communication systems, weapons systems, along with improved maintenance processes – basically, to use less to achieve more. The next-generation SAF, which Mr Desmond Choo asked about, too, will have more unmanned systems across the three services. The RSAF has acquired the Orbiter 4 Close-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (CR-UAV). And with their smaller size, capable sensors and increased portability, these can be used for a wide range of operations, in peace and combat.
This year, our Navy will deploy the first tranche of Maritime Security Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) to patrol local waters. The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) will also replace its Mine Countermeasure Vessels with a fully unmanned system from 2027 onwards.
We are among the first few navies in the world to operate unmanned maritime systems. These systems were designed and integrated locally by DSO National Laboratories and Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) and RSN. DSO and DSTA are critical enablers.
DSO celebrates its 50th anniversary this year. We are immensely proud of and grateful for the men and women of DSO, who, for the past five decades, have worked hard behind-the-scenes to provide game-changing defence technologies and solutions. They have transformed the SAF into today's modern fighting machine.
Some Members would remember that at last year's Committee of Supply (COS), I spoke about the inauguration of the Headquarters Sense and Strike (HQ SS) and the HQ SS was able to participate for the first time in exercise Forging Sabre late last year. The Army will also operationalise the first Hunter Armoured Battle Group later this month.
With your permission, Mr Chairman, I would like to display an image on the screens.
The Chairman : Please do. [ A slide was shown to hon Members. ]
Dr Ng Eng Hen : The next-generation SAF is taking shape. You can already see its new form now, inchoate, but with greater definition as each year passes. By 2040, the Army, equipped in the next-generation infantry battalions and new armoured tracked carriers and howitzers, will be more manoeuvrable, able to track and strike faster and harder. The Navy, with Multi-Role Combat Vessels, Invincible-class submarines and USVs will be able to see and strike further at sea and in the depths, to better protect our waters and our sea lines of communication.
The next-generation air force, with F-15s, F-35s and the next generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, will be more lethal, versatile and effective to better protect our skies. This next-generation SAF will provide for this and the next generation, our children and theirs, greater confidence in dealing with potential aggressors to fulfil the SAF's core mission.
Many Members have asked how we navigate the increasingly complex geopolitical situation and rivalries. I am afraid no country has a magic formula, no Aladdin's lamp that you can make wishes from. Our philosophy is a simple one. We make friends with all countries and seek no enemies. But we are realists, too, and keen observers of history and events around us, and, especially what happens to small, vulnerable states.
We saw how Kuwait, an oil-rich state, was invaded by Iraq in 1990. We observed how Qatar suffered an air, land and sea blockade imposed by its neighbours in 2017, not so long ago. And at this very moment, we witness Ukrainians deeply troubled as they ponder over their future, balanced on a knife's edge. The unthinkable and unimaginable have occurred. Their cities are under bombardment and with foreign troops; their way of life, their dreams are shattered; their independence and freedom are under peril. Ukraine, with a population of over 40 million, is not a small country. But size and might are relative. For them, Kuwaitis and Qataris, these moments are about life and death, freedom or subjugation.
Indeed, we live by the dictum that the stronger the SAF, the easier it is to make friends and have fewer enemies. No one will defend Singapore as robustly if Singaporeans do not or cannot. But if we are able to build up the kind of SAF by 2040, can we be satisfied collectively, as leaders in the Government and Members of this House, that we have discharged our duties honourably and with satisfaction to our children's generation?
Some here might say, yes, because that kind of SAF is impressive. I think our founding fathers could not have envisaged that we could have come quite this far. It will, certainly, be among the most modern and better-equipped militaries in the region. But my honest answer is "almost there, but not quite", because, as good and as ambitious as the next-generation SAF is, there are some gaps in capabilities, which recent events and developments have warned us against.
And I am glad that Members of this House have warned us, too – Mr Vikram Nair, Mr Shawn Huang and Mr Patrick Tay. And I am talking primarily about threats in the digital domain. To complete that SAF 2040, we will need a fourth service to complement the existing three services. I will spend some time elaborating on this significant move as the reasons are important.
Let us characterise the digital threat, first, in broad general terms, to know what countries, including Singapore, are up against. The digital terrain has become as real as the land, air and sea domains for which we have raised the Army, Air Force and Navy. I think no one here doubts that. In fact, some would argue that, for the next generations, the digital domain is the dominant domain. So much so that a new word "metaverse" has been coined for that virtual universe.
Threats that emanate in the digital domain can readily impact events in a real physical world. That divide between virtual and physical, in security terms, is a false one as the two are, in fact, intricately interwoven. Again, I do not think anyone here would gainsay this. We already have real-life examples that exemplify this truth and Members have quoted it: fuel shortages across the US East Coast last May due to ransomware attacks on the Colonial Pipeline; Iranians could not top up their gas and petrol stations last October because the payment systems were hacked. There have also been clear examples of countries or non-state entities, like terrorist groups, that use a combination of attacks through both the digital and physical domains.
I first spoke about this type of hybrid warfare seven years ago in my 2015 COS speech, but, over the past few years, there have been many more examples of this type of campaigns. Even now, we are witnessing with our own eyes that kind of campaign in Ukraine. The Financial Times reported it, with the headline: "Ukraine shores up cyber defences" and this was on 14 February, so quite recent. Let me give Members some relevant quotes which provide vividly what to expect in this kind of attack: " The country has been under constant attack since 2014, cyber-espionage damage to databases and servers, disruption to powers and communications, and disinformation are all part of the playbook. The Ukraine government and independent experts expect hostile cyber activity to increase, in an effort to destabilise the country before or during any physical attack".
Another quote: "There are bound to have been many, many more attacks over the years that we do not know about and that have left malware embedded in systems ready to be activated" – this was a quote from Prof VS Subrahmaniam, who is a professor of Computer Science at Northwestern University in the US. He adds: "It is a bit like a bomb being planted in your house, is benign until someone sets it off". Another quote: "Ukraine meanwhile suffers from a deficit of public sector cyber security expertise, weak regulation, limited response capabilities and a lack of coordination between various agencies".
I think all of the Members would agree with me here that we can learn from this unfortunate situation. And far better to learn and adjust now, because if we wait and change only after an attack on ourselves, the cost is going to be very high. When we look at all these incidents in the digital domain, what then should our response be? Fortunately, our intelligence sources have not identified such orchestrated attempts to subvert or subjugate Singapore using hybrid means.
But, of course, that does not mean that the threat will never come. So, I think, we best prepare now with a longer runway. And for SAF, a clear-cut response is a fourth service. Internally, over the past decade, MINDEF/SAF have progressively built up what we call the C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.
We built up that community to enhance the resilience of our networks and systems. We set up the Defence Cyber Organisation (DCO) in 2017, to coordinate cyber security across the defence sector, and Members of Parliament have filed questions and I have given updates. And some of you have asked for updates, even at this COS.
The C4I community and its predecessors, the Military Intelligence Organisation and Joint C4, have been supporting elements to the three other services for over 20 years. However, the demands and direct responsibilities on the intelligence community for both threats in the digital and physical world have risen sharply. If we take terrorism, for example, the role of the C4I community is not only supportive but a direct responsibility.
Members would remember that when 9/11 occurred, it was characterised as a failure in intelligence. Shortly thereafter, Members might recall that decisive actions by ISD, based on good intelligence, foiled a Jemaah Islamiyah plot to launch terrorist attacks in Singapore.
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The formation of a new service for the C4I community will greatly facilitate their mission focus, sharpen direct responsibility and accountability, and capability development. The human resource is particularly important for the intelligence services and having a Service status, just like Army, Navy and Air Force, will enhance recruitment and career prospects considerably.
The evolution of the C4I community into a new fourth service will integrate and expand our capabilities in the digital domain. But we will need more than that to deal effectively with digital threats from external aggressors that we expect will grow in number, sophistication and organisation. To achieve this, we will need not only an intelligence force but a dedicated digital force. The current DCO is building up such a force but it is insufficient for the SAF’s expanding needs and mandate. Figuratively, if the digital force is now a battalion force, we actually need a few brigades, perhaps even a Division-size force.
MINDEF and SAF have been considering these changes for some time now, exploring various options to better prepare for threats in the digital domain. Our conclusion is that a new fourth service – the Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS – best encapsulates this fourth arm of the SAF.
DIS should not and cannot be just like the Army, Air Force and Navy, with similar troops operating in the digital domain instead of the physical domain. The nature of the digital domain and the threats therein require different skillsets, mindsets – what we call Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. I think that is intuitive to most.
SAF envisages that the type of soldiers you recruit for DIS, their training, force structure will be different. But some traits must be maintained for soldiers across the four services – the adherence to SAF core values, operational mindset, resilience that lead to mission success and, above all, a commitment to the shared mission to enhance Singapore’s security and peace.
Technology, especially related to IT and communications, will play a big role for DIS. But it will also require a force with specialisations not only in core IT areas and communications, but in diverse areas, including data science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology and geography, that will help them understand the motivation and means by which orchestrated state and non-state groups aim to harm Singapore.
The addition of this fourth service, the DIS, will allow SAF to better train and fight as a networked, integrated and expanded force to deal with the spectrum of threats that we know exist today, but also the digital domain that we know will increase in the future. Other countries have also come to the same conclusion and added a digital force to their tri-services. Germany, for example, has established the Cyber and Information Domain Service, consolidating its Communication and Information Systems Command and Geo-information Centre.
There are many procedures and processes to undertake to set up this fourth service, DIS. Notwithstanding this, we expect to set it up by the last quarter of this year.
NSmen form the backbone of the SAF, on land, air and sea and, in the future, also our digital domain. Whatever our plans, ultimately, it is the quality and commitment of our NSmen that will determine whether SAF can succeed.
This year marks the 55th anniversary of NS and, as we have previously done, we will have a number of events to recognise their contributions. We will put out more details in the coming months.
But we also want to make improvements to our NS system. These new initiatives are from the NS Review Committee, which some Members have asked about, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary (Administration) of MINDEF and the Chief of Army. Three key changes are proposed.
First, to optimise our precious manpower resource, we will now use functional assessments as part of the pre-enlistment medical screening. I think Mr Lim Biow Chuan and Mr Mohd Fahmi Aliman asked about this. What are functional assessments? Compared to general physical assessments, functional assessments are a more precise gauge of whether the Servicemen can perform specific vocations. At the same time, we have redesigned 1,000 jobs so that more Servicemen can contribute in areas they were not previously eligible for.
Second, Make-Up Pay. And this has been a longstanding issue. I am happy to announce that better data management across Government services, agencies will now allow claims of Make-Up Pay to be streamlined and, yes, the magic word, automated. Streamlined and automated. There will be a default base NS pay which NSmen can claim for In-Camp Training. This will be especially useful for those in informal employment and training. The base NS pay is set at $1,600 per month and prorated for the duration of NS call-ups. Over 100,000 NSmen and 25,000 employers will benefit from the automated Make-Up Pay claims and base NS Pay.
Third, we will increase the NS HOME awards, with higher cash components – an extra $2,000 in cash to each National Serviceman.
Senior Minister of State Heng Chee How will provide more details on these changes, as well as several others.
This four-service Next Gen SAF, with committed and capable NSmen, will better position Singapore to deal with both conventional and emerging threats. Our deterrence depends on a strong Next Gen SAF. That is the main prong. But another prong is good relations, which many Members have talked about, particularly defence relations, with like-minded partners.
Mr Ang Wei Neng and Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked about our approach. As a small country, Singapore needs as many friends as we can have. Having a strong network of defence partners has allowed us to build up our defence capabilities, train overseas and cooperate on strategic issues critical to our security.
In the past year, we maintained high-level defence engagements. For example, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made his introductory visit to Singapore in July and we concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Concerning Cooperation in Cyberspace with the US Department of Defense in August. With China, I met Minister for National Defense General Wei Fenghe virtually in June. The RSN held joint naval exercises with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army via a “contactless” modality twice last year.
With India, we signed an MOU in January for the SAF to conduct weapon firings in India’s Chandipur Integrated Test Range. We renewed the Singapore-Vietnam Defence Cooperation Agreement in February. We have also concluded new defence cooperation agreements with a few Baltic States, to institutionalise our professional exchanges. This is interesting. We decided that the Baltic States were of interest and this happened before Ukraine. Now, we are even more interested. So, I think that cooperation will bear more fruit.
Closer to home, we conducted Exercise Safkar Indopura with the Indonesian Army in November, the first physical exercise between our Army and a foreign counterpart. In January, Indonesian Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto and I signed a Joint Statement on our agreement to bring into force the 2007 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and its Implementing Arrangement between SAF and the Indonesian Armed Forces for the Military Training Area in Indonesia.
Mr Henry Kwek asked what the implication of this is. The DCA will strengthen the strategic relationship between our defence establishments and promote closer interaction and cooperation between our armed forces.
Mr Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim asked about our approach to ADMM-Plus and ADMM. It is, indeed, the de facto multilateral defence grouping in Asia, and we have taken the lead on tackling threats in the cyber and information domains by establishing the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence, which now provides monthly reports for all ASEAN Member States. Similarly, SAF’s Counter Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF) has been in operation since 2020 and 11 foreign liaison officers are stationed there. The CTIF produces timely and actionable counter-terrorism intelligence.
I am also pleased that, this year, the Shangri-La Dialogue will resume in June physically, after a two-year hiatus.
Mr Chairman, let me also update Members on MINDEF/SAF’s major green initiatives, which Mr Don Wee has asked about, which I announced at the last COS, to reduce the growth of overall emissions by two-thirds by 2030.
The SAF Sustainability Office, led by SAF’s Chief of Staff-Joint Staff, has convened an external panel comprising experts to provide insights on implementation plans to meet our sustainability targets.
Members have asked for updates, let me give some. By the end of this year, about a quarter of SAF camps will have solar panels installed to deliver 20 megawatt peak of electricity. This is equivalent to the consumption of around 5,000 4-room households. By 2025, it will jump from a quarter to two-thirds of our camps generating 50 megawatt peak of electricity. Smart Metering Systems will also be installed to track electricity and water consumption automatically, starting with Jurong Camp, Paya Lebar Airbase and Changi Naval Base.
RSAF has commenced trials for the use of green fuel for its F-16 Fighting Falcons. These efforts and others will help us meet our emission targets by 2030.
I am thankful that Members of this House have supported our budget each year. On MINDEF and SAF’s part, our responsibility is to spend prudently and effectively to build a strong national defence, as I have detailed.
But it is gratifying to me, and to Members here, too, that SAF is a national asset to deploy in situations like the current COVID-19 pandemic. When Singapore experienced a resurgence of cases due to the Delta and Omicron variants, MINDEF and SAF personnel were called upon to assist MOH to provide operations planning capabilities, staff contact tracing, call centres or to man emergency departments. SAF also stood up the Home Recovery Task Group to better manage the home recovery programme for patients, and NSmen also helped as Home Vaccination Teams and Mobile Vaccination Teams. Our defence scientists and engineers contributed a variety of support systems.
Members have asked how we helped overseas. And, indeed, we did, beyond Singapore’s shores. Last year, SAF’s Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre coordinated the transfer of medical equipment and supplies to regional countries worst hit by COVID-19, including the shipment of over 500 tonnes of oxygen at Indonesia’s request as part of the "Oxygen Shuttle" programme.
Mr Chairman, let me thank Members of this House for their steadfast commitment and support for a robust national defence through a strong SAF. This year, particularly because of the events in Ukraine, I think Singaporeans need less convincing that it is our collective responsibility to keep Singapore safe and secure for ourselves and successive generations. So, we were pleasantly pleased that others were saying the right things on behalf of MINDEF and SAF, and of their own convictions, of course.
But I think salutary lessons have sunk in and, indeed, some Singaporeans have sent me emails. Let me just quote from two of them.
One is from Mr Tee KH: “I used to take my in-camp training as a ‘holiday’ camp till I realised how important it is to defend Singapore when Iraq invaded tiny Kuwait. Now a retiree and from the Merdeka Generation, I reminded my son who is serving NS to take his training seriously. The greater the force of dutiful citizens who are actively serving their country, defending the weak, fighting for freedom and doing what is right, the better chance that wars will end quickly and the less chance wars will even begin.”
The second is from Mr Cheng CF: “If Singaporeans don’t defend our country, nobody will help us. I am 67, a retired NSman. But as long as I am fit, I will not hesitate to don my uniform again to help my fellow Singaporeans to defend our country. This is my country, my home and soil.”
As long as we have Singaporeans who share the deep resolve and conviction that Mr Tee and Mr Cheng shared, then, I say, our future remains secure. [ Applause. ]