書面答覆 · 2026-10-06 · 屆國會 15

新加坡數字系統應對代理式 AI 韌性評估

李乃怡(Valerie Lee)、安迪(Saktiandi Supaat)、莫哈默法理(Fadli Fawzi)等議員就新加坡 AI 安全院的獨立測試能力、新加坡對前沿 AI 模型管控國際倡議的後續行動,以及公共部門代理式 AI 的安全防護措施,向數碼發展及新聞部部長楊莉明(Josephine Teo)提問。楊莉明答覆說,政府採取基於風險、多層次的治理方式,AI 安全院正建設技術能力評估先進 AI 系統,並確認目前沒有機構收到涉及無人監督 AI 代理的網路攻擊報告。

為什麼重要

楊莉明一併答覆七名議員:政府目前不要求前沿模型部署前向政府開放,改與前沿實驗室建立資訊共享,由新加坡 AI 安全研究所自建評測能力;至今無機構報告由無人監督 AI 代理發起的網路攻擊

關鍵要點

  • • IMDA 推出《代理式 AI 治理框架》和《LLM 應用測試入門工具包》,並通過全球 AI 保障沙盒測試生成式和代理式 AI 的安全防護。
  • • 新加坡 AI 安全院(AISI)正建設技術能力,評估先進 AI 系統並開發測試與保障方法。
  • • 截至目前,沒有任何政府機構收到涉及無人監督 AI 代理的網路攻擊報告。
  • • 新加坡已認可國際社會關於加強前沿 AI 模型安全保障的呼籲,並由國家 AI 理事會提供戰略方向。
  • • AISI 是“國際先進 AI 測量、評估與科學網路”創始成員,自 2025 年起召集全球專家並制定了《新加坡全球 AI 安全研究優先事項共識》。
政府立場

政府堅持基於風險、分層管理的治理思路,對高風險應用將繼續研究是否需要新規定。但政府未承諾把 AI 安全院的評估結果作為前沿 AI 系統部署的強制門檻,也不要求前沿 AI 開發商必須開放模型訪問許可權。

質詢立場

議員們擔心代理式 AI 失控、逃離管控的風險,質疑公共部門現有防護措施及新加坡 AI 安全院的能力是否足以應對前沿 AI 帶來的安全乃至生存風險。

政策訊號

這表明新加坡在前沿 AI 治理上採取審慎漸進的路線,優先構建技術評估能力和國際合作網路,而非對前沿 AI 開發商施加強制性訪問或監管要求。

“關於莫哈默法理議員的提問,到目前為止,還沒有任何機構收到過涉及無人監督 AI 代理的網路攻擊報告。”

參與人員 (8)

完整譯文(中文)

Hansard 原始記錄

45 李乃怡女士詢問數碼發展及新聞部長:(a) 新加坡 AI 安全研究所目前擁有什麼獨立測試和評估能力;(b) 這些能力與其他主要人工智慧安全研究所的能力如何比較;以及 (c) 政府在未來兩年內對該研究所有什麼具體的交付成果和成果預期,包括其評估是否會影響新加坡前沿人工智慧系統的部署。

49 安迪詢問數碼發展及新聞部長:(a) 新加坡認可國際呼籲管制前沿人工智慧模型後,將採取什麼後續步驟;(b) 考慮到新加坡的認可,如何改進國家人工智慧戰略 2.0 以及吸引人工智慧企業和促進人工智慧採用的舉措;以及 (c) 新加坡 AI 安全研究所的評估和測試如何支援這些努力。

50 莫哈默法理詢問數碼發展及新聞部長:(a) 國家人工智慧理事會是否以及如何評估了最近業界關於人工智慧滅絕風險的警告;以及 (b) 理事會本身是否已制定戰略或採取措施緩解人工智慧安全和對齊風險。

51 莫哈默法理鑑於最近發生的人工智慧代理逃脫控制的事件,詢問數碼發展及新聞部長:(a) 公共服務使用代理人工智慧的現有保護措施是否足夠穩健以防範漏洞;以及 (b) 是否有任何涉及無監督代理人工智慧的網路攻擊已報告給任何政府機構。

楊莉明女士:我的回應將涵蓋李乃怡女士、陳以君博士、任梓銘先生和莫哈默法理先生在今天議程檔案中提出的問題,以及葉漢榮先生、朱佩玲博士和安迪先生為隨後會議提出的相關問題。如果議員對回應感到滿意,他們可能希望在此交流後撤回問題。「請參閱《確保在新加坡部署的前沿人工智慧模型的安全,以及建立嚴重人工智慧事件的追蹤和報告框架》,官方記錄,2026 年 10 月 7 日,第 96 卷,第 39 期,口頭答問部分。」

新加坡對人工智慧(AI)的方法一直是在管理風險的同時促進創新。但隨著人工智慧系統變得更有能力和自主性,風險也在不斷演變。

這些系統可能以意外的方式行動,被惡意行為者操縱或與其他系統有意外的相互作用。能力也在迅速發展,有時比政府和外部評估者能夠充分評估的速度還要快。因此我們需要基於風險的多層次方法。

根據風險設定限制。首先,在部署人工智慧時,我們必須根據風險校準限制。我們應該考慮所涉及資料和系統的敏感性、給予人工智慧系統的自主程度以及任何潛在傷害的嚴重程度和可補救性。潛在傷害越大,保護措施應該越強。

這就是我們在公共服務中部署人工智慧代理的方式。我們考慮代理可以訪問什麼系統和資料,允許採取什麼行動,以及意外或未經授權行動的後果。這些保護措施由政策和治理流程補充,以確保適當的監督和問責。

對於更廣泛的經濟,資訊通訊媒體發展局(IMDA)的《代理人工智慧模型治理框架》和《基於LLM應用的測試入門工具包》提供了管理風險和維持有意義的人類問責的指導。此外,全球人工智慧保證沙箱便於對生成和代理人工智慧風險的現實世界測試,包括其保護措施的穩健性。

對於基本服務和其他高風險應用,需要更強的保護措施。這可能包括對風險進行更嚴格的測試、獨立可驗證的證據表明保護措施有效、更嚴格的部署控制或更嚴格的監管監督。政府將繼續研究對新要求的必要性,特別是在高風險應用中。

加強我們對意外行動和濫用的防護。其次,我們必須加強對意外人工智慧行動和濫用的防護。我們不能僅僅依靠告訴人工智慧代理做什麼。我們還必須故意限制他們能夠訪問和做什麼,進行適當的測試套件,保持適當的人類監督,監控其行為,如果出現問題則限制後果。

同時,我們必須假定惡意行為者將使用人工智慧以更便宜、更快和更大規模地造成傷害。鑑於數字服務在我們的經濟和社會中的深度嵌入,我們必須不斷加強我們的網路安全,並有效利用人工智慧進行網路防禦。網路安全域性(CSA)和政府科技局(GovTech)正在使用人工智慧加強政府系統和關鍵資訊基礎設施的安全,包括識別漏洞和更快地檢測潛在威脅。網路安全域性(CSA)還加強了關鍵資訊基礎設施運營商的網路安全要求,共享了關於主動威脅的情報以幫助他們採取預防措施,併發布了實用指導以幫助組織加強網路防禦和保護人工智慧系統。

檢測風險和提早應對。第三,我們需要更強的能力來識別部署前後的風險。

新加坡 AI 安全研究所(AISI)正在建立技術能力來評估先進的人工智慧系統,並開發實際的測試和保證方法。我們將專注於與新加坡需求相關的能力,同時與研究人員、行業和海外對應機構合作,以利用他們的專業知識和發現。

在部署人工智慧系統後,我們必須監控其行為,並從發生的事件和險些事件中學習。例如,在網路安全中,通過網路安全域性(CSA)、政府科技局(GovTech)和部門負責人建立了既定的渠道,其中應報告網路安全事件,包括涉及人工智慧的事件。我們正在研究如何更好地利用這些現有渠道來識別涉及人工智慧的事件,支援補救和改進保護措施,以及是否需要進一步的協調或報告安排。

關於莫哈默法理先生的問題,到目前為止,沒有任何機構收到涉及無監督人工智慧代理的對其系統的網路攻擊報告。我們將繼續監控發展,包括海外事件,並應用相關經驗教訓以加強我們的保護措施和報告安排。

與國際和行業夥伴合作。第四,我們繼續與國際和行業夥伴合作。前沿模型在國際上開發和部署,沒有任何單一國家或公司能夠充分獨立評估或管理風險。這就是新加坡最近認可國際呼籲對前沿人工智慧加強保護措施的原因。

一些涉及流氓人工智慧的情景設想災難性甚至滅絕級別的風險。我們不會忽視這些風險。我們也不假設每個情景都會實現。因此,我們的方法是密切監控證據,建立理解先進人工智慧系統所需的技術能力,並在國際上開展措施以解決嚴重風險,隨著證據的發展。這項工作是我們更廣泛的國家人工智慧風險方法的一部分。國家人工智慧理事會提供戰略方向,同時有關機構開發和實施必要的措施。我們將繼續調整我們的保護措施,隨著人工智慧能力和風險證據的發展而進行。

我們還與前沿人工智慧開發人員接觸,以獲取資訊和訪問他們的模型,如適當的話。我們目前不將其作為要求,因為僅對模型的訪問本身不一定能提供風險的完整圖景。如果剛性要求導致公司限制其合作或資訊共享,甚至可能適得其反。因此,我們的偏好是與前沿人工智慧實驗室建立強大的合作關係,這鼓勵實質性和及時的資訊共享。

同時,我們繼續建立自己的技術能力,並利用更廣泛的來源來識別與新加坡相關的風險。這包括開發人員自己的評估和測試、獨立研究和評估,以及其他人工智慧安全研究所和國際夥伴的工作。通過利用這些不同的來源,而不是依賴任何單一形式的訪問或評估,我們可以對新興風險及其所需的保護措施發展更全面的理解。

我們已加強與這些國際對應機構接觸的努力。我們的新加坡 AI 安全研究所(AISI)是《國際先進人工智慧測量、評估和科學網路》的創始成員。自 2025 年以來,我們通過《國際人工智慧安全科學交流》召集了全球專家,並制定了《新加坡全球人工智慧安全研究優先事項共識》。在過去兩年中,我們還主辦了一些世界上最重要的科學會議。這些有助於在研究人員、政府和公司之間建立關於人工智慧安全科學中最重要差距的國際對齊,建立網路和協調這項重要工作的共同基礎。

總之,隨著人工智慧越來越能夠代表我們行動,我們必須相應地引入更強大的保護措施。我們必須清楚地說明允許它做什麼,確保人類在關鍵地方保持控制和問責,並繼續加強我們理解新興風險和在問題發生時做出反應的能力。這將有助於建立對人工智慧的信任,作為一項服務公眾利益的技術。

英文原文

SPRS Hansard 原始記錄 · 抓取日期:2026-10-21

45 Ms Valerie Lee asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) what independent testing and evaluation capabilities the Singapore AI Safety Institute currently possesses; (b) how these compare with those of other leading AI Safety Institutes; and (c) what concrete deliverables and outcomes the Government expects from the Institute over the next two years, including whether its evaluations will influence the deployment of frontier AI systems in Singapore.

49 Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) what steps will follow after Singapore's endorsement of the international call for control of frontier AI models; (b) how can the National AI Strategy 2.0 and initiatives to attract AI enterprises and encourage adoption of AI be refined in light of Singapore's endorsement; and (c) how can the Singapore AI Safety Institute's evaluation and testing support these efforts.

50 Mr Fadli Fawzi asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) whether and how the National AI Council has assessed recent industry warnings on the extinction risks from AI; and (b) whether the Council itself has developed a strategy or adopted measures to mitigate AI safety and alignment risks.

51 Mr Fadli Fawzi asked the Minister for Digital Development and Information in light of recent incidents of AI agents escaping containment (a) whether existing safeguards for agentic AI use by the Public Service are sufficiently robust to guard against breaches; and (b) whether any cyber-attacks involving unsupervised agentic AI have been reported to any Government agency.

Mrs Josephine Teo : My response will cover the questions raised by Ms Valerie Lee, Dr Charlene Chen, Mr Alex Yam and Mr Fadli Fawzi in today's Order Paper, and the related questions filed by Mr Yip Hon Weng, Dr Choo Pei Ling and Mr Saktiandi Supaat for subsequent Sittings. If the Members are satisfied with the response, they may wish to withdraw their questions after this exchange. [ Please refer to " Ensuring Safety of Frontier AI Models Deployed in Singapore, and Setting Up Framework for Tracking and Reporting Serious AI Incidents ", Official Report, 7 October 2026, Vol 96, Issue 39, Oral Answers to Questions section. ]

Singapore's approach to artificial intelligence (AI) has always been to enable innovation while managing the risks. But the risks are evolving as AI systems become more capable and autonomous.

Such systems may act in unintended ways, be manipulated by malicious actors or have unexpected interactions with other systems. Capabilities are also advancing rapidly, sometimes faster than governments and external evaluators can fully assess. We therefore need a risk-based and multi-layered approach.

Set limits based on risk. First, in deploying AI, we must calibrate limits according to risk. We should consider the sensitivity of the data and systems involved, the degree of autonomy given to the AI system and the severity and remediability of any potential harm. The greater the potential harm, the stronger the safeguards should be.

This is how we approach the deployment of AI agents within the Public Service. We consider what systems and data an agent can access, what actions it is allowed to take, and the consequences of unintended or unauthorised actions. These safeguards are complemented by policies and governance processes to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability.

For the broader economy, the Infocomm Media Development Authority's (IMDA's) Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI and Starter Kit for Testing LLM-Based Applications provide guidance on managing risks and maintaining meaningful human accountability. In addition, the Global AI Assurance Sandbox facilitates the real-world testing of risks of generative and agentic AI, including the robustness of their safeguards.

For essential services and other higher-risk applications, stronger safeguards are necessary. This could include more rigorous testing for risks, independently verifiable evidence that safeguards are effective, tighter deployment controls or tighter regulatory oversight. The Government will continue to study the need for new requirements especially in high-risk uses.

Strengthening our defences against unintended actions and misuse. Second, we must strengthen our defences against unintended AI actions and misuse. We cannot rely on simply telling AI agents what to do. We must also deliberately limit what they can access and do, conduct appropriate test suites, retain appropriate human oversight, monitor their behaviour and contain the consequences if something goes wrong.

At the same time, we must presume that malicious actors will use AI to cause harm more cheaply, quickly and at scale. Given how deeply digital services are embedded across our economy and society, we must continually strengthen our cybersecurity and also make effective use of AI for cyber defence. The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA) and the Government Technology Agency of Singapore (GovTech) are using AI to strengthen the security of Government systems and critical information infrastructure, including to identify vulnerabilities and detect potential threats more quickly. CSA has also strengthened cybersecurity requirements for critical information infrastructure operators, shared intelligence on active threats to help them take preemptive action and issued practical guidance to help organisations strengthen their cyber defences and secure AI systems.

Detecting risks and responding early. Third, we need stronger capabilities to identify risks both before and after deployment.

The Singapore AI Safety Institute (AISI) is building technical capabilities to evaluate advanced AI systems and develop practical methods for testing and assurance. We will focus on capabilities relevant to Singapore's needs, while working with researchers, industry and overseas counterparts to draw on their expertise and findings.

After AI systems are deployed, we must monitor their behaviours and learn from incidents and near-misses when they occur. In cybersecurity, for example, there are established channels through CSA, GovTech and the sector leads, where cybersecurity incidents should be reported, including those that involve AI. We are looking into how these existing channels can be better leveraged to identify incidents involving AI, support remediation and improve safeguards, and whether further coordination or reporting arrangements are needed.

To the question by Mr Fadli Fawzi, no agency has received a report of a cyber attack against its systems involving an unsupervised AI agent so far. We will continue to monitor developments, including incidents overseas, and apply relevant lessons to strengthen our safeguards and reporting arrangements.

Working with international and industry partners. Fourth, we continue to work with international and industry partners. Frontier models are developed and deployed internationally, and no single country or company can fully assess or manage the risks on its own. This is why Singapore recently endorsed the international call for stronger safeguards around frontier AI.

Some scenarios involving rogue AI envisage catastrophic or even extinction-level risks. We do not dismiss these risks. Neither do we assume that every scenario will materialise. Our approach is therefore to monitor the evidence closely, build the technical capabilities needed to understand advanced AI systems and work internationally on measures to address severe risks as the evidence develops. This work is part of our broader national approach to AI risk. The National AI Council provides strategic direction while the relevant agencies develop and implement the necessary measures. We will continue to adjust our safeguards as AI capabilities and the evidence on risks evolve.

We also engage frontier AI developers to obtain information and access to their models where appropriate. We currently do not make this a requirement because access to a model by itself does not necessarily give a complete picture of the risks. A rigid requirement could even be counterproductive if it leads companies to limit their cooperation or information-sharing. Our preference is therefore to build strong collaborative relationships with frontier AI labs that encourage substantive and timely information-sharing.

At the same time, we continue to build our own technical capabilities and draw on a wider range of sources to identify risks of relevance to Singapore. This includes the developers' own assessments and testing, independent research and evaluations, as well as the work of other AI safety institutes and international partners. By drawing on these different sources, rather than relying on any single form of access or assessment, we can develop a more comprehensive understanding of emerging risks and the safeguards needed to address them.

We have stepped up efforts to engage these international counterparts. Our AISI was a founding member of the International Network of Advanced AI Measurement, Evaluation and Science. Since 2025, we have convened global experts through the International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety and developed the Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities. We have also hosted some of the world's most significant scientific conferences over the last two years. These have helped build international alignment on the most important gaps in AI safety science between researchers, governments and companies, creating networks and a common basis to coordinate this important work.

In conclusion, as AI becomes more capable of acting on our behalf, we must correspondingly introduce more robust safeguards. We must be clear about what it is allowed to do, ensure that humans remain in control and accountable where it matters and continue strengthening our ability to understand emerging risks and respond when problems occur. This will help build trust in AI as a technology that serves the public good.

引用此條

新加坡 AI 觀察. 新加坡數字系統應對代理式 AI 韌性評估. 檢索日期 2026-10-21, https://sgai.md/zh-tw/debates/written-answer-na-25101/

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